Concept
Personal Knowledge Under Rule 602
Ability to observe, remember, or relate accurately
Personal Knowledge Under Rule 602
Before a lay witness says what happened, Rule 602 asks how the witness knows. A witness may testify to a matter only if evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of it.1 Personal knowledge is knowledge gained through firsthand observation or experience, as distinguished from a belief based on what someone else has said.2 Until the proponent supplies that evidence, the testimony stays out.
The foundation compresses the capacity attacks of the earlier sections into one showing. The proponent must offer enough for a reasonable juror to find that the witness had the capacity and opportunity to observe through the senses and record an impression, did observe and record it, can now recollect it, and can comprehend questions and narrate it.3 Capacity attacks and the personal knowledge objection therefore meet at the same facts. The standard below decides whether those facts cost a witness the stand or only credibility.
The subsections that follow take up that standard, the ways a proponent proves knowledge, what happens when knowledge is missing, how the objection differs from hearsay, and why the rule exempts experts but binds lay opinion.
The Sufficiency Standard
Rule 602 sets its standard in one word: sufficient. The proponent need not convince the judge that the witness actually perceived the matter. The proponent must introduce evidence that, if believed, would support a finding by a reasonable juror that the witness has personal knowledge.4 Two more sentences finish the rule: the evidence may consist of the witness’s own testimony, and the rule does not apply to a witness’s expert testimony under Rule 703.5 Whether the witness in fact perceived the matter is left to the jury.
Personal knowledge has a concrete meaning. A witness who observed that a street was slippery has personal knowledge of its condition. A witness who thinks the street was slippery only because someone else saw it and said so does not; all that witness knows first-hand is that someone else thought it slippery.6 On direct examination the two witnesses may sound identical. They differ in the source of what they say.
The rule protects the jury’s access to the best source. The Advisory Committee Note called the requirement “a most pervasive manifestation of the common law insistence upon the most reliable sources of information.”7 One court put the same demand as requiring that the best evidence available, first-hand rather than second-hand knowledge, reach the jury.8 A witness who relays another person’s observation hands the jury a conclusion the witness cannot vouch for, and cross-examining the relayer cannot test it, because the person who actually saw the street is absent.
The proponent need not prove personal knowledge to the judge in advance, because the requirement is a form of conditional relevance. Testimony that the light was red helps the jury only if the witness saw the light; if the witness did not, the statement says nothing about the light. Rule 104(b) governs that kind of dependency: the proponent introduces evidence sufficient to support a finding of the preliminary fact, and the jury decides whether the fact is true.9 A court of appeals has accordingly described the rule as not an issue of competency but a specialized application of Rule 104(b) on conditional relevancy, quoting the advisory committee note.10
Conditional relevance fixes the judge’s role as a screen. The foundation is viewed most favorably to the proponent, and the witness must be permitted to testify unless a reasonable juror, on all the evidence, could not believe that the witness observed, recorded, recollects, and can narrate what the witness claims to have perceived.11 The assumption is that a jury that concludes the witness lacks personal knowledge will ignore the testimony, and a judge rarely finds that a rational jury could not believe a witness who claims it.12 The common mistake is to ask whether the judge is persuaded that the witness saw the event. The right question is whether a reasonable juror could find that the witness did.
The threshold is correspondingly low. In one decision, a prosecution witness’s testimony may have been largely unbelievable to some jurors, and his perception may sometimes have been impaired; still, a reasonable juror could believe that he and the other prosecution witnesses perceived the events, so admitting their testimony was no abuse of discretion. The court stated the governing line: testimony should not be excluded for lack of personal knowledge unless no reasonable juror could believe that the witness had the ability and opportunity to perceive the event.13 Another court asks the same question in different words: whether a reasonable trier of fact could believe the witness had personal knowledge.14 Doubt about how well a witness perceived therefore reaches the jury. Exclusion is for the witness with no first-hand basis at all, like the one who knows the street was slippery only from a neighbor’s report.
In ordinary trials the witness supplies the foundation. A bystander who is asked what she saw while standing on the corner of 20th and Main and answers, “I saw the defendant’s car go through a red light,” claims personal knowledge without being specifically asked whether she has it.15 The rule lets the witness’s own testimony carry the foundation, though it need not.16
Proving Personal Knowledge
A proponent can lay the Rule 602 foundation by three routes: the witness’s own account of where the witness was and what the witness could perceive, circumstances from which the witness’s knowledge can be inferred, and the witness’s direct familiarity with how things are ordinarily done. All three rest on one idea. Personal knowledge reaches whatever the witness personally experienced, even if that is only one fragment of a longer transaction.
The first route is the commonest and the least noticed. A witness need not be asked specifically whether she has personal knowledge; her answer to a question about what she saw from a named corner already claims it.18 The opening questions of any examination, where the witness stood and what the witness could see, supply the facts a juror needs to decide whether the witness perceived the event, so the foundation and the story begin together. Cross-examination then tests what the testimony depends on: that the impression derives from the witness’s own senses, gauged by the witness’s proximity to the event, the length of time involved, and the existence of proper conditions for observation and perception.19
The second route lets circumstances supply what direct testimony does not. In United States v. Tocco, witnesses testified that when Ferranti needed help with his properties he typically asked his brother Mario, who in turn recruited his friends. From that evidence the court held that a factfinder could reasonably decide that Tocco had personal knowledge that he and Mario had set the fire for the defendant, Jack Ferranti.20 The court applied the test of whether a reasonable trier of fact could believe the witness had personal knowledge, not whether the evidence compelled that conclusion.
A witness also need not account for every detail of what he knows. In Joy Mfg. Co. v. Sola Basic Industries, Inc., the witness could not say precisely why a furnace was inoperable at a particular time, and the court treated that inability as proper material for effective cross-examination rather than a basis to hold his testimony completely inadmissible.21 Gaps in detail test the witness. They do not erase the foundation.
The third route draws on what the witness knows about how an organization ordinarily operates. A witness with direct knowledge of the normal procedures a company follows is treated as having personal knowledge of those procedures, even if the witness took no part in applying them on the occasion at issue. The limit is just as clear: a witness cannot testify about documents the witness has never seen, such as statements in a competitor’s internal correspondence.22
The same showing is required on paper. An affidavit supporting or opposing summary judgment must be made on personal knowledge and set out facts that would be admissible in evidence; one that merely states conclusions or opinions, or rests on the affiant’s belief, falls short.23 In Western Sky Industries, LLC v. Colttech, LLC, the affiant stated that the matters he addressed rested on first-hand knowledge and, on that basis, that ColtTech’s terms and conditions were sent to WSI in approximately June 2005. He gave no exact date, yet the statement sufficed at that stage to create a genuine issue of material fact for the jury.24 An affidavit resting only on what the affiant believes falls on the other side of that line; see Synovus Bank v. Paczko.
A witness has personal knowledge of what the witness personally did or received, even when others saw the rest of the transaction. In United States v. Rodriguez, Agent Farley testified that he personally received drugs, wrapped in a subscription card, from Agent Russell five minutes after the transaction between Ellerbee and Rodriguez. On cross-examination Farley acknowledged that he had not personally viewed the transaction, had not seen the card when Ellerbee picked it up, and did not know the card’s precise configuration at that moment. The court nonetheless held that his testimony rested on his personal knowledge and was admissible under Rule 602. It read the defendant’s remaining complaint, that nothing showed what Russell did with the card in those five minutes, as essentially a chain-of-custody objection.25 Each witness in a chain supplies the link he personally handled. Farley could describe the handoff; he could not have described the sale.
When Knowledge Is Missing
Rule 602 conditions testimony on evidence sufficient to support a finding of personal knowledge,27 so testimony without that evidence does not come in. The gap can surface at either of two moments. The opponent may object before the answer, and the court sustains the objection because nothing yet supports a finding that the witness perceived the matter. Or the testimony may come in without objection, or on a foundation that collapses under cross-examination, and the opponent then moves to strike. The second route is open because testimony previously received may be stricken if it later appears that personal knowledge was lacking.28 The remedy targets the assertion that lacks a source, and whatever the witness did perceive can stay.
The commonest gap is the witness who relays what others said. All that witness knows first-hand is that the others said it,29 so the assertion itself has no source in the witness’s own perception; see Elizarraras v. Bank of El Paso. When it is clear that the witness is relying on others, the objection may also be framed as hearsay, a point the next subsection develops.30
Exclusion need not be final. In KW Plastics v. United States Can Co., the court found well taken the objections that a witness’s testimony failed to satisfy the requirements of the Federal Rules of Evidence for admissible testimony, and it conditionally excluded the testimony. The witness, Campbell, could testify only if he remedied the defects that had surfaced in his deposition.31 The cure for a missing foundation is more foundation. A witness whose work gave him first-hand dealings with the subject can supply it through preliminary questions. A witness who knows only what others told him cannot cure the gap by repeating himself.
The label “demonstrative” does not settle the question. A drawing that merely illustrates a testifying witness’s account borrows its foundation from that witness. In State v. Denton, the court rejected the State’s description of a computer-generated animation as simply a demonstrative exhibit, like a rough drawing on a chalkboard, used to illustrate a testifying lay witness’s testimony.32
A different gap appears when a witness testifies to what others knew. In United States v. Kaplan, a government witness testified to his own and others’ knowledge of a fraud. The court held that admitting this evidence was error: its probative value was limited, the risk of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed it, and the prosecutor compounded the harm by arguing that the defendant “had to know” because “everybody else did,” an inference the evidence did not support.33 Evidence of what other people knew proves little about what a defendant knew, and the court counted that weakness against admission.
The same limit binds the judge. A trial judge may not rely on his personal experience to support judicial notice. As the court in United States v. Lewis recognized, the judge is not to use from the bench, under the guise of judicial knowledge, that which he knows only as an individual observer outside of court.34
A ruling on personal knowledge can also be wrong without being reversible. An appellate court reverses for evidentiary error only if the error affects substantial rights, and it applies harmless-error analysis to decide.35
The tempting label for the first passenger is weight. Weight fits when cross-examination leaves some perception standing, as with the second passenger. It fits poorly when cross-examination removes every source of the witness’s own knowledge on the point, because nothing then remains for the jury to weigh.
Personal Knowledge Versus Hearsay
Rule 602 and the hearsay rule both steer testimony toward first-hand sources, but each blocks a different defect. Rule 602 asks whether the person speaking perceived the matter. The hearsay rule asks whether the jury is hearing an out-of-court statement offered for its truth. Each rule needs the other. Without the hearsay rule, the personal knowledge requirement could do little work, because a witness limited to his own experience could still testify, “Two months ago, here is what happened to me: I was told by some mutual friends that Oliver was dealing cocaine out of his apartment.”37
The choice of objection follows what the witness’s answers reveal. When a witness describes an event and then acknowledges being in a distant location at the time, the proper objection is lack of personal knowledge. When the witness says another person told him of the event, the proper objection is hearsay.38 Where it is clear that the witness is relying on others’ statements without saying so, the hearsay objection generally suffices.39
The two doctrines meet again when a hearsay statement is offered under an exception. To come in under Rule 803, 804, or 807, the declarant must also be shown to have personal knowledge of the matter related. Statements defined as not hearsay by Rule 801(d)(1) need the same showing, and the knowledge may appear from the statement itself or be inferable from the circumstances.40 The requirement is built into the present sense impression, which Rule 803(1) defines as a statement made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, and the excited utterance exception is available only if the declarant has firsthand knowledge of the subject matter of the statement.41
Bemis v. Edwards shows the requirement at work. The proponent, Bemis, bore the burden of establishing the declarant’s personal perception by a preponderance of the evidence.42 The court held that, because there were affirmative indications that the declarant, Estep, lacked firsthand knowledge of the events he described, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit the Estep statement.43
A witness who testifies only that a statement was made needs first-hand knowledge of the making of the statement, not of the events it describes.44 Rule 602 does not govern that testimony; Rules 801 and 805 apply. What Rule 602 does bar is the same witness testifying to the subject matter of the statement, since he has no personal knowledge of it.45
A party’s own statement offered against that party falls outside the declarant’s knowledge requirement. Personal knowledge of the matter admitted is not required of a party-opponent, nor is any showing of mental capacity, and an admission in the form of an opinion is competent even if the opinion is a conclusion of law. The court may still exclude an admission under Rule 403.46
Judges also accept routine background testimony, such as a witness’s place of birth or when her parents arrived in the country, without insisting on first-hand sources. It might be different if such facts were central points of contested fact, as when they affect citizenship rights or entitlement to benefits. Even then judges would likely accept the testimony, though it might carry little weight against official records or other persuasive counterproof.47
Experts and Lay Opinion
The last sentence of Rule 602 marks the outer edge of the requirement: the rule does not apply to a witness’s expert testimony under Rule 703.49 Rule 703 allows an expert to express opinions based on facts of which the expert has no personal knowledge, and the reference to it in Rule 602 prevents any suggestion that the two rules conflict.50 A personal knowledge objection aimed at an expert’s reliance on facts others gathered therefore misses; the rule it invokes steps aside for exactly that testimony.
A lay witness has no comparable freedom. A lay witness who offers an opinion under Rule 701 must have personal knowledge of the facts on which the opinion rests.51 Courts test that claim as they test any other: what the witness represents as knowledge must be an impression derived from the witness’s own senses, gauged by the witness’s proximity to the event, the time involved, and the conditions for observation and perception.52
The boundary between lay and expert opinion is not always clear, because police officers and auto mechanics often testify on points beyond everyday experience and can sometimes qualify as experts. The proviso in Rule 701, which bars lay testimony resting on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge, means such witnesses must qualify as experts before testifying as experts.53
A lay opinion grounded in first-hand observation passes. In John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Dutton, a witness who observed the altercation first hand gave opinions on the feelings of the parties. Those opinions rested on her personal knowledge and rational perceptions and were helpful to the jury.54 The Rules require nothing more for admission of such testimony,55 and the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting it.56
Training and time can supply the same footing. Lay opinion is admissible if it is rationally based on the witness’s perception and helpful to the jury. In one case a paramedic, trained to respond quickly in emergencies, had ample time while treating the defendant’s wife to form the impression that the defendant was feigning grief, and her opinion satisfied that test.57
Opinions that rest on what others said do not pass. In United States v. Kaplan, the government offered a witness’s opinion about what the defendant knew of a fraud. A lay opinion about a defendant’s knowledge ordinarily satisfies the rationally-based requirement only if the witness has personal knowledge of objective factual bases from which that knowledge can be inferred with some confidence. Those bases include:
- what the person was told directly;
- what the person was in a position to see or hear;
- what statements the person made to others;
- what conduct the person engaged in; and
- what the person’s background and experience were.58
The witness asserted that his opinion rested partly on first-hand experience, principally his prior experiences at the law office and a conversation with the defendant, but his response was extremely vague. It failed to show that the opinion was rationally based on facts he had observed, so the opinion was not admissible.59 Calling a statement an opinion does not excuse the proponent from showing where it came from. A witness who cannot trace the opinion to something personally perceived has given the jury nothing to evaluate.