Concept
Court Control of Questioning
Form of questions
Leading Questions and Question Form
Court Control of Questioning
Rule 611(a) puts examination technique under the trial judge's supervision: the court should exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of examining witnesses and presenting evidence.1 Mode covers how questions are put and answered, such as leading or open questions and short answers or narrative. Order covers the sequence in which witnesses and proof come in. The rule gives that control three purposes: to make the procedures effective for determining the truth,2 to avoid wasting time,3 and to protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.4 Each later form objection traces back to one of these purposes. A leading question threatens the search for truth, a rambling or repetitive question wastes time, and a badgering question harasses the witness.
Rule 611(c) is written in the same permissive voice. Leading questions should not be used on direct examination except as necessary to develop the witness's testimony, and the court should ordinarily allow them on cross-examination and when a party calls a hostile witness, an adverse party, or a witness identified with an adverse party.5 The verb advises the judge and does not command. Whether a question is suggestive, harassing, or wasteful depends on the witness, the phrasing, the tone, and the examination around it. The trial judge watches all of that live, while an appellate court sees only a cold transcript. A flat command would also force the judge to apply the rule where its reason is absent, as when counsel asks a witness's name in leading form. The Advisory Committee therefore chose words of suggestion over command. It also noted that appellate courts have shown an almost total unwillingness to reverse for infractions.6
The same discretion governs the order of proof as well as the form of questions. In one federal case, a plaintiff called the defendants to the stand during his own case-in-chief and claimed an unrestricted right to question them there with leading questions. The trial judge limited the examination to subject matter that could not be obtained any other way, invited a proffer of what each defendant would say, and promised unrestricted cross-examination once the defendants testified in their own case.7 The court of appeals found no reversible error. The limit was a reasonable way to make the presentation effective and to avoid needless consumption of time, and the plaintiff did not argue that the limit cost him any evidence.8 The power to lead an adverse party did not carry a right to examine that party at unlimited length in the plaintiff's own case.
Discretion does not let a judge ignore the categories the rule names. In Ellis v. City of Chicago, the trial judge refused to let plaintiffs' counsel lead two police officers who had worked closely with the defendant officer. That refusal was error, because Rule 611(c)(2) lists a witness identified with an adverse party among those the court should ordinarily allow to be led.9 The error brought no reversal, because the plaintiffs could not show prejudice. The two decisions mark the range. A ruling that serves truth-finding and saves time stands, and a ruling that disregards one of the rule's own categories is wrong but survives unless it harmed the appellant. The sections that follow apply this same discretion to leading questions, hostile witnesses, cross-examination, and the other form objections.