Concept
Impeachment Versus Substantive Use
Inconsistent statements and conduct
Impeachment Versus Substantive Use
A witness's earlier inconsistent statement can serve two purposes, and separate rules govern each. Rule 613(b) governs when the jury may hear outside proof of the statement: unless the court orders otherwise, the witness must first have a chance to explain or deny it, and the adverse party must have a chance to examine the witness about it.1 The hearsay rule governs what the jury may then do with the statement. The jury may use it only to doubt the witness, or, if it fits an exemption or exception, to find that what it says is true.
The distinction matters most when a witness recants. Rule 607 lets any party, including the party that called the witness, attack the witness's credibility, so a lawyer whose witness abandons the expected story may confront that witness with the earlier account.2 If the earlier statement is impeachment-only, the jury may treat it as a reason to discount the testimony and for nothing else, which leaves the lawyer holding a discredited witness and no replacement proof. If the statement also fits an exemption or exception, the jury may credit it as evidence, and it can carry the lawyer's proof alone.
Rule 613(a) adds a disclosure duty. The examiner need not show the statement or disclose its contents to the witness, but on request must show it or disclose its contents to the adverse party's attorney.3 The two subsections below take the default rule first and then the exemption that lets certain sworn statements serve as proof.
Impeachment-Only Evidence
A witness's own earlier out-of-court statement is hearsay when offered for its truth, even though the witness is on the stand and subject to cross-examination. Unless the statement fits an exemption or exception, it is inadmissible for that purpose.4 Yet the trier of fact plainly should learn that the witness once said something different, because the earlier statement casts doubt on the witness's credibility.5 The law reconciles the two points by splitting the statement's uses. A substantive use treats the statement as proof that the facts it describes are true; an impeachment use treats it only as a reason to give the trial testimony less weight, because the witness has told two stories.
The orthodox view, which most jurisdictions adopted and the Supreme Court described in California v. Green, treats the earlier statement as inadmissible for its truth for the usual hearsay reasons: it may not have been made under oath, the speaker may not have faced cross-examination when making it, and the jury could not watch the speaker's demeanor.6 That limit holds in bench trials as well as jury trials.7
The consequence is sharpest when the earlier statement is the only evidence on a point the party must prove. Suppose Ford sues Chrysler and must prove that a particular car was black. His witness Edsel testifies at trial in a way that contradicts an earlier statement that the car was black, and that earlier statement is Ford's only evidence on the point. The jury may use the statement to decide whether to believe Edsel's testimony, but it may not find the car black on the strength of the statement, so the judge will direct judgment as a matter of law for Chrysler.8 The statement supplies no proof that the car was black, which leaves Ford with nothing to set against Edsel's trial account.
Other admissible evidence would change the result. If Ford had enough of it to support a finding that the car was black, the judge would not direct judgment, and there would be no practical way to learn whether the jurors had also improperly treated Edsel's earlier statement as proof.9 A limiting instruction offers little protection, because it is unlikely to have much impact, if it can be understood at all.10
Albert v. McKay & Co. states the same limit. After a proper foundation had been laid by cross-examination, the plaintiff impeached the witness Elener by calling in rebuttal another witness, who testified that Elener had said shortly after the accident that the machinery had not been running and that somebody must have left the tightener down after Albert began work.11 The court explained that proof of prior inconsistent statements has one effect, which is to discredit the witness.12 The former statements are incompetent for any other purpose, and they are not evidence of the truth of the facts they state.13
The foundation requirement also protects the boundary between the two uses. When extrinsic evidence of an impeaching statement is admitted without being tied to the witness's testimony, and a significant time passes before it appears, the circumstances virtually invite the jury to treat the statement as substantive evidence.14 A strong case therefore exists under Rules 403 and 611 for requiring the traditional foundation on cross-examination before extrinsic proof of a statement admissible solely to impeach, unless the interests of justice require otherwise.15
Because the jury hears a statement it may use for only one purpose, the opponent should ask the judge to instruct the jury on the restricted purpose for which the evidence of inconsistency is admitted.16 The party who asks is almost always the one who wants the trial testimony believed and the earlier account disbelieved, which is Chrysler in the Ford example.
The hearsay classification of a witness's own earlier statement has drawn well-founded criticism. Earlier statements are often made before the pressures of litigation set in, so they may be more reliable than trial testimony, and they are made closer to the event, which reduces the risk of memory loss. The cross-examiner can also question the witness about both versions while the jury watches the witness's demeanor on each.17 The default rule nonetheless stands unless an exemption or exception applies.
An objection under Rule 403 that jurors will misuse the statement usually fails, because this mechanism of impeachment is so well accepted and so important in assessing credibility.18 A different problem arises when the witness has not hurt the party at all. In one federal case, the witness's in-court testimony did not affirmatively damage the Government's case; she merely refused to give the testimony the Government had hoped for, so the prosecution had no need to attack her credibility.19 A later section, on impeachment as subterfuge, takes up that problem.
The Rule 801(d)(1)(A) Exemption
Rule 801(d)(1)(A) is the narrow doorway through which some prior inconsistent statements pass from impeachment-only evidence to proof of what they say. Article VIII defines hearsay, excludes it, and then lets certain statements escape the exclusion;21 this exemption reaches a testifying witness's earlier inconsistent statement that was made under oath in a formal setting. The Edsel problem shows the stakes. Had Edsel's black-car account been a deposition answer, Ford would hold proof that the car was black and not merely a discredited witness.22
Each condition answers one of the hearsay worries. The setting condition limits qualifying statements to those given in a deposition, at a previous trial, or in some other formal legal hearing, and it does not demand that the earlier hearing have allowed cross-examination, even though most such hearings do.23 The requirement that the declarant testify at the current trial supplies what the earlier setting may lack. With the declarant present and testifying, the jury has two conflicting statements from the same witness before it, and the witness must affirm, deny, or qualify the earlier statement under penalty of perjury.24 The earlier statement may even be the more reliable of the two, since it was made nearer the event and before the pressures of litigation.25
A statement that fails any step is not lost. It remains usable to impeach, but it cannot prove the facts it asserts.26 An unsworn police interview, for example, fails the penalty-of-perjury step at once. Exam stems that feature a recanting witness usually hide the decisive fact in the setting of the earlier statement, so the first question is where the words were spoken.
The words, the inconsistency, and W's presence at trial are the same in both versions. Only the oath and the setting differ, and those two facts decide whether the jury may find that the light was green. In both versions, the coworker may testify about the remark only after W has had a chance to explain or deny it, unless the court orders otherwise.27
The witnesses in United States v. Castro-Ayon show how the exemption and the foundation sequence work together in a criminal trial. The prosecutor first asked foundation questions, and each witness admitted that she had made a statement to Agent Pearce shortly after her arrest. The prosecutor then called Pearce, who testified to the substance of the statements, all of which contradicted the witnesses' trial testimony. At the close of trial, the court instructed the jury to weigh the earlier statements not only in testing credibility but also in considering the defendant's guilt.28 An instruction allowing substantive use is proper only if the earlier statements satisfy every condition of the exemption, and the setting condition is the one that separates a deposition, a previous trial, or a formal legal hearing from a casual conversation.29
Admission through the exemption changes what the jury may do with a statement, but it does not change how the examiner puts the statement in. Rule 613(b) excuses only an opposing party's statement under Rule 801(d)(2), so unless the court orders otherwise, extrinsic proof of a statement admitted under Rule 801(d)(1)(A) must wait until the witness has had a chance to explain or deny it and the adverse party has had a chance to examine the witness.30 The opportunity is what counts, not whether the witness actually denies or explains.31 The prosecutor in Castro-Ayon followed that sequence, asking each witness about the earlier statement before calling Pearce.32
The line between credibility use and substantive use varies among jurisdictions. California, for example, admits prior consistent statements that predate the inconsistent statements the opposing party introduced, regardless of motive to fabricate, and it treats them as admissible for both substantive and credibility use.33