Concept
Supporting Truthful Character
Specific instances of conduct
Supporting Truthful Character
Rule 608(a) lets a party shore up a witness's credibility with reputation or opinion testimony about the witness's character for truthfulness, on one condition: "evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the witness's character for truthfulness has been attacked."1 Rule 608(b) adds a limit on form. Extrinsic evidence of specific instances of conduct is inadmissible to support a witness's character for truthfulness, just as it is inadmissible to attack it.2 Rehabilitation with character evidence therefore clears three hurdles: an attack must have occurred, the attack must be of a kind that opens the door, and the support must take the form of reputation or opinion.
No Support Before Attack
Impeachment always precedes rehabilitation, and the last sentence of Rule 608(a) enforces that order.3 A party may not follow a witness's direct examination with a character witness who vouches for the witness's honesty, because the law assumes that every witness who takes the stand has a good character for truthfulness until someone attacks it.4
That assumption heads off a bolstering contest. If each side could line up character witnesses for witnesses whose credibility nobody had challenged, the trial would fill with distracting, time-consuming testimony.5 A second danger concerns who decides credibility. Vouching that comes before any challenge lets a clever lawyer take the all-important credibility determination out of the jury's hands, because jurors overvalue claims that a witness is honest when they hear them before they hear evidence that the witness is dishonest.6
In practice, a party may call a character witness for its own witness only in rebuttal to an attack, for example after the opponent has called a witness who testifies to the first witness's bad character for truthfulness.7
On exams, the error usually appears as a party who calls a witness's pastor or employer on direct examination to tell the jury how trustworthy the witness is. The opponent's objection should be sustained, because nothing has yet attacked the witness's truthfulness.
Attacks That Open the Door
Rule 608(a) says only that the witness's character for truthfulness must have been "attacked," so each problem turns on which kinds of impeachment count. An earlier version of the rule allowed support once character had been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence "or otherwise." The 2011 restyling dropped those words without intending any change in content, although how courts read the shorter text remains to be seen.9
The sorting principle is response in kind: character evidence answers an attack on character.10 Opinion or reputation testimony that the witness is untruthful is the plain case, and a prior conviction under Rule 609, prior acts of misconduct, and a showing of coercion or corruption also qualify.11 Each charges the witness with a dishonest character, and good character is the reply. When the attack comes through cross-examination, the trial court must decide whether its net effect is a sustained direct attack on the witness's character for truthfulness, which is often a difficult call.12
A showing of interest or bias is different. It is not a sufficient attack on character, so it does not open the door.13 A relative of the proponent, or a witness paid to testify, has a reason to slant this testimony, and an opinion that the witness is honest by nature does not answer that charge in kind.14
Contradiction and inconsistency fall between the clear cases. The Advisory Committee's Note observes that whether contradiction amounts to a sufficient attack on character depends on the circumstances, and courts have generally held that mere contradiction by other evidence does not suffice.15 The reason is that contradiction shows only that the witness may be wrong, and even a witness with a stellar character for truthfulness can make a mistake.16 Treating every contradiction as an attack on character would invite the bolstering contests the timing rule exists to prevent.17
A sensible approach has the judge ask, case by case, whether the impeachment amounts in effect to an attack on the witness's character trait for truthfulness or only a limited attack on the specific testimony the witness has given.18 Three considerations guide that judgment. The first is whether the inconsistency concerns a matter on which the witness could be innocently mistaken. The second is whether it is so flat that the irresistible inference is a lie rather than a mistake. The third is how many inconsistencies the cross-examiner has shown, because a larger number strengthens the inference that the witness is a liar by character and not the author of one isolated lie.19 For a prior inconsistent statement, a court in its discretion may allow support when the impeachment raises an inference impugning the witness's truthfulness, but should not allow it when the impeachment merely charges lack of memory or mistake.20
A party also cannot manufacture the attack for the sake of rehabilitating. In State v. Carr, the court held that a prosecutor cannot create a foundation for character evidence by asking whether a witness has lied. In the court's words, "[a]n affirmative response to such an inquiry does not put the character for truthfulness of the prosecution witness at issue, nor does it open the door to rehabilitation evidence of truthful character."21 A defendant who answers yes when asked whether the accuser is lying has contradicted the accuser and has not attacked her character.
When the attack is too narrow to open the door to character witnesses, the party can still try to negate the impeaching evidence directly. Counsel may do so on redirect examination. Unless the impeaching evidence pertains to a minor point that the rules forbid proving, counsel may also produce extrinsic evidence that the impeaching evidence is false, as when a witness impeached by evidence of intoxication is shown to have been sober.22
The Form of Support
Once the door has opened, Rule 608(a) fixes what may come through it: reputation testimony or opinion testimony about the witness's character for truthfulness.24 Specific instances of good conduct stay out, because Rule 608(b) bars extrinsic proof of specific instances offered to support a witness's character for truthfulness as well as to attack it.25 The restyled rule keeps that limit, so specific instances in support remain inadmissible.26
The evidence rules prefer opinion and reputation because evidence of particular instances of conduct, despite its possibly superior probative value, is often unduly distracting and time-consuming. Evidence of past conduct is available in only one circumstance, which is cross-examination.27
The bar is framed in terms of extrinsic evidence, which courts define as evidence offered through other witnesses rather than through cross-examination of the witness himself or herself.28 In United States v. Murray, the Third Circuit applied that definition to a lieutenant's testimony about Brown's character for truthfulness and treated the testimony as "extrinsic evidence."29 The label matters because, once the door is open, the supporting party's own character witness may offer only an opinion or reputation conclusion and may not prove particular acts.
The proper shape of supporting testimony appears in an exchange with a witness named Gram. Gram testifies that Gardner belongs to his congregation, that he worked with her on church projects, and that he came to know her quite well. He then states his estimate of her character for truth and veracity, "of the very highest order," and says he would believe her whether or not she was under oath.30 The first part of the testimony shows how Gram knows Gardner, and the second states his conclusion about her truthfulness. Gram recounts no particular act of honesty.
Specific conduct enters through cross-examination of the character witness. The cross-examiner may ask Gram whether he knew of specific incidents that cut against Gardner's honesty, and the question helps the questioner however Gram answers. If he did not know of them, he lacked important information about Gardner, and if he did know, his good opinion of her honesty is hard to understand. The purpose is to test the knowledge and judgment of the character witness, as with character witnesses under Rule 405.31 Rule 608(b)(2) supplies the authority. It lets the court allow inquiry on cross-examination into specific instances probative of the truthfulness of "another witness whose character the witness being cross-examined has testified about."32 The authority runs both ways, so the party that called Gram may likewise cross-examine a witness who testified that Gardner is untruthful. Because extrinsic proof of the instances is barred, the inquiry stays on cross-examination, and the questioner cannot prove the underlying act through another witness.
The second step does the real work, since the classification of the attack decides whether a character witness may testify at all, and the fifth explains why specific acts reach the jury in this setting only on cross-examination.