Concept
Orders Under Rule 615(b)
Exclusion of witnesses
Orders Under Rule 615(b)
An order under Rule 615(a) removes witnesses from the courtroom and does nothing more. Subdivision (b) says so in its first sentence.1 It then adds that the court "may also, by order" take two further steps. The court may prohibit disclosure of trial testimony to witnesses who are excluded from the courtroom,2 and it may prohibit excluded witnesses from accessing trial testimony.3
The power is newer in the text than in practice. Rule 615 as promulgated in 1975 provided solely for exclusion from the courtroom, yet trial courts frequently went further. They ordered witnesses to remain physically apart, not to discuss the case with one another, and not to read a transcript of another witness's testimony, and they even, possibly, ordered an attorney not to convey the substance of one witness's testimony to another witness.4 The prevailing view located the authority for those steps in the courts' inherent procedural authority.5 An amendment effective December 1, 2023 wrote the power into the rule, specifically authorizing an order that prevents disclosure to and access by witnesses.6
Subdivision (a) excludes witnesses so that they cannot hear other witnesses' testimony.7 That protection covers only the room. A witness who steps into the hallway can still learn what was said, either from a person who tells it or from a record that reproduces it, and can then shape an account to match. Subdivision (b) closes those two routes in turn: the disclosure order governs the person who tells, and the access order governs the record.
The verbs change between the subdivisions. Under (a) the court must exclude witnesses at a party's request; under (b) it may enter the additional orders.8 A party who invokes the rule therefore receives courtroom exclusion as of right, and receives a disclosure or access order only by persuading the judge that the trial calls for one.
Barring Disclosure of Testimony
Rule 615(b)(1) lets the court "prohibit disclosure of trial testimony to witnesses who are excluded from the courtroom."9 Disclosure means conveying what was said on the stand to someone who has been kept out, so this order targets a speaker. The access order, taken up next, targets a record. The basic exclusion order controls where a witness sits while others testify; it does nothing about a conversation in the hallway, and (b)(1) fills that gap.
The clause identifies who is protected, the excluded witnesses, and does not say who the discloser may be. Another witness who has finished testifying is the obvious source, but the practice that preceded the amendment went further and even, possibly, included orders directing an attorney not to convey the substance of one witness's testimony to another witness.10 The information moves toward any waiting witness, and witnesses do not sort neatly into friendly and hostile camps: many have no strong allegiance to either party, and many have information that both parties find favorable.11 A disclosure order therefore matters for every waiting witness, whichever side calls that witness.
The most common use of the power is a plain instruction to the excluded witnesses themselves. One treatise describes instructing excluded witnesses not to confer with others as routine.12 The practice is older than the amendment: before 2023 the text provided only for courtroom exclusion, and courts ordered witnesses not to discuss the case with one another on the strength of their inherent procedural authority.13 Subdivision (b)(1) gives that familiar instruction written footing.14
Because (b)(1) frames the prohibition by the person it protects, a judge may also direct it at lawyers. That choice is discretionary like the rest of subdivision (b), and the routine form of the order remains the instruction to witnesses.
Barring Access to Testimony
Rule 615(b)(2) supplies the second additional order: the court may "prohibit excluded witnesses from accessing trial testimony."16 The disclosure order in (b)(1) targets a person who speaks. The access order targets a record of the testimony, which exists whether or not anyone chooses to talk. The most familiar record is the transcript, and the most familiar access order is an instruction not to read one.17
Courts gave that instruction long before the rule mentioned it. Rule 615 as promulgated in 1975 provided only for exclusion from the courtroom, yet trial courts frequently ordered witnesses not to read a transcript of another witness's trial testimony, and the prevailing view was that courts held inherent procedural authority to do so.18 The amendment effective December 1, 2023 gave the practice an express footing in the text, so a judge who enters an access order no longer has to rest it on inherent power alone.19
The reason the rule needs a second order appears when you compare a transcript with a seat in the gallery. A witness who listens in court hears the testimony once, at the pace of the proceeding, and retains only part of it. A transcript supplies the same testimony word for word and can be reread before the witness takes the stand. If the court could keep a witness out of the room but not away from the record, exclusion would accomplish little. The text speaks of "accessing trial testimony" and names no medium, so on its face the order is not limited to paper transcripts.
When an exam stem has a witness read the morning's transcript during a lunch recess, the answer depends on which order the judge entered.
The whole difference between those two trials is the (b)(2) order. An order under (a) operates only to exclude witnesses from the courtroom, so reading a transcript falls outside it unless the court has added the access prohibition.20
The stakes of an access violation show in the 2006 trial of Zacarias Moussaoui. According to press reports, a lawyer from the Federal Aviation Administration apparently read the transcript of the first day of trial and discussed the case with several potential witnesses who were due to be called by both the prosecution and the defense.21 Judge Brinkema said she had never seen such an egregious violation of a sequestration order, and she reportedly considered dismissing the case.22 She ultimately barred testimony by several witnesses but allowed others, who had not violated the order, to testify to the same points.23 The episode predates the 2023 amendment, yet the lawyer's conduct touched both things subdivision (b) now addresses in express terms: reading the record of testimony, which is the access problem, and discussing the case with witnesses due to testify, which is the communication the disclosure order targets. The judge's response also previews the remedies discussion, because witnesses who had not violated the order were treated differently from those who had, and what a court does after a violation is a separate question from whether it entered the order.
Subdivision (b) is phrased as permission, so the access order is a separate and discretionary step beyond the order under (a). Exclusion under (a) is a "must" when a party asks, while separation under (b) is a "may," which leaves the order to the trial court's discretion.24 A party that wants the protection should therefore ask for it expressly, because invoking the rule delivers only the courtroom exclusion.