Concept
Reputation and Opinion Testimony
Reputation or opinion rehabilitation
Reputation and Opinion Testimony
Rule 608(a) gives a party two ways to prove a witness’s character for truthfulness: testimony about the witness’s reputation for that character, and testimony in the form of an opinion about it.1 Either way, the proof comes from a character witness, someone other than the witness whose credibility is in doubt, and either way the Rule admits evidence of truthful character only after an attack on the witness’s character for truthfulness.2 That condition has teeth. When government counsel merely points out inconsistencies in the accused’s testimony and argues that it is not credible, no attack on the accused’s reputation for truthfulness has occurred within the meaning of Rule 608, and a district court acts within its discretion when it excludes the accused’s reputation-for-truthfulness witness in response.3 The next section sorts out what does count as an attack. This section assumes the door has opened and asks what the supporting testimony may contain.
The answer is narrow, and cost explains why. Rule 403 names the costs: misleading the jury, confusion, unfair prejudice, and undue consumption of time. Add the policy worry that excessive scrutiny makes people reluctant to come forward and testify, and the result is stringent limits on inquiry into a witness’s character.4 The limits take three forms, and the subsections below follow them in order: the foundation for reputation testimony, the foundation for opinion testimony, and the boundary that confines both to truthfulness and shuts out specific acts.
Reputation Testimony
Reputation is a group’s verdict, so a reputation witness reports what the people who know the principal witness say about the principal witness’s honesty. Rule 608(a) authorizes testimony about the witness’s “reputation for having a character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.”5 The character witness’s own view of the principal witness is a different thing, called opinion, and the next subsection treats it. A reputation witness is only as good as the access the witness has to the group’s talk, which is why the proponent must establish that access before the jury hears any conclusion.
In United States v. Bedonie, the court of appeals stated the standard: a witness testifying under Rule 608(a) must show “such acquaintance with the [person under attack], the community in which he has lived and the circles in which he has moved, as to speak with authority of the terms in which generally he is regarded.”6 The trial court decides in its sound discretion whether the evidence comes in, and it also decides whether the evidence survives Rule 403 balancing.7 The standard governs reputation testimony offered to support a witness and testimony offered to attack one, because Rule 608(a) authorizes both. The testimony in Bedonie itself came after the defendants had testified.8
The foundation does three jobs. The acquaintance showing keeps a stranger from passing off a private impression as the community’s judgment. The currency requirement ties the evidence to the person the jury is watching now. The setting question decides which community counts. A proponent can build all three on direct examination, one question at a time, and a student can check each link against a fact pattern.
The first three steps carry the weight, because they alone test whether the witness is positioned to speak for a community. Steps four and five are nearly ritual, and the examination stays brief by design. Rule 608 bars proof by specific acts, so a character witness cannot explain a bad opinion by saying that the principal witness defrauded the witness of a life’s savings.14
The second step admits three sources of knowledge, and the third deserves a closer look. The witness may have discussed the reputation with others, may have heard others discuss it, or may never have heard it discussed at all while being so placed that contrary comments would have reached the witness had any existed.15 Silence counts as evidence only from someone inside a circle where people talk about one another’s honesty, because only then does the absence of complaint show how the group regards the principal witness. A bystander who happens to have heard nothing cannot use it.
The reputation must also be current. The testimony must describe the principal witness’s reputation at or near the time of trial, and the customary question asks about the principal witness’s current general reputation for truth and veracity.16 The evidence helps the jury decide how far to trust what the principal witness says on the stand today. A standing among former neighbors that ended years ago describes a different social world.
The setting in which a reputation forms is wider than the principal witness’s home neighborhood. The traditional common-law approach required a reputation for truthfulness in the community where the principal witness resided, but today it suffices that the principal witness has a reputation in some associational setting, such as a work environment, where more or less the same group of people frequently interact.17 The customary question accordingly reaches the neighborhood where the principal witness lives and also the people with whom that person works, attends school, or socializes.18 A person with no neighborhood reputation can still have one among co-workers, and the wider rule lets the jury hear it.
Bedonie also shows which objections leave a foundation standing. The court did not treat the witness’s inability to speak Navajo as crucial to his ability to speak to the defendants’ reputation in the community, because the defendants and most of the other Navajo witnesses spoke and understood English. It also found no Rule 403 problem simply because a white witness testified to an all-white jury about Navajo defendants, and it found no abuse of discretion in admitting the testimony.19 Those complaints went to the edges of the foundation. A foundation that lacks acquaintance with the relevant community fails at the center, as the next example shows.
Opinion Testimony
Rule 608(a) names opinion as the second vehicle, allowing a party to attack or support credibility with “testimony in the form of an opinion about that character.”21 A reputation witness reports what a group says. An opinion witness offers a personal conclusion, drawn from the witness’s own dealings with the principal witness, such as “I think X is a liar.”22 The timing rule governs both forms, so opinion supporting truthfulness comes in only after an attack.23
The common law admitted reputation alone. Wigmore found that restriction curious: the law shut out the person who knows as much as humanly can be known about another’s character, and yet admitted “the second-hand, irresponsible product of multiplied guesses and gossip which we term ‘reputation.’”24 The restriction persevered anyway.25 The Federal Rules broke with that tradition: they permit attack by opinion and continue to authorize the traditional reputation attack.26 The Advisory Committee’s note to Rule 405 suggests why reputation lasted so long, since it is largely opinion in disguise.27
The reasons for the change follow from what each form rests on. A reputation-only rule removed much of the objectivity from appraising character and encouraged parties to select character witnesses who, under the guise of reputation, voiced opinions based on prejudice and ill will.28 An opinion rests on what the character witness personally observed, so the jury can see where it comes from and the opponent can test it. The cost is the risk of distracting side disputes about the principal witness’s specific conduct, since the opinion witness can be cross-examined about the basis of the view. That danger exists, and the judge must confine such disputes to reasonable limits.29
Because an opinion is the character witness’s own judgment, its foundation asks about the witness’s own contact with the principal witness. The opinion must be rationally based on the character witness’s personal knowledge, and that knowledge may come from contact with the principal witness in any aspect of the principal witness’s life.30 The proponent therefore shows that the character witness is personally acquainted with the principal witness and that the acquaintance has been close enough to permit an informed opinion about truthfulness.31 The threshold is low. The Rule imposes no prerequisite of long acquaintance or recent information, and cross-examination is expected to expose lack of familiarity, reliance on isolated or irrelevant instances of misconduct, and personal hostility toward the principal witness.32 These weaknesses go to weight, and cross-examination is the remedy. The one timing condition attaches to the opinion itself, which must be the view the witness holds at or near the time of trial.33
The testimony itself is short. After the foundation, a witness may say simply, “She is a scrupulously honest woman,”34 and may be asked whether the witness would believe the principal witness under oath.35 The form serves attack as readily as support. In one case, after the defendant testified, the government recalled a witness, a former employer, and asked whether he would believe the defendant under oath; over defense objection, the witness answered no.36
Dale’s failure marks the two ways a student goes wrong on these foundations. One is to demand a reputation foundation for an opinion: an opinion witness need not know what the neighborhood or workplace says, and the questions about setting and circle that govern reputation testimony have no counterpart here. The other is to let reputation pass as opinion: a witness whose view is only what others are assumed to think has relayed talk without showing any access to it, and satisfies neither foundation.
Truthfulness Only, No Specific Acts
Two limits govern what a character witness may say once the foundation is laid, one on subject and one on proof. The subject limit confines the testimony to the principal witness’s character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, in the form of reputation or opinion.38 The proof limit comes from Rule 608(b): except for a criminal conviction under Rule 609, extrinsic evidence of specific instances of a witness’s conduct is inadmissible to attack or support the witness’s character for truthfulness.39 Extrinsic evidence means proof from outside the witness’s own answers, such as another witness’s account. Convictions travel a different road, and a ruling that admits one to impeach a testifying witness is reviewable on appeal along with any other claim of error.40
The subject limit rests on relevance. A truthful person is more likely to be telling the truth from the witness stand, and that inference is the only reason character enters a credibility dispute. Generosity, devotion to family, and peaceableness do not feed it. The great majority of courts accordingly confine the inquiry to reputation for truth and veracity, and Rule 608(a) restricts opinion and reputation alike to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness; only a few jurisdictions admit reputation for general character, and fewer still admit proof of traits other than veracity.41 General praise also invites the jury to reward a likable witness with belief, and it invites the opponent to answer with unrelated failings, so the dispute would drift from honesty to worth.
A ruling in United States v. Bonner shows a court policing the subject limit through the form of the question. After the defense suggested that a cooperating witness gained by cooperating, the prosecutor asked another witness what kind of woman the cooperator was. The answer, an honest mother, a good wife, and a friend, drew a defense objection, and the court required a more precise question.42 Only “honest” speaks to the trait. A question aimed at truthfulness from the start leaves nothing to cure.
The proof limit guards against a different danger. A character witness who supports a principal witness may state the reputation or give the opinion, and may not back either with stories of what the principal witness did on particular occasions. The limit reaches the character witness’s own direct examination, since specific instances probative of truthfulness are not admissible on direct in support of the reputation or opinion testimony.43 It also explains why these examinations sound so formulaic. After the foundation, the witness states the reputation or opinion with little or no elaboration and cannot say that the view rests on some episode, such as a swindle suffered or an honest act witnessed.44
Specific acts are the strongest character proof available and also the most dangerous. The Advisory Committee’s note to Rule 405 observes that evidence of specific instances of conduct is the most convincing way to prove character, and that it also has the greatest capacity to arouse prejudice, to confuse, to surprise, and to consume time.45 The mechanism is easy to trace. Each recounted deed is a factual claim the opponent may dispute: did it happen, did it happen as described, and does it show what the character witness says it shows? Answering those questions takes cross-examination, rebuttal witnesses, and perhaps documents, all about episodes collateral to the lawsuit, so the trial would split into a trial within the trial. Reputation and opinion avoid that cost because neither requires a significant expenditure of time.46 The bar leaves one asymmetry for the opinion witness, whose view usually rests on observed conduct: the jury hears the conclusion without the observations behind it, while the opponent may probe the basis. Rule 608(b)(2) also lets the court allow cross-examination of a character witness about specific instances of the principal witness’s conduct that bear on truthfulness, a risk of calling such a witness that a later section takes up in full.47
The limit bites hardest when the supported witness is a cooperating informant. Defense cross-examination exposes the informant’s drug use and criminal record, and the government answers by calling a police officer who has worked with the informant. That is the setting of United States v. Murray. The officer may give opinion or reputation testimony about the informant’s truthfulness, but he may not support the informant with extrinsic evidence of specific instances of conduct. His account of how many cases the informant’s tips produced is of that second kind, because each case is an episode the defense could dispute one by one.48
An exam stem often folds both limits into one answer, pairing a flattering anecdote with a one-line opinion about honesty, and the analysis splits that answer in two. The opinion or reputation about truthfulness is admissible once an attack has opened the door. The anecdote is excluded however admirable the deed, because it is a specific instance offered through extrinsic proof. A witness whose praise runs only to general goodness fails the subject limit, and the cure is a question aimed at truthfulness.
Character testimony is not the only way to repair a damaged witness, and the other routes run on different logic. Bolstering with a prior consistent statement turns on whether the earlier statement predated the alleged influence or fabrication. When the attack was only a prior inconsistent statement, a consistent statement adds very little, because the trier already has two conflicting accounts and it is not a question of which account was stated more often.49