Concept
Sources of Bias
Bias and interest
Sources of Bias
Impeachment for bias asks whether a witness has a reason to shade the truth, and the reasons come from two places: a relationship with a party, or a stake in how the case ends. The relationship may be personal or professional, and the stake may be emotional, moral, or religious as well as financial.1 Rule 610 even permits evidence of religion when it is offered to show bias, a point taken up below. The Supreme Court strongly affirmed the admissibility of bias evidence in United States v. Abel. Relevant evidence is admissible unless an exclusionary rule blocks it, Justice Rehnquist reasoned, and evidence supporting bias clearly meets the test of relevance because it diminishes the likelihood that the facts the biased witness described are accurate.2
So many relationships give rise to favor or animus that the points an examiner may raise are wide indeed. Hard-edged rules are few, and the permissible extent of cross-examination for bias is largely a matter for the trial judge's discretion. The judge cannot, however, cut off every apparently legitimate attempt to show bias, and some subjects, like plea bargains affecting prosecution witnesses and fees paid to experts, are so clearly proper that at least some questions are always allowed.3
The facts that qualify fall into three families, each working through a different mechanism. Personal feeling toward a party moves a witness through affection or resentment. A financial or legal stake moves a witness through something to gain or lose. Group membership moves a witness through loyalty. The families illustrate the idea without closing the list: whatever the link, the question is whether it gives this witness a reason to slant this account.
Relationships and Hostility
Feeling runs in both directions. A witness who is a friend or relative of a party may want that party to win, and a witness whose feelings predispose the witness against a party may want that party to lose.4 Either motive can lead a witness to shade an account, so an examiner who finds any tie between witness and party asks one question: does this tie give the witness a reason to prefer one outcome?
Friendly ties work through different mechanisms. Kinship and friendship work through affection, since a witness who cares for a party wants that party to prevail. Employment and business dealings work through dependence, since a witness whose paycheck or contracts rest with a party has a reason not to displease that party. Payments work through gratitude and a continuing interest in the payer's goodwill. The questions counsel may ask in this territory range widely: a prosecutor may ask a defense witness, an alleged co-offender, whether the defendant has been paying the witness's wife's grocery and light bills since the witness was jailed.5
The examiner need not prove that the relationship is improper or that the witness lied. The inquiry is whether the link plausibly gives the witness a reason to prefer one outcome, and a loving, lawful family tie qualifies as readily as a shady one. A juror cannot discount testimony for affection or dependence unless someone discloses it, and cross-examination is the means of disclosure.
Hostility is the mirror image. A witness who has quarreled with a party, sued or been sued by that party, or been rebuffed or offended by the party has a reason to want the party to lose, so testimony that damages the party deserves a second look. A defense lawyer may ask a government witness whether the defendant rebuffed the witness's sexual advance,6 a question that hands the jury a concrete reason, apart from anything the witness remembers, why the witness might want the defendant to lose.
Not every grudge earns the jury's time. The judge controls how far cross-examination on bias may go, and Rule 403 applies to bias evidence as it applies to any other.7 A fight the witness lost to the defendant forty years ago says little about present motive, and proving it, if the witness disputes it, would cost confusion and delay. A court will probably exclude it.
The forty-year-old fight and the pending lawsuit are both grudges, and they differ in how alive the motive remains. A recent, unresolved dispute still pulls on the witness at the moment of testifying, while an ancient scuffle gives the jury almost nothing to weigh and gives the court a collateral dispute to untangle. The judge's discretion also has a constitutional floor. When a criminal defendant is exposing the motive of a prosecution witness, the Confrontation Clause can require the court to allow the cross-examination, a limit discussed below.
Financial and Legal Stakes
A stake in the outcome supplies a motive just as a feeling does, and Abel's reasoning covers it: evidence of bias matters because it makes the witness's account less likely to be accurate, whatever the source of the bias.10 The stakes that qualify tie the witness's own interests to the result, and money and legal exposure are the two main forms. When a witness's income or freedom depends on who prevails, the account may drift toward the side that controls the reward, and it may do so without any conscious lie.
Money comes in many shapes. A defense lawyer may ask a government informer whether the informer's livelihood depends entirely on government payment and whether the informer made up testimony about the client in order to collect a bounty.11 The question ties the witness's income to the paying side's satisfaction. The grocery-and-light-bills question above shows that a witness need not receive a dollar personally to depend on a payer's goodwill, since a payment to the witness's wife reaches the witness through the family.
The retained expert is the cleanest example, because nothing about the fee is improper. Evidence that an expert is paid by one of the parties is admissible to show bias.12 Fees paid to experts, like plea bargains affecting prosecution witnesses, are so clearly proper a subject that at least some questions are always allowed.13 The examiner shows the incentive that the arrangement creates, and the jury gives that incentive whatever weight it deserves. No finding is needed that the fee was excessive or that the expert shaded an opinion. The common error is to treat a legitimate fee as irrelevant because it reflects no misconduct, when the only question is whether the arrangement gives the witness a reason to favor the paying party.
The bystander scene illustrates a weak inference and is not a decided case. The expert's fee exists because one party chose the expert, and it depends on that party's continued satisfaction, while the bystander's fee is fixed for every witness. A payment that varies with the side or the testimony reveals a stake. A payment that does not vary reveals little, and a judge may trim that inquiry when balancing probative value against delay and confusion under Rule 403.14
Legal exposure can create a stake larger than any fee. A witness who has pleaded guilty and awaits sentencing, holds a promise of immunity, or has charges pending has a strong reason to please the prosecutor, whose choices about charges and sentencing recommendations shape what happens to the witness next. Abel's own trial followed the pattern. The government's witness, Ehle, had pleaded guilty to the same robbery, and the defense theory was that he meant to implicate Abel falsely in order to receive lenient treatment.15 Ehle's testimony may have been true, and the cross-examiner need not prove otherwise. The jury is entitled to know that the witness's own freedom is on the table.
Only the prosecution knows the terms of its dealings with a witness, so the law places the burden of disclosure on the prosecutor. A prosecutor must disclose deals and promises of leniency affecting key prosecution witnesses, as Giglio v. United States requires, and the defense uses that disclosure to question the witness at trial.16 Without disclosure the defense would have no basis for the question, and the jury would hear a cooperating witness as though the witness were a neutral observer. The courts of appeals have supported the follow-up: in United States v. Maloof the defense questioned an alleged co-offender extensively about a plea agreement, and in United States v. Roberts the court said the defense should be allowed to ask about plea agreements between the government and its witnesses.17
Probationary status is a quieter legal stake, and it is developed fully with the confrontation right below. In Davis v. Alaska the Court held that confrontation rights were violated when the defense was barred from cross-examining a youthful prosecution witness about his juvenile probation, because probationer status might reveal “biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives.”18 A witness on probation answers to the same system that is prosecuting the defendant, which may give the witness a reason to stay in the authorities' good graces. Probation therefore belongs beside pending charges and plea deals as a stake worth showing to the jury.
Group Membership
Abel also supplies the rule for the third family: a witness may be impeached by showing common membership with a party in an organization whose tenets require members to lie for one another. Membership works much as affection or money does. A close group creates loyalties, and a witness loyal to a fellow member has a reason to shade testimony in that member's favor. Three people carry the facts, so it helps to fix their roles at the start: Ehle, the cohort who testified for the government; Mills, the defense witness whose bias was at issue; and Abel, the defendant.
Abel was tried for a bank robbery. Ehle, who had pleaded guilty to the same robbery as a co-participant, testified for the government, and his testimony directly implicated Abel.22 To answer him, Abel called Mills, who took no part in the robbery but was friendly with Abel and Ehle and had spent time with both in prison. Mills planned to testify that Ehle had admitted, after the robbery, an intent to implicate Abel falsely in order to receive favorable treatment from the government.23 If the jury believed Mills, Ehle's testimony would look like a purchase of leniency.
The prosecutor answered by attacking Mills's bias. He announced that he would recall Ehle to show that Abel, Mills, and Ehle all belonged to the “Aryan Brotherhood,” a secret prison gang whose members had to deny that it existed and to commit perjury, theft, and murder on each member's behalf.24 Ehle then testified that the three belonged to a secret prison organization whose tenets required members to deny its existence and “lie, cheat, steal [and] kill” to protect each other, and that, given how close Abel and Mills were, it would have been “suicide” for Ehle to have told Mills what Mills attributed to him. Abel's counsel requested no limiting instruction, and none was given.25 The trial court did use Rule 403 to keep out particularly inflammatory and detailed evidence about the association, including the gang's name.26 On bias, a cross-examiner need not settle for the witness's denial, and extrinsic evidence such as Ehle's rebuttal testimony is admissible, subject to Rule 403.27
The court of appeals saw a problem. Ehle's testimony, it said, was admitted not only to show that shared membership might lead Mills to color his account but also to suggest that Mills must be lying because he belonged to a perjurious organization, and an inference of perjury drawn from a group tenet was impermissible.28 The court insisted that the government show that the individual knows of and personally accepts the organization's tenets. It refused to allow impeachment on mere membership, which, “without more, has no probative value” and “establishes nothing about the individual's own actions, beliefs, or veracity.”29
The Supreme Court rejected that reasoning. A witness's and a party's common membership in an organization is probative of bias even without proof that the witness or party has personally adopted its tenets.30 Relevance came first: the membership of Mills and Abel in a gang embracing secrecy and falsehood supported the inference that Mills's testimony was slanted, or perhaps fabricated, in Abel's favor.31
The Court then explained why the court of appeals had borrowed the wrong standard. Scales and Brandenburg set the constitutional requirements for convicting people under the Smith Act and state syndicalism laws for belonging to organizations that espoused illegal aims and engaged in illegal conduct.32 Mills's membership was offered to impeach him, not to convict anyone, and the only sanction he faced was that he might be disbelieved.33 For purposes of the law of evidence, the jury may infer subscription to the tenets from membership alone, even though that inference would not support a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt under the Smith Act.34
The standards differ because the stakes differ. A conviction punishes a person for belief and conduct, so the law demands proof that this individual accepted the group's aims before it punishes. Impeachment asks only whether the jury should give testimony less weight, and a reasonable inference can answer that. The inference is permissive, so a witness who admits membership may still say that the creed meant nothing, and the jury decides whether to believe it. An examinee who demands proof of personal adherence before membership may come in is applying a criminal-law standard to a credibility question.
The second holding concerns the kind of group the witness and the party share. If the organization is a loosely knit group having nothing to do with the subject matter of the litigation, the inference of bias from common membership may be small or nonexistent, and two people who belonged to the Book of the Month Club would probably not lead a jury to infer bias.35 The Aryan Brotherhood was different. A secret prison sect sworn to perjury and self-protection bore directly on the fact of Mills's bias and also on its source and strength, because its tenets gave Mills a powerful motive to slant his testimony toward Abel or even to commit perjury outright.36
The strength of the inference depends on how closely the group's norms touch the act the witness is performing. A book club's norms say nothing about testimony, so shared membership shows little more than acquaintance. A group that demands secrecy, requires lying for fellow members, and punishes those who break ranks speaks directly to what a member does when a fellow member is on trial, which is why the details of the tenets were probative and not merely decorative.
The court of appeals' objection, that membership suggests Mills must be lying, treats the evidence as proof of untruthful character, and that purpose carries its own rules. When Rule 608(b) governs, the questioner may cross-examine but may not offer extrinsic evidence.37 Bias is a different purpose, and evidence admissible for one purpose is usually not rendered inadmissible because it would be excluded if offered for another.38 That principle is why Ehle could be recalled to prove the membership, and why the trial judge's task was to limit inflammatory detail under Rule 403 and not to bar the proof.
On an exam, the description of the group in the fact pattern usually controls the answer. A group sworn to mutual protection and perjury supports a strong inference of bias, while a hobby club supports almost none, and neither answer depends on proof that the witness personally embraced the creed.