Concept
Inconsistent Conduct
Inconsistent statements and conduct
Inconsistent Conduct
Rule 613(b) regulates proof of a witness's "prior inconsistent statement" and says nothing of other prior acts. Its condition is that extrinsic evidence of the statement may not be admitted until the witness has had an opportunity to explain or deny it and an adverse party has had an opportunity to examine the witness about it.1 A witness can contradict trial testimony by acting as well as by speaking, and the impeacher may use either. Conduct, in this sense, is something the witness did: going to a place, taking an action, keeping a routine. A witness who swears to fear of the defendant and then dines at the defendant's table has contradicted that testimony as plainly as if she had said she was never afraid. The theory is the same one that supports prior-statement impeachment: acts that point one way and testimony that points the other give the jury a reason to doubt the testimony.
The text of Rule 613(b) answers the procedural question. A rule that conditions proof of a prior inconsistent statement does not, by its words, condition proof of prior inconsistent conduct, so a lawyer holding evidence of the witness's contrary acts need not first give the witness a chance to explain or deny them.2 For statements, the opportunity does real work. It lets the witness admit the statement as his own, which reduces the likelihood that extrinsic evidence of the statement will be offered, and such evidence is much harder for the jury not to accept substantively.3 The rule asks for no comparable step before proof of conduct.
The neighbor's testimony reaches the jury although no one first put the visits to the witness. The subject is no side issue, because the visits go to the fear the witness described. The jury weighs the acts against the words and decides how much of the testimony to credit.
Freedom from the sequence is the only relief conduct receives. The collateral-matter limit taught earlier in this chapter still applies: a party may not offer extrinsic evidence to prove conduct that bears only on a collateral matter. Rule 403 also stays in force. In a prosecution for extortionate extension of credit, the trial judge limited a witness's prior inconsistent grand-jury statements to impeachment and admitted only those he found reliable. The reviewing court held that these discretionary judgments served Rule 403's purpose of minimizing evidentiary costs while protecting parties from undue prejudice, and it rejected the collateral-issue objection because the statements went directly to the elements of the offense.4 A judge holds the same controls over conduct proof. The cross-examiner may still ask the witness about a trivial act, but if the witness denies it, the examiner must take the answer.
Both scenes escape the explain-or-deny sequence, and they differ in what the act is about. The visits to the defendant's house go to the center of the testimony. The stop at the car wash serves only to contradict the witness, which is why only the first earns outside proof.
Rule 806 extends the same freedom to hearsay declarants. It lets a party attack a declarant's credibility with the same impeachment techniques available against a testifying witness. A declarant's inconsistent statement may come in without any opportunity for the declarant to explain or deny, because the declarant is usually not at trial and few such statements would ever be admitted if the opportunity were required.5 Conduct proof never carried that condition, so the declarant's contrary acts need no special treatment.