Concept
No End Run Through 608(b)
Pardon, annulment, or certificate of rehabilitation under Rule 609(c)
No End Run Through 608(b)
Rule 609(c) makes evidence of a conviction inadmissible1 when the conviction was the subject of a pardon, annulment, certificate of rehabilitation, or other equivalent procedure based on a finding of rehabilitation, so long as the person has no later conviction for a crime punishable by death or by imprisonment for more than one year,2 or when it was the subject of a pardon, annulment, or equivalent procedure based on a finding of innocence.3
That text bars evidence of a conviction, and the wording suggests a workaround. A cross-examiner who may not mention the conviction might try to reach the same wrongdoing through Rule 608(b) by asking about the underlying acts and never uttering the word “conviction.” Rule 608(b) opens with an exception: “[e]xcept for a criminal conviction under Rule 609,” extrinsic evidence (proof from sources other than the witness's own answers) is not admissible to prove specific instances of a witness's conduct in order to attack or support the witness's character for truthfulness. The court may nonetheless, on cross-examination, allow such instances to be inquired into if they are probative of the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.4 Whether that permission reaches acts that produced a conviction Rule 609(c) has put off limits is disputed.
One view gives Rule 609 exclusive control whenever the conduct led to a conviction. Rule 609 appears designed to cover the whole subject of impeachment by conviction, and Rule 608 appears designed to cover only misconduct that never became a conviction. On that division of labor, Rule 609 and its limits on cross-examination apply whenever the conduct in question has produced a conviction.5 Misconduct can escape conviction for many reasons: the person was never caught, the conduct never reached the authorities, it was a civil wrong but not a crime, charges were never brought or were dropped, or an acquittal followed.6 Rule 608(b) governs those cases. A witness whose conduct was prosecuted to conviction stands on the other side of the line, and forgiving the conviction under Rule 609(c) does not change the fact that the conduct led to one. Applied to a forgiven conviction, this view means the bar protects the witness from questions about the acts as well as from questions about the judgment.
The federal circuits have split. In 2009 the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Osazuwa, agreed that Rule 608 is unavailable when conduct has resulted in a conviction, and the First Circuit, in United States v. Rogers, is on the same page.7 The Seventh Circuit went the other way in United States v. Barnhart (2010). It rejected a claim of error where the prosecutor “paraded” the facts underlying the defendant's convictions, holding that the cases applying Rule 609's limits were “inapplicable” because Rule 608 permits cross-examination on the “facts underlying his theft and deceptive practices convictions.”8 State courts divide as well. Kentucky's Childers treats impeachment by conduct that led to a conviction as governed exclusively by Rule 609, with Rule 608 reserved for conduct that did not. North Dakota's Hoverson found error where the trial court thought it had no discretion to let the defense ask about the facts underlying an informant's theft conviction.9
As the sources report these decisions, they concern conduct underlying convictions generally. Carrying them over to a conviction barred by Rule 609(c) extends the split to a new setting. An exam answer should label it as an extension and not as a holding.
The exclusive view rests on what Rule 609's limits are for. A prosecutor who could ask about the facts underlying a conviction would evade the reverse balancing test in Rule 609(a)(1), which protects criminal defendants who testify against the unusually high danger of unfair prejudice that earlier convictions create.10 The same objection applies to the Rule 609(c) bar, which would keep out the label while letting in the wrongdoing behind it.
The Seventh Circuit's answer starts from the text of Rule 608(b), which reaches specific instances of conduct probative of truthfulness. The carve-out for convictions sits in the sentence about extrinsic evidence, not in the sentence that permits inquiry on cross-examination. The permission is also discretionary and subject to a balancing of probative value against the risk of prejudice and confusion under Rule 403.11 That discretion is what Hoverson said the trial court overlooked.
On an exam, first ask whether the acts the examiner wants to explore are the same acts that produced the forgiven conviction. If they are, state both positions and say which one the forum follows if the facts identify it. Do not present either as settled nationally. If the acts never led to a conviction, Rule 608(b) applies in the ordinary way and Rule 609(c) has nothing to say. Two mistakes recur: concluding from the bar alone that the examiner has no route to the acts, and concluding from Rule 608(b)'s focus on conduct that the examiner always has one. Even in a court that allows the inquiry, Rule 608(b)'s bar on extrinsic evidence limits what the examiner can do with the witness's answer.12