Concept
Who May Impeach
Inconsistent statements and conduct
Who May Impeach
Rule 607 answers the question in one sentence: any party, including the party that called the witness, may attack the witness’s credibility.1 Every impeachment technique, from prior inconsistency to the Rule 613 procedure, therefore belongs to the lawyer who called the witness as fully as to the lawyer on the other side.2
That breadth carries a risk. A party seldom knows for certain how a witness will testify, and a party whose witness abandons the expected story needs some way to answer. But the same freedom lets a lawyer call a witness who is expected to give no useful testimony and then “impeach” that witness with an earlier statement that fits no hearsay exemption or exception. Offered for its truth, such a statement is hearsay, and it reaches the jury only as a reason to doubt the witness’s trial testimony.3 The jury is told to use it for that purpose alone, yet jurors often find the line between impeachment and proof hard to keep.4
Rule 607’s text offers no remedy, so the remedy has to come from elsewhere. The first subsection shows what the rule replaced and why. The second teaches the limit that courts have built from the hearsay rule, a limit that rests on judicial decisions and not on any wording in Rule 607. Both subsections rest on one point: Rule 607 settles who may impeach and leaves untouched how. A party that offers extrinsic proof of its own witness’s prior inconsistent statement must still give the witness a chance to explain or deny it, unless the court orders otherwise.5
Rule 607 Ends the Voucher Rule
Rule 607’s single sentence repeals a doctrine that long forbade a party to impeach its own witness, the voucher rule.6 Courts gave two explanations for it. By calling a witness, they said, a party vouches for the witness’s trustworthiness. And the power to impeach is the power to coerce: a witness who knows that the calling party may assassinate his character has reason to testify as the party wishes. Both rationales are flawed.7
Vouching presupposes that the party chose the witness, but apart from character witnesses and experts a party has little or no choice, because the people who saw the events are the people it must call.8 The Advisory Committee made the same point, remarking on the unreality of assuming that a party has unfettered choices in selecting witnesses.9 The rule also left the calling party exposed. An adversary will attack a witness whose truthful testimony hurts it, but if the witness lies, the adversary has no reason to attack, and under the voucher rule the calling party could not.10 Nor could the rule sensibly be carried to an absurd extreme: when a witness has been bribed to change his story, the calling party ought to be allowed to expose the bribe.11
Courts built escape routes long before the federal rules arrived. The prohibition did not apply when the court itself called the witness, when the law required the party to call a particular witness, such as an attesting witness to a deed or will, or when the party called its adversary; and it was suspended when the party was genuinely surprised by the testimony.12 Courts that went further and allowed impeachment by inconsistent statements often demanded both surprise and positive harm, so that a witness who merely failed to deliver expected favorable testimony could not be impeached.13
Rule 607 discards those conditions along with the prohibition. The calling party need not show surprise or harm, and resort to the old escape devices is unnecessary.14 Prior inconsistency is one attack among several. The Advisory Committee, in explaining when character evidence may support credibility, treats as attacks opinion or reputation that the witness is untruthful, evidence of misconduct including conviction of crime, and evidence of corruption.15
Change one fact and the reach of the rule shows. Suppose Arnold does Washington no harm but simply fails to give the favorable testimony Washington expected. Courts that demanded positive harm would have refused the impeachment; Rule 607 imposes no such condition.16
Rule 607 settles only who may impeach, and the rest of the machinery stays in place. A prior statement that fits no exemption or exception remains hearsay when offered for its truth, so impeaching its own witness gives the calling party no substantive proof.17 The explain-or-deny condition of Rule 613(b) still governs outside proof of the statement.18 And because a party may now attack its own witness, a new danger appears: calling a witness chiefly to carry otherwise inadmissible statements to the jury under the guise of impeachment.19 The next subsection teaches the limit that courts have placed on that practice.
The Good-Faith Limit: Impeachment as Subterfuge
Rule 607 says nothing about the examiner’s motive,21 but courts refuse to read it so literally that it becomes a delivery system for hearsay. In United States v. Webster, the Seventh Circuit described the abuse: a prosecutor who calls a witness she knows will give no useful evidence, only to put hearsay against the defendant before a jury that may miss or ignore the line between impeachment and proof, pursues a purpose Rule 607 does not authorize.22 The court drew the limit from the Fourth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Morlang.
The limit rests on the hearsay rule, not on the voucher rule that Rule 607 abolished. A prior statement that fits no exemption or exception is hearsay when offered for its truth, so it can serve only to discount the witness’s testimony, in bench and jury trials alike.23 Because jurors struggle to keep impeachment and proof apart, the limiting instruction is a weak safeguard.24 A lawyer who knows a witness will give no useful testimony therefore has no plausible reason to call that witness except to expose the earlier statement, and the jury’s tendency to treat it as proof is the very result the lawyer must be seeking. Courts condemn that practice in civil and criminal cases alike, and the remedy is to disallow the impeachment by the prior statement.25
The question in every case is whether the lawyer acted in good faith in offering impeachment evidence that the hearsay rule would otherwise bar.26 Good faith is a familiar demand elsewhere in examination: a cross-examiner needs a good-faith basis when her question effectively asserts the truth of a fact, but not when she merely inquires whether something is true.27
Rule 607 itself opened the door to the abuse. The old voucher rule had prevented it by barring the calling party from impeaching its own witness, and Rule 607 did away with that bar.28 A party can now call a witness not to get useful testimony but to prove whatever the witness said before, under the guise of impeachment, hoping the jury will treat the statements as substantive evidence.29 The good-faith limit now does part of the old rule’s work, but only when the purpose is to put hearsay before the jury.
Morlang shows the abuse at its plainest. The prosecutor called Wilmoth, ostensibly to prove that Morlang had admitted joining a scheme to divert federal funds, though Wilmoth had told the prosecutor before trial that he would not testify that way.30 Wilmoth denied the admission on the stand, and the prosecutor then called Wilmoth’s cellmate to testify that Wilmoth had said Morlang admitted his involvement.31 The Fourth Circuit reversed the conviction. Courts must not, Judge Widener explained, “permit the government, in the name of impeachment, to present testimony to the jury by indirection which would not otherwise be admissible,” because doing so would be tantamount to convicting a defendant on hearsay.32
Webster applied the same limit and reached the opposite result, and the difference lies in what the prosecutor knew when the witness took the stand. The government called King, an admitted bank robber, and when he gave testimony that would have exculpated Webster, it proved his earlier unsworn statements to federal agents implicating Webster.33 The Seventh Circuit affirmed because, before calling King, the prosecutor had asked the judge to let her examine him outside the jury’s presence: she did not know what he would say.34 A prosecutor who knew King would give no useful evidence would not have invited a voir dire, which would have handed the defense a foundation to object under Morlang, so the request itself showed good faith.35 Wilmoth had announced his testimony in advance, while King’s remained unknown. Uncertainty of that kind protects the calling party: when a witness says only that he is leaning toward unfavorable testimony without committing to it, courts find no abuse if he testifies that way.36
Courts phrase the test in different words, but the formulations converge on the calling party’s expectation and purpose. One asks whether the party called the witness with a reasonable expectation of helpful testimony apart from the prior inconsistent statement; if the witness is useful on any fact of consequence, the party may elicit that testimony and impeach on the other fact the earlier statement addresses.37 Another asks whether the examination’s primary purpose was to place inadmissible substance before the jury, as the Ninth Circuit put it in United States v. Gomez-Gallardo.38
Webster refused to add a requirement that the calling party be surprised and harmed. A party may call an adverse witness expecting testimony that is partly helpful and partly harmful, knowing a prior statement can neutralize the harmful part, and a surprise requirement would force that party to choose between forgoing impeachment and forgoing the helpful evidence.39 The good-faith standard strikes a better balance, and the defendant remains free to argue under Rule 403 that the impeaching evidence should be excluded because the jury would have difficulty confining its use to impeachment.40 Trial judges exercise that discretion in practice. One federal court approved the admission of a witness’s grand jury statements where the judge limited their use to impeachment and admitted only those statements he found reliable, discretionary judgments that served Rule 403’s purpose of minimizing evidentiary costs while protecting parties from undue prejudice.41
The Second Circuit took a different route in United States v. DeLillo, treating the problem as one of how much the witness matters to the government’s case. The government called Monahan to testify about a critical meeting at which the defendant allegedly ordered a subordinate to hide leaks in a pipe. Another witness had said the defendant gave that order, but Monahan testified that no such order was given, and the court approved proof of his pretrial statement that it was.42 The government’s primary aim could not be called impeachment, the court concluded, because Monahan was essential in many areas of its case.43 Webster asks what the calling party knew about the coming testimony, whereas DeLillo asks how central the witness is, and the two standards can diverge for a witness who is important but known in advance to be hostile on one point.
Rule 403 supplies a third approach, and United States v. Ince shows how surprise can return as a fact the balance weighs. At Ince’s second trial the government called Neumann, who repeatedly claimed she could not recall what Ince said right after a shooting, and then called Military Police Officer Stevens to testify that within hours of the shooting she had told him Ince admitted firing the gun.44 The court reversed. Neumann had made clear at the first trial that she would not readily testify to the confession, so her memory loss did not shock the government, and Stevens’s testimony had nil probative value for impeachment against a serious risk that the jury would treat an unsworn confession as proof.45
The subterfuge problem disappears when the earlier statement is itself admissible for its truth. If the statement fits Rule 801(d)(1)(A) because it was made under oath at a proceeding, substantive use of it is no longer misuse, and the party may call the witness solely to get it admitted.46 The same logic explains People v. Freeman, where a California prosecutor called Mrs. Duckworth, who denied telling an investigator that the man who came to her daughter’s house was Norman Freeman, and then called the investigator to relate what she had said. The court found no abuse, because California’s Evidence Code admits a witness’s inconsistent statement for its truth, so the prosecutor was using the statute for the purpose it serves.
Both outcomes follow from asking first what the earlier statement may prove, and only then what the calling party expected.47
Step three does the real work, and the usual mistake there is to import a surprise requirement, which Webster rejected. A second mistake treats the limiting instruction as the cure. The instruction safeguards an impeachment made in good faith; a subterfuge calls for exclusion of the statement itself.48