Concept
Statements Within the Rule
Impeachment of hearsay declarants
Statements Within the Rule
Rule 806 opens with a condition, and that condition decides whether any attack on an absent speaker is available. The declarant's credibility may be attacked, and then supported, when a hearsay statement, or a statement described in Rule 801(d)(2)(C), (D), or (E), "has been admitted in evidence."1 An opponent who wants to offer a conviction, a showing of bias, or any other attack on a speaker who never testified must therefore be able to say two things: the statement falls in one of the two groups the clause names, and the judge has actually let it in.
The first group is ordinary hearsay received under an exception. Article VIII sets out those exceptions in Rules 803 and 804 and the residual exception in Rule 807, and it places Rule 806 alongside them as the provision for attacking and supporting the declarant.2 The second group is the three party-opponent categories in Rule 801(d)(2)(C), (D), and (E): statements by a person the party authorized to speak, by the party's agent or employee, and by the party's coconspirator. The Rules define an opposing party's statement as not hearsay instead of treating it as an exception.3 A rule addressed only to hearsay would have passed these speakers by, and Rule 806 therefore names them.
What the two groups share explains the gate. In each, the jury hears the words of a speaker who is not on the stand, and the opponent has had no chance to cross-examine that speaker. Rule 806 supplies a substitute for the missing cross-examination, and it has nothing to supply where no one asks the jury to credit the speaker. The subsections below take the core case first, a statement admitted under a hearsay exception. They then turn to the three party-opponent categories and finally to the statements the rule does not reach, so that the threshold question can be run before any method of attack is chosen.
Statements Admitted Under Exceptions
Rule 806 asks whether a hearsay statement has been admitted, and it does not ask which exception admitted it.4 A statement that qualifies as an excited utterance, a business record, or former testimony is hearsay the court has chosen to receive anyway, and receipt is all the rule requires. Once the judge lets the statement in, the declarant's credibility is open to attack, and then to support, with any evidence that would have been admissible had the declarant testified. The admitting exception gets the statement before the jury, but it has no say over what the opponent may do about the speaker afterward.
The structure of Article VIII points the same way. Rule 803 collects exceptions that apply without regard to the declarant's availability, Rule 804 collects those that require unavailability, and Rule 807 supplies a residual exception for statements with equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. Rule 806 stands apart from all three.5 A business record prepared down the hall and testimony from a witness who has since died enter through different doors, yet both doors lead to the same consequence.
An exception does not immunize the speaker because of what it certifies. One court described the unifying trait of the Rule 803 exceptions as "a circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness sufficient to justify nonproduction of the declarant, whether available or not."6 That guarantee excuses the proponent from producing the speaker, and it goes no further. It does not establish that the speaker saw clearly, remembers accurately, or has no stake in the case. The same court read Rule 806 to confer a generalized right to attack the declarant, although not a right to any particular form of attack.7 Because the opponent has lost the chance to cross-examine, the rule treats the hearsay declarant as a witness for impeachment and rehabilitation purposes.8
On an exam, the usual question is whether an opponent may prove something damaging about a speaker who never took the stand, and the first thing to check is whether the statement came in.
Change one fact and the result reverses. If the judge sustains the hearsay objection, the bystander's remark has not been "admitted in evidence," so the rule is never triggered and neither side may offer credibility evidence about the bystander.9 Nobody is asking the jury to rely on that speaker. The sequence also runs in one direction, because the rule speaks of attack and then support. A proponent who wants to bolster the bystander waits until the opponent has attacked.
Agent and Coconspirator Statements
Rule 806 reaches past ordinary hearsay in its first sentence, which also applies when "a statement described in Rule 801(d)(2)(C), (D), or (E)" has been admitted.11 Those subdivisions cover a statement made by a person the party authorized to speak on the subject, a statement by the party's agent or employee on a matter within the scope of that relationship and while it existed, and a statement by the party's coconspirator during and in furtherance of the conspiracy.12 In each, the speaker talks for the party or alongside it without being the party, and the words are offered against the party. The separate naming needs explaining, because Rule 806 already speaks of hearsay statements.
The explanation is a classification choice. At common law, a party's out-of-court statements, known as admissions, were an exception to the hearsay rule. Under the Federal Rules they are outside the definition of hearsay.13 A rule that spoke only of hearsay would have skipped these declarants on its face, because the statement the jury hears from an employee or coconspirator is by definition not hearsay. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. records the committee's view that such statements "should open the declarant to attacks on his credibility." It traces their exclusion from Rule 806's operation to the drafting technique of defining some statements as not hearsay instead of calling them exceptions.14 The text now lists the three categories, so the label attached to the admitting doctrine no longer decides whether the declarant can be attacked.
The reason these speakers need a credibility rule lies in why their statements are admitted. An opposing party's statement comes in because the party is treated as answerable for it. For the party's own words that treatment is easy to defend, since the party can take the stand and explain that he was mistaken, was guessing, or had been misled, and the assumption likely extends to authorized spokespersons, since the party who authorized the statement must have had some basis for doing so.15 It is harder to apply to an agent's statements, because the declarant may be cooperating with the party offering the statements at the time of trial, as when a coconspirator cooperates with the government.16 Rule 801(d)(2) does not require the declarant to take the stand.17 The opponent is therefore held to words spoken by someone else, and it may have no way to question that person. Rule 806 answers by letting the opponent use against the absent speaker any technique that would have been available had the speaker made the statement in testimony.18 If the speaker is available, the opponent may also call the speaker and question as if on cross-examination.19
Two limits keep this from sweeping too widely. The gate still requires that the statement be admitted. A remark by an employee on a matter outside the scope of the relationship, or by a coconspirator before or after the conspiracy, does not satisfy Rule 801(d)(2)(D) or (E), and unless some other route admits it, Rule 806 has nothing to act on.20 The parenthetical also lists only (C), (D), and (E). Why a party's own statements are absent is taken up in the next subsection.21 An exam stem that says the statement is not hearsay, so Rule 806 does not apply, is wrong whenever the statement was admitted under (C), (D), or (E), since the rule names those categories precisely to override that label.
Statements Outside the Rule
Rule 806 describes two kinds of statement, an admitted hearsay statement and a statement described in Rule 801(d)(2)(C), (D), or (E), and its text gives no such treatment to other out-of-court words that reach the jury.23 Three kinds fall outside both descriptions: statements offered for a purpose other than their truth, a party's own and adopted statements under Rule 801(d)(2)(A) and (B), and the prior statements of a declarant who testifies under Rule 801(d)(1). Each exclusion tracks the logic of the rule. Rule 806 substitutes for cross-examining someone the jury is asked to believe, so it has no work to do where the jury is not asked to believe the speaker, where the speaker is the party who can answer for the words, or where the speaker is already on the stand.
The first exclusion follows from the definition of hearsay. An out-of-court statement is hearsay only if the proponent offers it to support a conclusion that the idea or information it asserts is true.24 A statement offered for another purpose, such as to show that a listener received a warning and acted on it, is not hearsay, and Rule 806 does not apply to statements that are nonhearsay and not admitted for their truth.25 The jury need only find that the words were spoken, and that finding does not depend on whether the speaker saw clearly or told the truth. An attack on the speaker's credibility would answer a question nobody is asking.
The second exclusion covers the party's own words. Rule 801(d)(2)(A) reaches a statement made by the party in an individual or representative capacity, and Rule 801(d)(2)(B) reaches one the party manifested that it adopted or believed to be true.26 Rule 806's parenthetical names only subdivisions (C), (D), and (E), so these two are absent.27 The reason is that the party can answer for its own words. A party can take the stand and explain that the earlier statement was a mistake, a guess, or the product of being misled.28 A party who made a statement and then objects that no one can cross-examine the speaker is saying, in essence, that she needs to cross-examine herself to expose a mistake or falsehood, a position that is untenable on its face.29
The two scenes differ in who the speaker is. In the first the speaker is the party, who can speak for himself at trial. In the second the speaker is a separate person whom the company may be unable to question, which is the situation the three listed categories address.
The party-statement exemption runs in one direction only. It covers statements offered against a party by her opponent, and a party cannot introduce her own favorable out-of-court statements as nonhearsay under Rule 801(d).30 A party who wants the jury to hear its own earlier words must find a hearsay exception, and a statement admitted that way is an admitted hearsay statement that triggers Rule 806. Rule 806 then treats the declarant like any other witness, including a non-testifying defendant, who may be impeached with prior convictions when his or her hearsay statement is introduced.31 What matters is who offers the statement and under which rule it was admitted, and the words "party's statement" alone do not settle the question.
The third exclusion concerns a declarant who testifies. Rule 801(d)(1) takes certain prior statements of a witness out of the hearsay definition on one condition: the declarant testifies and is subject to cross-examination about the prior statement.32 That requirement applies to every exemption in subdivision (d)(1) and not to the party-opponent exemptions in (d)(2).33 The declarant is therefore on the stand, the opponent can question the declarant about the earlier statement, and the declarant is impeached by the ordinary methods that apply to any witness. Rule 806's substitute is unnecessary because the thing it substitutes for is present. Its relaxed handling of inconsistent statements, which is taken up below, exists because the declarant is generally not at trial, and that reason is missing here.34 Both (d)(1) and (d)(2) carry the nonhearsay label,35 yet only (d)(2)(C), (D), and (E) appear in Rule 806, because only there does the rule let a speaker other than the party stay off the stand.
A deposition statement that contradicts a witness's trial testimony comes in under Rule 801(d)(1), and the witness answers for it on the stand. The same deposition, offered because the deponent died before trial, would be admitted, if at all, as former testimony, an ordinary hearsay exception, and the absent deponent would then be open to attack under Rule 806.36