Concept
Common Applications
Limited admissibility
Common Applications
Rule 105 supplies one template for every setting in this section. When the court admits evidence that is admissible against a party or for a purpose, but not against another party or for another purpose, it must, on timely request, restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.1 The earlier sections took that sentence apart clause by clause: the two kinds of limits, the request that triggers the duty, the wording of a good instruction, the role of Rule 403 in deciding whether an instruction suffices, and the constitutional exception when a codefendant's confession names the accused. This section watches the rule work in the settings that come up again and again, because those are the settings trial judges face and examiners test.
Each setting has three parts. A proper inference comes in, because the evidence is relevant and admissible for some purpose or against some party. A forbidden inference is fenced off, because another rule bars the evidence for a different purpose or against a different party. And on request, the court tells the jurors where the line falls. Only the source of the prohibition changes from one setting to the next, so a fact pattern that looks new usually turns out to be the old structure with a different rule supplying the forbidden inference. Seen that way, every limited-use problem yields to the same three questions: what the jury may do with the item, what it may not do, and whether anyone asked for the limit.
Rule 403 stands behind each pattern. A judge who doubts that an instruction can hold the jurors to the permitted path may exclude the item; a judge who expects the instruction to work admits and confines it, which is the usual result. The applications below therefore turn on two linked questions: does the evidence have a legitimate use worth preserving, and can an instruction realistically guard against the illegitimate one? The first setting, other-acts evidence, puts the second question in its sharpest form.
Other-Acts Evidence
Rule 404(b) is the clearest reason Rule 105 exists. It permits evidence of another crime, wrong, or act unless the sole purpose of the offer is to show propensity, that is, to prove character in order to show that the person acted in accordance with it on a particular occasion.2 The same acts are admissible for other purposes, among them motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, and absence of mistake or lack of accident, and that list is illustrative, not exhaustive.3 The proponent must specifically identify the particular purpose for which the evidence is relevant.4 An other act therefore carries a permitted inference and a forbidden one at the same time, which is the structure Rule 105 addresses.
The instruction matters more here than in most settings, because the two inferences start from one fact and resist separation. When the other act resembles the charged crime, its probative value rises and so does its prejudice; the two often vary directly.5 A juror who learns that the accused once struck a patron with a wineglass cannot easily treat that fact as bearing on state of mind without also thinking of the accused as a violent man. Rule 403 therefore counts the probable effectiveness of a limiting instruction in the balance,6 and the instruction itself directs the jurors to consider the evidence only for the purpose for which the court admitted it.7
Many courts follow a four-part process drawn from Huddleston v. United States: the judge decides whether the evidence is offered for a proper purpose, whether it is relevant for that purpose, whether its probative worth is outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice, and, on request, gives a limiting instruction.8 Run in order, the first three steps decide whether the evidence comes in at all, and only the fourth is Rule 105's own work.
The instruction works twice in that sequence. Its probable effectiveness is an input to the Rule 403 balance at step three, and it is the remedy after admission at step four. A court that doubts the instruction can hold the line, because the other act tracks the charged offense so closely that the propensity inference overwhelms it, may exclude at step three and never reach step four.
The standard illustration shows the process. Don, charged with assault after a glass in his hand broke against Vince's mouth, testifies that he jumped to avoid a patron pushing through a crowded bar and that the glass struck Vince by accident. In rebuttal, the prosecution calls Coach Jones, who saw Don in the same bar a month earlier strike another patron with a clenched wineglass, causing bloody injuries, clearly on purpose. The earlier blow bears on whether this one was an accident and on Don's intent, a proper purpose, even though it also invites the inference that Don is a violent man.13 A court that admits the evidence after the Rule 403 balance, counting the probable effectiveness of an instruction,14 should, on request, tell the jurors to use it on intent and accident alone and not as proof that Don is violent or guilty because he is.
Beechum shows the instruction at work in a reported case. The Fifth Circuit regarded the credit card evidence offered on intent as a context in which limiting instructions are of substantial efficacy.15 It held that the trial judge had adequately admonished the jury to consider that evidence solely on the issue of Beechum's intent.16
The structure is not confined to criminal cases. Prior dangerous conduct, or a reputation for it, offered to show that a defendant negligently entrusted a dangerous instrumentality or position to another person does not rest on propensity reasoning, and it is often admissible.17 Its relevance depends on what the defendant knew or should have known about that conduct or reputation.18 If the evidence comes in against the entrusting defendant but not against the person entrusted, Rule 105 entitles the second party, on timely request, to an instruction confining it.19
Two procedural features complete the picture. In a criminal case the prosecutor must give reasonable notice of other-act evidence so that the defendant has a fair opportunity to meet it, must state the permitted purpose and the reasoning that supports it, and must do so in writing before trial unless the court, for good cause, excuses the lack of notice.20 That warning also gives the defense time to decide, before the evidence arrives, whether it wants an instruction. Rule 105 still runs on request: counsel often refrain from asking in order to avoid emphasizing damaging evidence, and absent plain error, a failure to request an instruction precludes raising the question on appeal. The court may on its own initiative give an instruction, or first ask whether counsel wants one, when it believes an instruction is needed to avoid plain error.21
A common mistake is to treat every bad act mentioned at a criminal trial as Rule 404(b) evidence. Direct evidence of the charged offense falls outside the rule, and so do acts closely linked in time and space to the criminal event that complete the story, fill a chronological or conceptual void, or blend with and explain the circumstances of the charged offense.22 For such intrinsic evidence, the notice requirement does not apply, and a limiting instruction is not appropriate.23 The reason follows from the instruction's function. It fences the forbidden inference of a separate act away from the permitted one, and an act that belongs to the charged episode leaves nothing separate to fence off.
What separates the pistol blow from the wineglass attack is whether the act belongs to the charged event or stands apart from it. The wineglass attack a month earlier was a separate episode, and the charged assault can be told in full without it. The prosecution must therefore offer it for a stated purpose under Rule 404(b), give pretrial notice, and accept a limiting instruction when the defense asks for one.
Impeachment Uses
Impeachment shows Rule 105's logic in its plainest form, because the item is admitted for one purpose only: to attack or support a witness's credibility.25 Impeaching proof is competent on whether to believe the witness and incompetent as proof of the underlying facts it may seem to establish. Courts admit a great deal of it anyway, because little proof would be admissible if its relevance or impact had to match its competency exactly, and the party who objects to the spillover must content itself with a limiting instruction.26 The danger is a slide in the jurors' minds from doubting the witness to believing the opposite of the testimony, or to punishing a party for a record that has nothing to do with the claim. Each device below carries that danger in a different form, and each raises the same questions: what the jury may do with the item, what it may not, and what the instruction must say.
A prior conviction used to impeach goes to credibility only. The cautionary instruction fits at two moments: immediately when the conviction comes out, and again when the judge charges the jury on the law at the close of the case.27 The first sets the limit while the item is fresh, and the second reaches the jurors as they deliberate. Whether a given conviction may be used at all is a Rule 609 question treated elsewhere; the concern here is the instruction once the court lets the conviction in.
The testifying accused presents the hardest version of the problem. In deciding whether to admit a prior conviction, the judge may weigh how similar it is to the present crime, how old it is, how it relates to truth-telling, how effective a limiting instruction is likely to be, and how crucial the accused's credibility is in a close case.28 The judge may also consider what admission would do to the accused's willingness to testify and how much the case needs that testimony.29 Similarity matters most when no one asks for an instruction, because the omission is more likely to be plain error where the prior conviction is similar.30 A conviction that resembles the offense on trial pulls the jurors toward the forbidden inference that the accused is the sort of person who commits this crime.
The credibility instruction is the same in both trials. What differs is how hard the forbidden inference pulls on the jurors, and that pull is what makes silence at trial costly in one case and tolerable in the other.
A prior inconsistent statement offered only to impeach calls for the same restriction. On request, the jury is advised that the statement was admitted solely to impeach.31 The contradiction itself does the impeaching: a witness who said one thing out of court and another on the stand has given the jury a reason for doubt without anyone deciding which version is true. Using the earlier statement as proof of what it says is a different step, because it asks the jury to trust the earlier version. The rules extend that trust to statements given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition, which is the scope of Rule 801(d)(1)(A).32 A statement outside that category stays confined to credibility, and if no one asks for the limit, the jury may consider it as substantive evidence unless the omission amounts to plain error.33
The same limiting logic applies when a party supports a witness instead of attacking one. Impeachment is one of three stages in credibility analysis: bolstering before attempted impeachment, impeachment, and rehabilitation after it.34 Impeachment is not a dispassionate study of the witness's capacities and character but an attack on his credibility.35 Under the adversary trial system, the witness's proponent must be given an opportunity to meet that attack with evidence rehabilitating the witness.36 Evidence admitted only to rehabilitate answers the attack and does no more, so Rule 105 entitles the opponent, on timely request, to an instruction confining it to that purpose.37
Cross-examination of a character witness is a third impeachment device, and it aims at the witness's basis of knowledge more than at the accused's guilt. When the accused calls a character witness, the prosecutor may cross-examine about incidents from the accused's past that could not be proved otherwise.38 The inquiry tests the witness: a lack of familiarity with such matters bears on the basis of the testimony, and familiarity explores the witness's standard of goodness and badness.39 The cross-examiner must have a good-faith basis for asking.40 The court may prohibit inquiry into specific acts when the unfair prejudice likely to result substantially outweighs its value in helping the jury evaluate the witness's testimony, Rule 403.41 And it is improper to ask the witness whether his testimony would change if he assumed the very act for which the accused is on trial.42
In Michelson v. United States, the Court recognized that merely asking such questions may waft an unwarranted innuendo into the jury box. It nevertheless concluded that defendants who voluntarily tender the issue have no valid complaint at the latitude the law gives the prosecution to meet it on cross-examination.43 The instruction answers the innuendo. The inquiry is generally permitted to test the knowledge and standards of the character witness, with cautionary instructions against any other use, such as treating it as making it likely the accused committed the crime charged.44 Michelson treated the accused as entitled to such instructions even though the jury will likely find them unintelligible.45
The instruction is not always enough, and Awkard v. United States marks the line. On occasion the evidence is excluded because, on the facts, the danger of the impermissible use outweighs the permissible one. In Awkard, the impeaching value was slight because the character witness did not testify to familiarity with the defendant in the locale or at the time of the alleged wrongdoing, but only that he knew him at another place and period.46 Michelson shows the ordinary course, in which the questions probe the testimony and an instruction confines them. Awkard shows the exception, in which the testimony gives the questions almost nothing to probe and exclusion follows under Rule 403.
The last problem arises when the party impeaching a witness is the party who called that witness. Rule 607 gives the calling party the right to impeach its own witness, with no restriction corresponding to the limit on substantive use of prior inconsistent statements.47 That asymmetry raises the problem of the calling party's potential misuse of impeachment by prior inconsistent statement.48 The calling party chooses the witness, so it controls whether the impeachment is real or only a vehicle for putting a substantively inadmissible statement before the jury under the label of impeachment.
Because every impeachment device raises the same underlying question about use, the analysis runs best in a fixed order that separates the permitted inference from the forbidden one.
Hearsay Admitted for Limited Use
Hearsay invites Rule 105 because an out-of-court statement can matter to a case for two reasons at once.52 The permitted purpose is any use that does not depend on the statement being true: the effect of the words on the person who heard them, the notice they gave, or what they show about the speaker's knowledge. The forbidden purpose is the one the words themselves invite, which is to take the statement as an accurate report of the fact it describes. This section assumes you already recognize when a statement falls outside the hearsay definition. It asks what the court does next, because the permitted and forbidden uses run through the same sentence and only an instruction can hold them apart.
Courts keep the statement in because exclusion would destroy the proper use along with the improper one. Motive, notice, and knowledge are often provable only through what was said, so a rule that kept out every statement whose words might be believed would leave those issues without proof. Limiting instructions exist for exactly this reason: sometimes evidence is admissible for only one of several purposes or against one of several persons, and the jury is directed to consider it for that permissible use only.53 Admission is still not automatic, since the potential harm from jurors considering evidence admitted for a limited purpose must be weighed under Rule 403 against the instruction's potential effectiveness.54 The task is realistic in the ordinary case because the permitted inference never requires jurors to believe the statement; the instruction asks them only to stop short of one extra step.
The effect-on-the-listener pattern shows the structure most plainly. Statements made by one person that become known to another fall outside the hearsay definition when offered as a circumstance under which the listener acted or as bearing on the likelihood of later disputed conduct, such as motive.55 The familiar example is the officer who explains that he went to the scene because of a radio call.56 The statement matters because it was said, whether or not it was true.
Notice applies the same device to a defendant's state of knowledge. A plaintiff who claims an owner was warned of a danger wants the jury to focus on the fact of the warning and not on whether the warning was accurate.
Had the club instead stipulated that its manager received the warning, notice would no longer be disputed. The remark would add almost nothing for its permitted use, and its flat assertion about the steering would be the only thing left for the jury to use. A court that weighs that danger against the probable effectiveness of an instruction would lean toward exclusion, because evidence whose probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice does not come in even with an instruction.57
Knowledge works the same way when the speaker's knowledge is the point. The Parry example from earlier in the chapter involved an out-of-court statement offered as circumstantial evidence of Parry's knowledge. The dangers of misuse did not require exclusion, so the court admits the statement and instructs the jury that it is admissible only as circumstantial evidence of Parry's knowledge and not as evidence of the truth of the matter asserted.58
A second recurring pattern arises when a statement is admitted under Rule 803(3) to show the declarant's state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition. Such a statement may also contain an assertion as to particular facts.59 A limiting instruction under Rule 105 is then required to insure that the jury considers those assertions solely as bearing on the declarant's state of mind and not for the truth of the factual matter asserted.60
The instruction is not an automatic cure for these statements. If the unfair prejudice likely to follow from the jury's substantive consideration of the factual assertion, despite a limiting instruction, substantially outweighs the probative value of the statement on state of mind, considered in light of the need for the evidence, Rule 403 calls for exclusion.61
Rule 105 still runs on request in this setting. Counsel often decline to ask for the instruction in order to avoid emphasizing damaging evidence, and absent plain error a failure to request one precludes raising the question on appeal.62 Hearsay sharpens the hesitation, because the content being fenced off is the damaging content itself. An instruction to disregard may alert the jurors that the law regards the evidence as suspect, and so induce them to use it with caution even if they do not disregard it entirely.63 When such evidence has already come in, I move to strike is the proper form of objection. The lawyer should ask that the instruction be given immediately and again at the end of trial before the case goes to the jury, with the timing left to the judge's discretion.64
Expert Basis Evidence
Expert testimony produces one of the most durable limited-use problems at trial, and Rule 105 supplies the tool for it.67 Rule 703 identifies the limited purpose. The facts or data an expert relies on need not themselves be admissible, and they are not admitted for the truth of what they assert. Under some circumstances they may be disclosed to the jury for one narrow reason: to help the jurors judge the weight the expert's opinion deserves.68 The permitted inference is an evaluation of the opinion; the forbidden inference is that the underlying facts are true.
Rule 703 was designed to bring judicial practice into line with the practice of experts themselves when not in court.69 The system is also simpler and less likely to confuse than the alternatives.70 The rule answers two separate questions, and an exam answer should keep them apart. The first is whether the expert may rely on the information. Reliance does not make the information substantive evidence; it becomes substantive only if some other rule admits it.71 The second question is whether the jury may hear what the information said. Basis evidence can help the factfinder understand the expert's thought process and determine the weight to give the opinion,72 so the court balances that value against the risk that jurors will misuse the information as substantive proof. The proponent may disclose it only if the court finds that its value in helping the jury evaluate the opinion substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.73
The direction of that balance is the reverse of the ordinary Rule 403 balance. Under Rule 403, relevant evidence stays in unless its probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice; under Rule 703, basis facts stay out unless their value substantially outweighs the prejudice. The reason lies in what each side of the scale holds. The opinion is already before the jury and is the proof. The basis facts add only a secondary aid to evaluating it, yet what they say carries the full risk of misuse, because jurors hear content that no rule would admit on its own. A proponent who cannot show real help to the jury's evaluation gains nothing the opinion lacks, so nondisclosure is the default. An attack on the basis changes the calculus, since it will often open the door to the proponent's rebuttal with information the expert reasonably relied on, even if the information would not have been disclosable initially under the balancing test.74
When the court does allow disclosure, Rule 105 does the rest. The trial judge must, on request, give a limiting instruction informing the jury that the underlying facts, data, or opinions must not be used for substantive purposes.75 The request requirement from earlier in this chapter applies here as elsewhere: counsel often decline to ask in order to avoid emphasizing damaging material, and absent plain error, silence forecloses the point on appeal.76 The Rules thus pair a demanding balancing test with the instruction, and the opponent keeps cross-examination and closing argument to expose that the expert has no personal knowledge of the facts relied on.77
Because disclosure of basis facts has several gates and the instruction is only the last of them, the problem runs best in the order the rule sets.
The first four steps can be seen working together in a civil case.
Nothing in that scene touches the Constitution, because no criminal accused is facing the radiologist's words. Rules 703 and 105 govern completely, and the instruction is the remedy. The situation changes when the proponent is the prosecution and the absent person is a witness against the accused.
The arrangement rests on an assumption that jurors can treat basis statements as evidence about the expert's reasoning without taking them as true, and Smith v. Arizona tested that assumption in a criminal prosecution. Shortly before trial, the State replaced the analyst who had tested the seized substances with a different expert who had taken part in none of the testing. The substitute testified from the first analyst's notes and report that the testing had used proper scientific methods and that the substances were drugs. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, reasoning that the absent analyst's statements were offered to show the basis of the substitute's opinion and not for their truth.82 The Supreme Court vacated that judgment and remanded. Justice Kagan, writing for the majority, explained that when an expert conveys an absent analyst's statements in support of an opinion, and the statements provide that support only if true, the statements come into evidence for their truth.83 The reasoning turns on why the prosecutor elicits them: the jury has reason to credit the substitute's opinion only because the absent analyst's statements are accurate.
The majority did not decide whether the statements were testimonial, because that question was not presented. It left the question for remand, where the lower court must identify the statements at issue and determine the primary purpose of each.84 The primary-purpose inquiry comes from Davis. A 911 call describing an ongoing emergency is not testimonial, while statements made once the emergency has ceased are, because the primary purpose shifted from responding to the emergency to proving past events relevant to a later prosecution.85 An exam answer should therefore say that Smith decided how basis statements are characterized and left the testimonial question open. The decision does not announce that every such statement is testimonial.
The fact that separates the orthopedist from Smith is the setting in which the opinion's value depends on truth. In the civil scene, Rules 703 and 105 are the only limits, and the instruction does its ordinary work. In Smith, once the statements are treated as offered for their truth, an instruction telling the jurors to ignore their truth cannot change that characterization, so it does not solve the confrontation problem. That repeats the earlier point about Rule 105 in general: confinement works only when a permitted purpose actually exists, and an opinion that depends on the truth of the statement leaves none.
Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, concurred only in the judgment, and his opinion shows the other side of the dispute. He rejected as plainly wrong the idea that basis testimony is necessarily offered for its truth, because what makes basis evidence useful is the help it gives the factfinder in judging the weight of the opinion, and a trial judge must, on request, instruct the jury to consider it only for that purpose.86 He asked where the Confrontation Clause problem lies if a judge rules that basis evidence is not admitted for its truth and so instructs the jury, and he concluded that the majority must believe jurors incapable of following such an instruction, a belief he found inconsistent with commonplace trial practice and a string of the Court's decisions.87 He illustrated the consequences with the Federal Rules, noting that the witness testified in an Arizona state court under rules virtually identical to them.88 A concurrence in the judgment states the view of those Justices and does not bind, so it supports the Rule 703 mechanism as a description of ordinary practice without displacing the majority's test.
State practice supplies the same limited-use mechanism. Under the California Evidence Code, if a party requests an instruction limiting the jury's consideration of expert testimony on battered women's syndrome to a particular issue, the instruction must be given.89 The example illustrates the pattern without controlling a federal question, but it shows the feature that matters: the request makes the instruction mandatory.
Policy-Based Exclusions
Rule 105 does much of its work at the edges of rules that exclude evidence for policy reasons. When the court admits evidence that is admissible for one purpose but not another, it must on timely request restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.91 Rule 407 shows the pattern most clearly. It bars evidence of a subsequent remedial measure, a change, repair, or precaution taken after an injury that would have made the injury less likely had it been taken earlier, when the evidence is offered to prove negligence, culpable conduct, a defect in a product or its design, or a need for a warning or instruction.92 The same evidence may be received for another purpose, such as ownership, control, or the feasibility of precautionary measures if disputed, or impeachment.93 Rules 408 and 411, which govern compromise offers and liability insurance, share that two-part design.94
Each exclusion targets a particular inference, and none rests on doubt that the evidence is true. A remedial measure proves fault only if the jury infers that the actor impliedly recognized its own fault.95 Liability insurance proves little about carelessness, since a person is hardly more likely to act negligently for being insured, and it invites the jury to share the insurer's resources with the plaintiff whatever the merits.96 Compromise evidence is protected because the law wants to encourage settlement.97 The same facts, however, often bear on some other question with real force, so a flat ban would waste that value. Each rule instead forbids only the fault inference, and Rule 105 supplies the instruction that fences it off. The qualifier if disputed in Rule 407 adds a check: the other purpose must be a live issue, and a party can forestall the evidence by admitting the point.98
A customer who slips on fruit on the sidewalk in front of a supermarket and sues the store for negligence shows how the pieces fit. After the accident, the store began requiring employees to clean the sidewalk every 15 minutes instead of once an hour. Which inference the evidence supports depends on how the store defends. Offered to show negligence, the change invites a chain of reasoning: the store changed its policy because it believed the old one left customers unprotected, so the old policy posed an unreasonable danger. Rule 407 forbids that chain, and the court excludes the evidence on the store's objection.99 If the store instead defends by denying that it was responsible for the sidewalk, the same change supports a different chain: the store acted because it understood the sidewalk to be its own to maintain, which tends to prove that it was.100
That second chain does not ask the jury to infer fault from an implied admission, so Rule 407 does not forbid it; the rule bars no other use of the evidence.101 The evidence nonetheless stays relevant to the forbidden point, which makes this a case of limited admissibility. On timely request the court instructs the jurors to consider the new schedule on control and not as proof of negligence. Because the other purpose is disputed, the evidence also remains subject to exclusion under Rule 403 if the danger of misuse substantially outweighs its probative value on control.102
Control is the hinge, and the store holds the key to it. If the store concedes that the sidewalk is its responsibility, the qualifier if disputed means control is no longer in contention, and the changed schedule proves nothing the jury must decide except the one thing Rule 407 forbids.103 The legitimate purpose has disappeared, so an instruction has nothing to confine, and the court excludes the evidence. The plaintiff's offer and the schedule are unchanged. Only the defendant's position moved, and that position decides whether a permitted use exists. Rule 105 confines evidence to a use that is really in the case, and it cannot create one.
When the other purpose is genuinely disputed, admission is still not automatic. In deciding whether the probative value of such evidence is substantially outweighed by the Rule 403 concerns, the court must consider the potential effectiveness of a limiting instruction, Rule 105.104 Feasibility shows the usual result. If a manufacturer disputes that a safer design was feasible, evidence of a later product change can be admitted on feasibility, with an instruction to consider it for that purpose only and not for the forbidden ones.105 As one court put it, as long as rules of evidence admit testimony for some purposes but not others, courts must guard against its misuse by the jury.106 A permitted purpose therefore opens the door without guaranteeing entry, because an objection of unfair prejudice can still succeed when the permitted value is slight or the forbidden inference strong. Rulings on the admissibility of subsequent remedial measures belong exclusively to the court under Rule 104(a).107
Rule 408 runs on the same mechanics. When proof is offered that a witness received or made a payment by way of compromise, the principle that bias or prejudice may be shown collides with the policy of encouraging compromise.108 Rule 408(b) resolves the collision by letting the court admit the evidence for another purpose, such as proving a witness's bias or prejudice, negating a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.109 Rule 403 then requires weighing probative value and need against the danger of unfair prejudice and misleading the jury, as it does wherever evidence is admissible for one purpose but not another.110 The list of other purposes has a boundary. Since the 2006 amendment, conduct or statements made in settlement negotiations cannot be used to impeach by prior inconsistent statement or contradiction.111
Rule 411 applies the pattern to insurance. The fact that a defendant is insured is inadmissible on fault, yet it may be shown on issues such as agency, ownership, control, or the bias or prejudice of a witness, subject to Rule 403 and the potential effectiveness of a limiting instruction.112 When the fact of insurance is disclosed improperly and without bad faith, striking the testimony and instructing the jury to disregard it is generally sufficient, and no mistrial is required. The court may also ask the jurors whether they can decide the case without letting insurance affect their judgment.113
The insurance fact is identical in both trials. In the first it travels through the physician's credibility, an inference the rule allows. In the second it can travel only through the defendant's fault, which the rule forbids, and no instruction can turn that use into a proper one.