Concept
What Counts as Inconsistent
Inconsistent statements and conduct
What Counts as Inconsistent
Rule 613(b) postpones extrinsic evidence of a witness’s “prior inconsistent statement” until the witness has had an opportunity to explain or deny it and the adverse party has had an opportunity to examine the witness about it.1 The rule governs how to prove such a statement. It never says what makes a statement inconsistent. A lawyer who skips that threshold question may build an entire impeachment on words that conflict with nothing the witness said at trial.
The threshold matters because the technique rests on one idea. A witness who testifies one way at trial after speaking differently before has blown hot and cold, and the jury’s reason for doubt is the conflict between the two versions. When both versions can be true, the witness has not vacillated, the jury has no reason to discount the testimony, and the impeachment fails at the start. Rule 607 lets any party attack a witness’s credibility, including the party that called the witness,2 but it does nothing for a lawyer whose earlier statement does not conflict with the testimony.
Inconsistency also gates the substantive use of earlier statements. The drafters of the Rules tried to lift out of the definition of hearsay any prior inconsistent statement by a witness who testifies at trial and is “subject to cross-examination” about it,3 although Rule 801(d)(1)(A) makes only some such statements substantively admissible.4 Whether a lawyer wants an earlier statement for impeachment or for its truth, the statement must first be inconsistent.
What the lawyer must show is a conflict, but not a total one. Witnesses seldom contradict themselves with the neatness of a traffic light that is both red and green. More often the trial account shifts emphasis, adds a detail the earlier statement lacked, or replaces an earlier certainty with a hazy recollection, and a rule demanding flat contradiction would let those witnesses escape the doubt that impeachment exists to raise. The trial judge decides the question and has considerable discretion in doing so: inconsistency is not limited to diametrically opposed answers but may be found in evasive answers, inability to recall, silence, or changes of position.5
Three recurring situations test that standard. The first is ordinary variance between two accounts of the same event. The second is an earlier statement that left out something the witness now asserts. The third is a witness who now claims not to remember what he once described. On an exam, the first move with any earlier statement is to place it beside the trial testimony and ask whether the jury could reasonably see the two as pulling against each other. The sequencing rules that follow matter only for a statement that survives that comparison.
Variance, Not Flat Contradiction
Rule 613(b) conditions outside proof on a “prior inconsistent statement” without saying how far two accounts must diverge before one is inconsistent with the other.6 The accepted answer is that the earlier statement need not flatly contradict the testimony. It need be merely inconsistent with it.7 The federal courts have generally applied that liberal view.8 The reason is the one that opened this section: the jury’s ground for doubt is that the witness has blown hot and cold, and a witness can do that without ever saying the exact opposite of what was said before.
Two formulations capture the liberal test. One asks whether a jury could reasonably find that a witness who believed the truth of the facts testified to would have been unlikely to make a prior statement of this tenor. Wigmore’s version asks whether the two expressions appear to have been produced by inconsistent beliefs.9 Both look to the witness’s likely state of mind. They ask what a person holding the trial belief would have said earlier, and they do not ask whether the two sentences could technically both be true.
A drug prosecution shows how much room the test leaves. A witness testifies that the defendant sat in the back seat of the car during the transaction, but earlier the witness said the defendant sat in the front seat. Both accounts place the defendant at the transaction, so the witness is steady on the fact most likely to matter. The earlier statement is still inconsistent, because the conflicting accounts of the seat tend to undermine the witness’s credibility.10 Someone who really watched the event does not ordinarily give two pictures of where a participant sat, so the jury may fairly suspect that the witness’s memory or candor is shaky.
The seat-position answers pull in opposite directions, while dark and black pull the same way, and that difference separates the two scenes. The question is whether the earlier statement conveys a significantly different picture of events than the testimony does.11 Testimony that is merely less thorough than the earlier account is not inconsistent on that ground alone.12
Because the standard asks only whether the variance weakens the testimony, the importance of the point does its work later, in the jury’s weighing and not in the judge’s gatekeeping. Inconsistency on important points matters more than on lesser points, and large discrepancies matter more than small ones.13 A lawyer holding a modest variance still has a usable statement, since counsel may cross-examine about a prior inconsistent statement even when it seems incidental to the substantive facts. The theory is that a witness who was inconsistent about small matters may have been inaccurate about central ones.14 If the witness testifies that the bank teller wore an orange dress, the cross-examiner may ask whether the witness told a detective the day after the robbery that the dress was green, and a witness who contradicted herself about the dress may have misdescribed the getaway car too. The jury will likely discount a slip on a trivial point, while a sharp conflict on the heart of the case is far more damaging. Whether outside proof may follow when the witness denies the statement and the subject is minor is governed by a separate limit, taken up in a later section.
Omissions and Silence
An earlier statement can conflict with trial testimony by what it leaves out. The common law has long allowed a witness to be impeached by a previous failure to state a fact in circumstances in which that fact naturally would have been asserted, as the Supreme Court observed in Jenkins v. Anderson.16 Two forms of inconsistency follow from that tradition: the omission from a prior statement of a matter that would reasonably be expected to have been mentioned if true, and a failure to speak at all of a matter asserted at trial under circumstances in which it would have been natural to do so.17 The word that does the work in both is natural. An omission has impeaching force only where speech would have been expected.
An omission carries weight because of an inference about how truthful people give accounts. A witness who really knows a fact, and who is describing the event it belongs to, will ordinarily mention an important detail. When the detail is missing from the earlier account, either the trial version has been embellished or the earlier version was incomplete, and either possibility bears on how far the jury should trust the witness. Each link in that inference must hold. The earlier statement must have been meant to cover the ground where the detail belongs, the detail must have been significant enough that a truthful speaker would have included it, and nothing about the occasion may explain its absence. If any link fails, the silence shows only that the speaker was talking about something else.
In United States v. Strother, a witness testified that the defendant specifically asked her to make payment on a particular check, but her earlier written statement never mentioned that request.18 Every link holds. The request was a significant part of her account, because it tied the defendant to the payment, and a written account of the transaction is where a witness who actually heard the request would be expected to record it. The Second Circuit’s decision stands for the proposition that it suffices for impeachment that a significant point in the testimony was omitted from the earlier statement.19 The omission need not contradict anything the statement says. The gap itself makes the two accounts pull apart.
Silence in the broader sense, a failure to speak at all on an occasion that called for comment, follows the same logic. In an illustrative problem, Anders wrote a letter about an apartment that complained of its size and said nothing of any odor, and at trial Anders testified that the apartment smelled badly. The letter’s explicit content supports part of the testimony. Its silence on odor, however, might be deemed equivalent to a statement that size, not smell, was the problem, because proof that a person said nothing about a topic on an occasion when a comment would naturally have been expected can be treated like proof of a statement.20 The cross-examiner may therefore ask about the missing mention of odor, and since Anders is a party, the letter is a statement by a party offered against that party.21 Courts describing the range of inconsistency likewise list silence alongside evasive answers, inability to recall, and changes of position.22 A related but distinct doctrine treats a failure to respond to another person’s statement, where circumstances would normally call for a denial if the statement were untrue, as an adoption by silent acquiescence.23
The common-law permission depends on probative value, and Jenkins v. Anderson marks where it stops. The Court said that each jurisdiction may formulate its own rules to determine when prior silence is so inconsistent with present statements that impeachment by reference to it is probative. It noted that in the federal courts prior silence cannot be used for impeachment where it is not probative of the witness’s credibility and prejudice might result.24 Silence supports an inference of inconsistency only when the circumstances would have prompted speech. A silence that anyone might keep for many reasons teaches the jury nothing about whether the later testimony is true.
A cross-examiner tells a meaningful silence from an empty one by asking what the earlier occasion called for.
The omission can also lie on the other side of the comparison. Trial testimony that leaves out material facts contained in the earlier statement can conflict with it, but testimony that is merely less thorough than the earlier account does not.25 Significance again decides the matter: dropping a central fact counts, while trimming background detail does not.
Once the judge accepts an omission as inconsistent, the statement is handled like any other prior inconsistent statement. The examiner may ask the witness about it without first showing it, though on request the examiner must show it or disclose its contents to the adverse party’s attorney.26 Extrinsic proof waits until the witness has had an opportunity to explain or deny, and in an omission case that opportunity is valuable, because the witness can answer that nobody asked about the detail.27 The importance of what was left out then goes to weight, since inconsistency on important points matters more than inconsistency on lesser ones.28
Claimed Lack of Memory
A witness who claims at trial to have forgotten the event strains the premise of impeachment, because forgetting contradicts nothing the witness said before. An earlier statement that describes the event in detail is arguably not inconsistent on its face with a present claim that the witness cannot recall it.30 The judge’s question becomes whether the claimed lapse is a change of position the jury may weigh against the earlier account, or an honest gap that leaves nothing to impeach.
The default follows from the theory of the technique. Impeachment by prior inconsistency works because the witness has blown hot and cold, and a witness who has truly forgotten has not changed the story; the story is simply gone. The earlier statement can still matter. Proving that the witness once described the event brings into question the weight to give the witness’s overall ability to recall, and whether the claimed lapse is real or feigned. Because adversely affecting the credibility of a witness called by an opponent is one of the purposes of cross-examination, the court may permit inquiry into the earlier statement in its discretion, even though the statement is not treated as a flat inconsistency.31
The default gives way when the claimed forgetfulness is a pretext. Forgetting is a well-known refuge for the unwilling witness, because a person who says he cannot recall commits to no version of events and cannot be contradicted by anything he said before. If every such claim counted as consistent with the earlier account, a witness could defeat the technique simply by claiming amnesia. Testimony can therefore be inconsistent with a prior statement when the witness claims not to remember in ways that indicate he has not forgotten but simply does not want to testify about the subject.32 The trial judge may find inconsistency in evasive answers and claimed inability to recall,33 and the need for that judicial finding protects the other kind of witness, since a person who has genuinely forgotten loses nothing unless the judge disbelieves the claim.
The same issue arises when a party’s own witness claims on direct examination to have forgotten. If the court first determines that the claimed lack of recollection and the earlier statement are in fact inconsistent, the calling party’s right to impeach is governed by Rule 607,34 which allows any party, including the party that called the witness, to attack the witness’s credibility.35 The finding on inconsistency comes first, and Rule 607 supplies the right to act on it.
Whether an account the witness now claims to have forgotten may also be used for its truth is a different question. Rule 801(d)(1)(A) makes some, but by no means all, prior inconsistent statements substantively admissible,36 and decisions such as United States v. Williams apply that exemption to witnesses who claim at trial to have forgotten earlier grand jury testimony. For impeachment alone, the judge’s task is the narrower one described above. An exam answer should name the finding the judge must make, whether the lapse is real or feigned, and apply it to the facts.