Concept
Invoking the Rule
Exclusion of witnesses
Invoking the Rule
A request to exclude witnesses is often called “invoking the rule on witnesses.”1 The first sentence of Rule 615 says what follows the request, and it uses two different verbs to do so. At a party's request, the court must order witnesses excluded from the courtroom so that they cannot hear other witnesses testify. The court may do the same on its own.2 The word must belongs to the party's request. Once a party asks, the judge enters the order and does not first weigh whether this trial presents a real danger of tailoring. The word may belongs to the court's own initiative, which is a permission and creates no duty. Students often merge the two into one standard, either by treating the own-motion power as an obligation or by treating a party's request as one factor for the judge to balance.
The mandatory half is a deliberate break from older practice. At common law the court had discretion to exclude witnesses, and it could act on its own motion, though in many, if not most, cases the judge entered the order at a party's request. Rule 615 does not follow that discretionary approach. It treats exclusion as a matter of right.3 The practical effect is that the requesting party has nothing to prove. The request carries the point, and the judge's own estimate of the risk drops out of the decision.
That estimate may be a tempting basis for refusing. A judge looking at a witness list may suppose that people with no stake in the outcome will not shade their accounts, and many witnesses do have no strong allegiance to either party.4 The rule does not ask the judge to act on that supposition.
The command is mandatory but not unlimited. The same sentence of the rule goes on to say that it does not authorize excluding certain people, a list taken up in the next section.5 The command also does nothing until someone asks. The exam question often runs the other way: what must a judge do when no one mentions witnesses at all?
Timing works differently. The rule specifies no time in which the request must be made.6 Still, the purpose of the order shapes the sensible practice. An order keeps a witness from hearing testimony only if it is entered before that testimony is given. A witness who has already sat through earlier testimony cannot be made independent again by an order entered later. A party who wants the full protection therefore should ask before testimony begins, even though the text does not require it.
The mandatory command is also a separate matter from what happens when a trial court ignores it. Whether a failure to order exclusion requires reversal is a distinct question, and the appellate courts have applied several standards in answering it.7 Those standards are taken up under prejudice on appeal below.