Concept
Cross-Examining Character Witnesses
Specific instances of conduct
Cross-Examining Character Witnesses
Rule 608(b)(1) lets a cross-examiner press a witness about her own untruthful acts, even when no conviction resulted. Subdivision (b)(2) changes the target: the court may allow inquiry into acts probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness of “another witness whose character the witness being cross-examined has testified about.”1 The familiar sequence runs like this. A party calls a character witness to give an opinion about the truthfulness of someone who testified in the case, or to report that person’s reputation for it, and the opponent cross-examines the character witness. The examiner may then ask about specific prior acts of the principal witness, the person described, when those acts are probative of untruthfulness.2 The character witness is the one being questioned; the principal witness is the one whose acts the questions recount.
The rule exists because character testimony arrives as a bare conclusion. “She is honest” does not tell the jury what the speaker has seen or how much deceit the speaker would tolerate before choosing a harsher word. A question about a specific act fills that gap, because the answer shows whether the character witness knows enough to hold an opinion and whether her standard of honesty is one the jury can accept.3
Because the questions aim at the character witness, the specific act works as a probe and not as proof. The extrinsic-evidence bar in the rule’s first sentence therefore continues to govern the principal witness’s conduct,4 and the cross-examiner needs a good-faith basis for the inquiry.5 The first subsection below traces the cross from question to answer. The second takes up a limit that comes from the rule’s own wording: it reaches only a person who is in fact a witness.
Testing the Character Witness
The usual sequence has three steps. Someone attacks a witness’s truthfulness, typically with opinion or reputation testimony. The other side answers with a character witness who vouches for the principal witness’s truthfulness, which is permitted only after the attack has been made.6 The attacker then cross-examines the vouching witness about specific prior acts of the principal witness that are probative of untruthfulness.7 The rule’s language also runs the other way: a witness who impeached by opinion or reputation for non-veracity may be asked about good specific acts of the person described, which shows what that kind of impeachment opens up.8 The rest of this subsection follows the cross of a vouching witness.
A single question about a specific act tests the character witness twice. It tests what she knows, because someone who knows the principal witness well should know of a serious episode of deceit. It tests what she means by honest, because a witness who knows of the episode and still vouches for the principal witness is either lying or using a rather strange standard for good character.9 The cross-examiner comes out ahead whichever way she answers. If she did not know, she lacked important information; if she did, her good opinion is hard to understand.10 A reputation witness fares no better. One who has not heard of the episode may not be plugged into the community, and one who has heard of it and still reports a good reputation puts the community’s judgment in question.11
The court refused the investigator because the first sentence of Rule 608(b) bars extrinsic evidence of a witness’s specific conduct offered to attack or support character for truthfulness, so the cross-examiner must take the character witness’s answer.12 The 2003 committee note describes the prohibition as absolute “when the sole reason for proffering that evidence is to attack the witness’ character for truthfulness,” and here the only legitimate relevance of the pastor’s answer is to the pastor’s own credibility.13 A criminal conviction is the one exception, because the rule’s opening clause lets a conviction be proved as Rule 609 provides.14
The form of the question matters little under the federal rules. At common law the reputation witness was asked “Have you heard that . . . ?” and the opinion witness “Did you know that . . . ?”15 The distinction has slight practical importance, and the Federal Rules abandon it. A character witness may be asked directly about the principal witness’s acts probative of untruthfulness and also about her familiarity with the principal witness’s convictions, arrests, and indictments.16
How far the cross may reach depends on what the character witness said. One court put the principle this way: the cross “may take in as much ground as the testimony it is designed to verify,” because a narrower rule would let a defendant enjoy testimony of honest, law-abiding reputation that might not be true.17 Rule 405(a) states the same idea for reputation and opinion witnesses generally, allowing inquiry on cross into relevant specific instances of conduct.18 Rule 608(b)(2) is narrower in subject, because its text reaches only acts probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness.19 A witness who vouched only for honesty has therefore not opened the door to conduct that says nothing about lying, such as a barroom brawl, while courts usually treat acts of dishonesty or false statement as sufficiently probative.20
Two safeguards come from the rule itself. The court allows the inquiry in its discretion,21 and the cross-examiner must have a good-faith basis in fact for the question. If the opponent objects and the examiner cannot show a basis at sidebar, the judge should bar the inquiry.22 The requirement carries weight because these questions pay off whichever way the witness answers, so a question without a reasonable basis amounts to gross misconduct.23
Time is the third limit, and it turns on what the character witness actually said. If her testimony was clearly confined to recent reputation, a question about an event twenty years back is improper, because the event cannot logically bear on current reputation. If her testimony was not so confined, the question is allowable, and the rules set no time limit on inquiry into past bad conduct.24 Even a very old event may come in. One court acknowledged that a jury might find a 1920 arrest too old and indecisive to shed light on present reputation, yet found no abuse of discretion in admitting the question where two witnesses had known the defendant for thirty years and no one objected on that ground.25
Step 1 is the subject of the next subsection, and step 5 explains why the cross pays off even though the answer cannot be contradicted.
When the Principal Never Testifies
Rule 608(b)(2) reaches the acts of “another witness whose character the witness being cross-examined has testified about.”27 The operative word is witness. The preceding subsection assumed two people on the stand, one vouching for the other. When the person described never testifies, the rule gives the examiner nothing to attach the question to, and praise or criticism of that person does not open the door to his past conduct.
United States v. Anderson applied the limit. Thibodeau, an officer, testified that Besore was trustworthy, and Besore did not testify. The defense wanted to bring out Besore’s prior felony conviction while cross-examining Thibodeau, and the trial court refused to allow the question under Rules 403 and 609.28 The defense tried again after Thibodeau answered “Absolutely” when asked whether he believed and trusted Besore. Counsel acknowledged the earlier ruling but argued that the conviction bore on how credible Thibodeau was as a witness who vouched for such a person. The prosecutor replied that Rule 609 is a tool for impeaching a witness and that the person the defense wanted to impeach, Besore, was not one.29
The appellate court affirmed and rested on Besore’s status, and the claim failed whichever way the defense named its target. If the target was Besore, Thibodeau, in discussing Besore’s trustworthiness, “was not attacking or supporting the credibility of a witness,” because Besore did not testify.30 If the target was Thibodeau, Rule 608(b) foreclosed the argument that the officer’s own credibility was really at stake and that Besore’s felony conviction could enter through the back door when the front door was barred. The rule refers to specific instances of the conduct of a witness, the conviction was Besore’s conduct, and Besore was not a witness, so the conviction could not come in during Thibodeau’s cross-examination.31
The relabeling fails because the rule limits the subject by whose conduct the question describes and not by the purpose the examiner announces. If calling the question an attack on the vouching witness were enough, any party could reach an absent person’s record by pointing to one sentence of praise from someone who did testify, and the requirement that the person described be a witness would mean nothing. An exam stem in which a police witness praises someone who never testifies, followed by a question about that person’s record, is testing this limit, and the first thing to ask is whether the person took the stand.
The two trials differ only in whether the person described took the stand, and that one fact decides whether the permission exists. The rest of the analysis from the preceding subsection, including the probative-of-truthfulness threshold and the judge’s discretion, comes into play only after this first step is satisfied.