Concept
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
Character for truthfulness
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
Rule 608(b) lets a cross-examiner ask a witness about specific acts that bear on truthfulness, and many of those acts are also crimes: lying on a loan application, falsifying a tax return, forging a signature.1 A question about such an act asks the witness to describe conduct that a prosecutor could use in a separate case. The witness therefore may have a legitimate claim of Fifth Amendment privilege to refuse to answer, whether the witness is a party or not and whether the case is civil or criminal.2
The last sentence of Rule 608(b) answers the question this raises: does taking the stand cost the witness that claim? For questions of this kind, it does not. By testifying on another matter, a witness does not waive any privilege against self-incrimination for testimony that relates only to the witness's character for truthfulness.3
The sentence does not create the privilege, and reading it that way is a common mistake. The Fifth Amendment already supplies the privilege, and Rule 608 speaks only to waiver. It reaches the criminal defendant and any other person who testifies.4 The real question is whether a witness who has taken the stand still holds a privilege that was never in doubt.
The rule is needed because of how waiver ordinarily works. A criminal defendant cannot be compelled to testify, but by choosing to take the stand he is ordinarily deemed to have waived the right to refuse questions substantively related to the charges.5 Carried over unchanged to impeachment, that principle would put a hard choice to an accused who wants to deny the charge. He would have to stay off the stand, or else answer every question aimed at dishonest acts. Many such acts, including false statements and fraud, are crimes in their own right and could supply evidence in a different prosecution. Rule 608 removes the choice by treating a credibility-only question as outside the transaction the witness opened up. The cross-examiner asks about the other act only to test how far the jury should trust the testimony, and the witness volunteered nothing about that act by testifying about something else.6
One variable decides almost every problem in this area: does the question relate only to character for truthfulness, or does it also reach the charged transaction? The instinct that loses points is to say that a defendant who takes the stand has given up the privilege altogether. He gives it up for the matters he put in issue. He keeps it for uncharged misconduct that is inquired into only to test his credibility.7
The privilege helps only a witness who invokes it. A witness who answers a question about a prior bad act without asserting the privilege has disclosed the act, and the answer may be used to assess her credibility.8 Rule 608 guards against waiver by the act of testifying, but it does nothing for a witness who simply answers. The protection is only as good as the witness's decision to claim it when the question arrives.
Impeachment by conviction sits on the other side of this line. The privilege ordinarily does not apply to it, because a conviction removes the possibility of further incrimination.9 The privilege guards against answers that could supply evidence for a prosecution, and an answer confirming an existing conviction hands the government nothing it does not already hold. That follows from the division between Rule 608(b) and Rule 609 taught above. A dishonest act with no judgment behind it is a Rule 608(b) subject on which the privilege may be claimed. The same act after a judgment is a Rule 609 subject on which the privilege ordinarily gives little protection.