Concept
Limits on Impeaching Declarants
Impeachment of hearsay declarants
Limits on Impeaching Declarants
Rule 806 measures every attack on an absent speaker, and every effort to support that speaker, by a single test: whether the evidence "would be admissible for those purposes if the declarant had testified as a witness."1 The earlier sections used that test for what it gives the opponent: convictions, bias, defects of capacity, and character for untruthfulness, all available against a speaker who never took the stand. The same test also sets the rule's boundaries. A standard that asks what a court would receive against a live witness brings in every live-witness rule, including the rules that restrict impeachment. The declarant takes on a testifying witness's exposure and a testifying witness's protections together.
Two limits follow. The first is practical. Some techniques work only because the witness sits in the courtroom, where a lawyer can ask and the witness must answer. Rule 806 waives one condition of that kind, the opportunity to explain or deny an inconsistent statement, but it supplies nothing for techniques that depend on questioning. Cross-examination about specific past acts is the main example. The second limit is doctrinal: when the declarant does not testify, the procedure for the impeachment is relaxed, but separate restrictions in other rules are not eliminated.2 The two subsections below take up the limits in that order.
Specific Acts Under Rule 608(b)
Rule 806 sends the court back to the live-witness rules to test each technique of attack, and most techniques pass because the proof comes from someone other than the declarant: a record of a conviction, a witness who knows of the declarant's bias, an acquaintance who can speak to the declarant's character. One technique consists of asking the person a question. A witness who testifies may be cross-examined about past bad acts that never produced a conviction but that reflect on truthfulness, such as an earlier lie on a loan application.3 Rule 608(b) limits that permission by barring extrinsic evidence of the acts, meaning proof from any source other than the witness's own answer.4 The cross-examiner must live with the answer the witness gives.
That arrangement assumes the witness is in the courtroom, and an absent declarant breaks the assumption. A declarant whose words reached the jury through an incident report or a recording cannot be asked about past conduct, so no parallel procedure exists for such a declarant.5 The obvious substitute is a third person who describes the act, but that is extrinsic proof, which the rule bars. The technique requires the person to be present, and many hearsay declarants will not be, so many of them cannot be impeached with prior bad acts under Rule 608(b).6
Rule 806 does not close the gap. Its second sentence excuses any opportunity to explain or deny an inconsistent statement, and it says nothing about questioning a declarant on specific acts.7 The loss is narrow. Convictions, bias, capacity, and character for untruthfulness all remain open against the absent speaker, and none of them requires the declarant to answer a question.8
Courts have not settled what happens when a party offers extrinsic proof of the lie in place of a question. Read literally, Rule 608(b) bars that proof, and the declarant escapes this one technique. Some courts reject that result and admit extrinsic evidence against a hearsay declarant, reasoning that otherwise the declarant would escape an attack that reaches an in-court witness.9 The tension is built into Rule 806 itself. Its test asks what would be admissible had the declarant testified, and against a testifying witness extrinsic proof of the lie would be excluded. An exam answer should state the gap, identify the split, and decline to treat either side as settled law.
The route in the hypothetical runs through the third sentence of Rule 806: if the party against whom the statement was admitted calls the declarant, that party may examine the declarant on the statement as if on cross-examination.10 A later section develops that sentence in full. Here the declarant's presence is the missing ingredient, because impeachment through inquiries about past bad acts becomes possible once the declarant is available and can be a witness.11
Two errors recur on exams. The first is to conclude that an absent declarant cannot be impeached at all, which overlooks every attack that depends on someone other than the declarant. The second is to treat a third person's account of a specific lie as ordinary character evidence. A coworker who testifies that the declarant is known around the office as a liar gives character evidence for untruthfulness, which is available against a declarant.12 A coworker who testifies to watching the declarant lie to a lender last March describes a specific act, and that testimony meets the extrinsic-proof bar under the literal reading, subject to the split described above.
Other Rules Still Apply
Rule 806 tests each item of attacking or supporting evidence against one standard: whether it would be admissible for those purposes if the declarant had testified as a witness.15 The standard asks about admissibility, so it carries along every rule that decides what a court will receive, including the rules that exclude. The second sentence of Rule 806 removes one procedural condition, the opportunity to explain or deny an inconsistency, and the third sentence governs examination of a declarant who is called to the stand. Neither sentence suspends the rest of the Rules of Evidence. When the declarant does not testify, the procedure for the impeachment is relaxed, but separate restrictions in other rules are not eliminated.16 An opponent attacking an absent speaker therefore faces two questions: whether the evidence fits a method open against a live witness, and whether any exclusionary rule keeps it out.
The declarant's absence is the problem Rule 806 was written to solve, and absence changes nothing about the dangers the other rules guard against. Unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, and wasted time come from the evidence and from the way a jury reacts to it, and they are as real when the person under attack is not in court to answer. Under Rule 403 the judge asks whether the probative value of the proffered evidence, meaning its bearing on credibility, is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, and undue delay.17 The weighing runs the same way for a declarant as for a testifying witness, so the parity that exposes the declarant to attack also shields the declarant from attacks a live witness would escape.
The same structure explains why Rule 806 guarantees no particular method of attack. One court read it as conferring a generalized right to attack a hearsay declarant's credibility, while observing that it cannot be read to confer a right to any particular form of attack.18 That generalized right weakens further when the declarant is unidentified, a problem taken up in a later section. Each item the opponent carries through the door must still satisfy the rule that governs it. A conviction is admissible against a declarant under the same restrictions that apply to an in-court witness's impeachment.19 Evidence of a mental condition meets a four-part Rule 403 weighing: the medical link between the condition and testimonial accuracy, the importance of the testimony, the time the proof will take, and the risk that it embarrasses more than it informs.20
Rule 404 supplies a related limit. A conviction offered to show that a person may have lied while testifying is an impeachment use, and a conviction offered to show that the person committed the charged act is a substantive use, which Rule 404(a)(1) ordinarily bars because character may not be used to show action in conformity with it.21 Impeaching evidence has to stay within the first use.
Inconsistent statements follow the same pattern. The rule says the court "may admit" evidence of a declarant's inconsistent statement or conduct, regardless of when it occurred or whether the declarant could explain or deny it, and the word may leaves the ruling with the court.22 For a testifying witness, Rule 403 governs extrinsic proof of an inconsistent statement. If the inconsistency concerns an incidental matter, extrinsic evidence is forbidden, because it does not advance the credibility inquiry enough to justify the risk of confusion and delay.23 A witness who gave two versions of the color of a teller's dress can be questioned about the difference, though the judge may bar outside proof of it. A witness who gave two versions of the color of the getaway car was inconsistent about a central fact, and extrinsic proof is permitted.24 Rule 806 imports the live-witness standard, so the same weighing applies to an absent declarant, for whom extrinsic proof is usually the only proof available.25
The two inconsistencies differ in what they tell the jury and in what they cost the trial. A conflict about the getaway car bears on a central fact, so it advances the credibility inquiry enough to justify the time. A conflict about the dress shows only that the speaker varied an incidental detail, and proving it invites confusion and delay out of proportion to its worth. Rule 806 opens the door for both items, and Rule 403 decides which one passes through. An exam answer should name the method of attack, confirm that a live-witness rule would admit it, and then ask whether Rule 403 or another exclusionary rule keeps it out.