Concept
Taking the Witness's Answer
Specific instances of conduct
Taking the Witness's Answer
Rule 608(b) lets the examiner ask about a witness's specific acts of untruthfulness, but it gives the examiner no way to prove those acts when the witness disputes them. Except for a criminal conviction under Rule 609, extrinsic evidence is not admissible to prove specific instances of a witness's conduct in order to attack or support the witness's character for truthfulness.1 Lawyers describe the result as taking the witness's answer. When the witness denies the misconduct, the cross-examiner may not contradict the denial with other witnesses, with impeaching documents, or with any evidence other than the cross-examination itself, even by waiting for the examiner's own turn to put on evidence.2
The bar costs something, and the rule pays the cost deliberately. A witness may deny an act that really happened, and the jury may never learn the truth. In exchange, the trial avoids a mini-trial within the trial over an alleged act whose only relevance is to the witness's character for truthfulness, and common-law courts usually ruled that the examiner must settle for the admissions and concessions obtained on cross-examination.3 Extrinsic proof of such acts would be time-consuming, distracting, prejudicial, unrelated to the issues being proved, and not particularly probative.4
Two questions remain, and the subsections below take them in turn: what the bar forbids and what the examiner may still do, and what counts as extrinsic evidence.
The Extrinsic Evidence Bar
When the witness denies an act, minimizes it, or explains it away, the examiner is left with what the witness said. The examiner may not call a second witness who saw the event, offer a document that records it, or play a recording of it. Extrinsic evidence is evidence other than what comes from cross-examining the witness being impeached, so the term covers documents, recordings, and the testimony of other witnesses.5 The question opens the topic, and the witness's answer closes it.
The bar does not lapse when cross-examination ends. An examiner who loses the exchange may hope to hold the proof for the examiner's own case or for rebuttal, on the theory that a new stage of the trial has begun. The rule contains no timing exception, and the examiner must take the answer even after waiting until it is time to put on evidence.6 The objection reaches rebuttal witnesses as well. In one dispute, the objecting party argued that rebuttal testimony about a witness's gang membership was extrinsic evidence offered to impugn the witness's veracity and so was barred by Rule 608(b).7 Whether such an objection succeeds depends on the purpose for which the evidence is offered, a point taken up below.
Taking the answer does not confine the examiner to a single attempt. The answer the examiner must accept is not necessarily the witness's first, and some badgering is tolerated so long as it stays within the cross-examination.8 The line falls where persistence would become proof. Putting the question a third time is questioning, while calling the investigating officer to say the act occurred is extrinsic evidence.
Two separate limits govern an examiner who wants to use a witness's past deceit, and the two should not be confused. The extrinsic-evidence bar controls how the act may be proved. The second sentence of Rule 608(b) controls where the inquiry may occur, since it authorizes the court to allow the instances to be inquired into “on cross-examination.”9 Past acts may be inquired about only on cross-examination, so direct examination is not a vehicle for eliciting a witness's specific untruthful acts to prove character for truthfulness.10 Either limit can be violated without the other. A lawyer who asks a witness on direct about the witness's own earlier forgery has gone outside the permission although no outside proof was offered, and a lawyer who asks a proper cross-examination question about a forgery and then calls the bank teller to prove it has run into the bar although the question was proper.
The bar cuts both ways, because the rule speaks of conduct offered to attack or support character for truthfulness. A cross-examiner cannot prove a lie through another witness, and a proponent cannot prove an honest act through another witness, such as the witness's refusal of a bribe. After an attack, the proponent's tool is reputation or opinion testimony about truthful character.11 The sequence is easy to follow with a witness named Wendy. The defendant waits until its case-in-chief and calls Xander to testify to Wendy's bad character for telling the truth. The plaintiff may then, in rebuttal, call Yasmine to attest to Wendy's character for truthfulness, but the plaintiff could not have called Yasmine before Xander impugned Wendy's honesty.12 Impeachment always precedes rehabilitation.13 The later section on supporting truthful character develops that sequence. Here it is enough to see that the extrinsic-evidence bar applies to both sides of the credibility contest.
The bar follows the logic of the collateral-evidence rule. As with that rule, a fact bearing on credibility, such as a past lie, may in the trial judge's discretion be elicited on cross-examination, yet because a mini-trial on the fact would invite confusion, prejudice, and waste of time, extrinsic evidence of the matter is prohibited.14 The alleged act matters only because it brings the witness's character for truthfulness into question.15 To prove that the alibi witness defrauded an elderly woman, the examiner would need the woman, perhaps an investigator, and documents. The witness would answer with evidence of her own, and the jury would end up deciding a fraud that no one is trying.
For this purpose the exclusion is categorical. Specific instances of conduct involving dishonesty or false statement are fair game on cross-examination even without a conviction, but extrinsic evidence of them is inadmissible.16 The word may in the rule's second sentence governs the inquiry on cross, while the first sentence says flatly that the proof is not admissible.17 The Advisory Committee's Note to the 2003 amendment confirms that the “absolute prohibition on extrinsic evidence applies . . . when the sole reason for proffering that evidence is to attack the witness' character for truthfulness.”18 The same facts may therefore come in for a different purpose, such as bias, which the next section takes up. The rule's opening clause also lets a criminal conviction be proved under Rule 609, a point developed in the section on convictions.19
What Counts as Extrinsic
The text of Rule 608(b) never defines extrinsic evidence, but the working definition turns on the source of the proof. Extrinsic evidence is evidence other than the witness's own testimony on cross-examination, which means the testimony of other witnesses or documentary evidence.21 Courts put the point this way: extrinsic evidence is evidence offered through other witnesses rather than through cross-examination of the witness.22 Recordings belong with documents.23 One question sorts any proffer: did the proof come from the witness's own mouth in answer to the examiner, or from somewhere else?
Two borderline situations test the definition, and each tempts an examiner to find a way around it. The first involves a document the examiner holds in hand.
An examiner who has a letter or record can use it in two ways, and only one of them is extrinsic evidence. Having a document marked as an exhibit and then asking the witness about it does not introduce extrinsic evidence, while introducing the document into evidence would violate the bar.24 The difference lies in what each step does. Marking identifies the paper for the record and lets the examiner question the witness about it, and the jury receives nothing from a marked item until the court admits it, so the witness's answer remains the only proof of the act. Admission puts the document before the jury as a second, independent source of proof, and that is what the bar forbids.
The line therefore falls at admission, and an examiner's reliance on a paper in framing the question stays on the permitted side of it. The paper may supply the good-faith basis for asking, as the earlier discussion of that requirement explained.
The second situation involves no witness and no paper, which makes it harder to spot. A cross-examiner asks, “Didn't your employer fire you for falsifying time sheets?” No second witness appears and no document is offered, so the question seems to stay within the rules. Yet the question works to get the witness to concede what the employer did, so that the jury takes the employer's conclusion as contradicting the witness's denial of the falsification. The Advisory Committee's Note to the 2003 amendment of Rule 608 recognized this risk of abuse and stated that the practice was barred by the extrinsic evidence rule.25 A firing carries the employer's conclusion that the witness falsified the records. If the witness admits the firing, the jury hears that conclusion without the employer ever testifying, and if the witness attributes the firing to another cause, the examiner cannot prove otherwise. The question substitutes proof of a third party's belief for proof of the act.
A cleaner form puts the witness's own conduct in issue. “Did you falsify your time sheets?” calls for the witness's answer about the witness's own act, and the examiner is bound by it. “Didn't your employer fire you for falsifying them?” calls for an answer about the employer's act and invites the jury to adopt the employer's view.
Neither situation is barred merely because a document or a third party's conduct is involved, because the bar attaches to purpose. It applies only when a party offers evidence to contradict a witness's denial of an act raised solely to challenge the witness's character for truthfulness, and evidence offered for any other relevant purpose falls outside it.26 Rob is on trial for receiving stolen television sets and claims he had no suspicion they were stolen. A former employee would testify that Rob made false entries in his books to cover up the crime. If the testimony showed only that Rob has an untruthful character, the bar would exclude it. The false entries also undermine Rob's claim of no suspicion and are an integral part of the crime charged, so the testimony proves a substantive fact and the bar does not reach it.27 The next section develops that limit, and the steps below classify a proffer only as far as the bar itself.
The third step is the one students overlook, because the absence of a second witness or an exhibit makes the question look harmless. The fourth explains why a ruling that excludes proof under this rule can still leave the same facts available for another purpose.