Concept
Souter's Dissent
Preemptive introduction and appellate waiver under Ohler
Souter's Dissent
Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, dissented in Ohler v. United States. He argued that the majority's waiver holding lacks support in precedent, in the Rules of Evidence, and in the objectives of a fair trial.1 The dissent is not the law, and a federal court applies the majority's rule. It still repays close reading, because it isolates the premises that carry the majority's result, and the later criticism of Ohler presses the same blunting point.2 The dissent contests three things. It asks whether Luce v. United States reaches a defendant who testified. It asks whether the rule against appealing evidence you introduced yourself fits a party who introduces it only to blunt it. And it asks whether the majority's rule helps or harms the jury's search for the truth. Each is a rival account of the same facts.
The Record Answer to Luce
The dissent answered Luce with a fact: Ohler testified. Her direct examination, including the disclosure of her conviction, is in the transcript. In the dissent's view, that record eliminates the speculative concerns that drove Luce and makes the decision inapplicable.3 That reading fits Luce itself. There the Court observed that a reviewing court is handicapped in ruling on subtle evidentiary questions outside a factual context. The handicap is greatest under Rule 609(a)(1), where the court must weigh a conviction's probative value against its prejudicial effect and therefore must know the precise nature of the defendant's testimony.4 The Luce Court added that, had the petitioner testified and been impeached, the court of appeals would have had a complete record of his testimony, the scope of the cross-examination, and the possible impact of the impeachment on the verdict.5
Luce also named a second gap. When the defendant does not testify, the reviewing court cannot know whether the Government would have used the conviction at all, since a prosecutor with a strong case might leave an arguably inadmissible conviction alone.6 Ohler's testimony fills the first gap but not the second. Because she disclosed the conviction herself, nothing in the record shows whether the prosecutor would have raised it. Which gap counts as the heart of Luce decides which side has the better argument. The dissent puts the record first. Treating the Government's choice as the heart of Luce points toward the result the majority reached. For Ohler the difference is concrete: on the dissent's view the court of appeals reaches the merits of the in limine ruling, and on the majority's view the appeal ends at the threshold. Reaching the merits is not winning, because the court would still have to find error.
The Blunting Exception
The dissent's second point concerns the principle the majority applied: that a party who introduces evidence cannot appeal its admission. The dissent called Ohler's situation an exception. The law of evidence and leading treatises, it said, generally treat a party who objected, lost, and then introduced the evidence she expects her adversary to offer, in order to blunt its force, as not having waived the objection.7 The exception turns on who creates the exposure. A party who volunteers evidence creates her own exposure. A party whose objection was overruled faces an exposure the court has already created, and she chooses only how to meet it.
The majority was unmoved. Ohler argued that the rule forces a defendant to give up the tactical advantage of preemptive introduction in order to keep her appeal. The Court answered that both the Government and the defendant must make choices as a trial progresses.8 It rejected the argument that a defendant may 'draw the sting' of her convictions on direct examination without losing her appeal of the denied motion in limine.9 Because the dissent's exception is defined by purpose, it has an edge that a pair of defendants makes visible.
The controlling rule draws no distinction by purpose. Each defendant lost the motion and then introduced the conviction on direct, so each stands on the same footing and each has forfeited the claim.10 The dissent's purpose line therefore works as criticism and as a guide to how some states have reasoned, and it does not change the federal answer.
Accuracy and Concealment
The dissent's third point tests the waiver rule against the objectives of a fair trial. When a defendant discloses her convictions at the outset of her testimony, the factfinder can weigh them in judging her credibility. When they surface only on cross-examination, the jury may infer concealment and attribute present deceit to her. That impression bears less on her old conduct than on whether she is honest in the testimony being given.11 A fact the witness volunteers can sound like candor, while the same fact pulled out by an adversary can sound like evasion. The dissent called the prosecution's resulting advantage a distortion of the search for truth, and no reason to forbid a defendant from introducing the convictions herself while keeping appellate review. It concluded that the majority's rule discourages a course that promotes fairness and dispassionate factfinding, and that it offers no persuasive gain in accuracy.12
The predicament is real for a federal defendant. She can preserve her claim by leaving the conviction unmentioned on direct, at the risk that the jury concludes she is hiding it. She can forfeit the claim in the hope of deflating the impeachment. Or she can decline to testify.13 Luce itself holds that a defendant must testify to raise and preserve a claim of improper impeachment with a prior conviction.14
Critics of the holding have taken the ground the dissent staked out. Blunting anticipated damaging evidence is an accepted, reasonable trial tactic, they say, and using it should not cost the defendant her challenge to an erroneous ruling.15 The holding is not constitutional in character, so states may adopt a contrary rule, and several have. At least one state expressly rejects Ohler and lets a defendant who draws the sting appeal the ruling.16
The common exam error carries the dissent's logic into the federal answer. A defendant who testified and left a full record has still forfeited the claim if the defense, rather than the prosecutor, first put the conviction before the jury, and her purpose in blunting does not restore it. State the dissent accurately as the strongest critique of the rule, and reach the majority rule in the conclusion.