Concept
Bias Under the Federal Rules
Bias and interest
Bias Under the Federal Rules
Rules 608, 609, and 610 each regulate a way of attacking a witness's credibility: character for truthfulness and conduct, criminal conviction, and religious belief. None addresses bias by its terms.1 A cross-examiner who notices the gap might fear that the Rules silently abolished a familiar attack. The Supreme Court confronted that fear in United States v. Abel. The Court noted that neither party had suggested what the omission signified, and it admitted that, although it nominally promulgates the Rules, it is in truth merely a conduit and cannot resolve the question by consulting its own collective memory.2 It then held that a party may impeach a witness by showing bias under the Federal Rules just as before their adoption.3
The case grew out of a robbery prosecution. Mills, a friend of the defendant Abel who had spent time in prison with both Abel and Ehle, planned to testify that Ehle had admitted, after the robbery, that he intended to implicate Abel falsely in order to win favorable treatment from the government.4 The prosecutor planned to discredit Mills by calling Ehle back to the stand to show that Abel, Mills, and Ehle all belonged to the Aryan Brotherhood, a secret prison gang whose members had to deny its existence and commit perjury, theft, and murder on one another's behalf.5 The Court held that the shared membership supported an inference that Mills's testimony was slanted, or perhaps fabricated, in Abel's favor. Common membership in an organization is probative of bias even without proof that the witness has personally adopted its tenets.6 Later sections take up the sources of bias and the methods of proving it. The point here is what the Rules' silence means.
The Court first asked what the law was before the Rules. Federal admissibility then depended partly on statutes and rules and partly on case law, and in Alford v. United States the Court had held that a trial court must allow some cross-examination of a witness to show bias, in accord with the overwhelming weight of state authority.7 The courts of appeals had also upheld extrinsic evidence of bias, such as another witness's rebuttal testimony, both before and after the Rules took effect.8 A technique that federal precedent required and state courts overwhelmingly accepted is an unlikely casualty of omission. The constitutional side of cross-examination for bias, which begins with Davis v. Alaska, has its own section below.
The structure of the Rules supplies the affirmative argument. A successful showing of bias makes the facts the witness reported less probable in the jury's eyes than they would be without the testimony, and that tendency is what makes evidence relevant.9 The Reporter for the Advisory Committee that drafted the Rules described the consequence: in principle no common law of evidence remains, because "All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided."10 The Rules therefore start from admissibility, and whoever wants relevant evidence kept out must find a provision that excludes it. Rules 608, 609, and 610 are provisions of that kind, each regulating a particular credibility use. A technique that no rule regulates stays inside the default.
The old law does not vanish, however. The Reporter added that the body of common-law knowledge continues to exist as a source of guidance in exercising the powers the Rules delegate.11 For bias, that guidance has concrete content. The common law allowed bias to be shown by extrinsic evidence, while requiring the cross-examiner to "take the answer of the witness" on less favored forms of impeachment.12 Federal practice keeps the bias half of that rule: the cross-examiner need not settle for the witness's denial, and extrinsic evidence is admissible, subject to Rule 403.13 Rule 403 has real force. The trial court in Abel used it to keep out particularly inflammatory and detailed evidence about the witness's association in the prison gang, including the name of the gang.14 Abel also illustrates the familiar principle that evidence admissible for one purpose is usually not rendered inadmissible simply because it would be excluded if offered for some other purpose.15
The relevance default gives way when a rule provides otherwise, and Rule 610 does. Evidence of a witness's religious beliefs or opinions is not admissible to attack or support the witness's credibility.16 A cross-examiner who argues that a nonbeliever is less believable because he fears no divine punishment for lying therefore gets no help from the general admissibility of relevant evidence. A later section examines when a religious tie may still be shown as a motive.
The same reasoning reaches other credibility techniques that the Rules do not spell out. Like bias, specific contradiction, which shows that part of a witness's testimony is untrue, is relevant to credibility and, by parity of reasoning, permissible in federal practice.17 The Rules do not expressly limit specific contradiction on collateral matters, although some federal courts still apply the common-law restriction. Logically relevant contradiction evidence is presumptively admissible under Rule 402, and the judge may limit it under Rule 403.18