Concept
Tome v. United States
Prior consistent statement rehabilitation
Tome v. United States
Subpart (i) of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) admits a consistent statement offered “to rebut an express or implied charge that the declarant recently fabricated it or acted from a recent improper influence or motive in so testifying.”1 That language, and the clause requiring that the statement be consistent with the declarant’s testimony,2 never says when the earlier statement must have been made. The common law did say. A consistent statement made after the source of the bias or motive arose was treated as irrelevant to the charge, because its reliability is open to the same doubt as the trial testimony.3 Tome v. United States asked whether the Rule keeps that requirement, and the Supreme Court held that it does: a declarant’s consistent statements rebut a charge of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive only when they were made before the fabrication, influence, or motive arose.4
The decision matters for two reasons. Its holding poses the question every later timing dispute must answer: when did the alleged motive begin, and did the statement come first? And its opinions show how a court fills a silence in a rule’s text, by asking what the words borrow from earlier law, what the drafters’ commentary says and leaves unsaid, and whether a judge may adjust the result one statement at a time. The four parts below take up the facts and holding, the Court’s reasoning from text and common law, its refusal to weigh statements case by case, and the separate opinions.
Facts and Holding
The record in Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150 (1995), makes the order of events decisive, so the facts come in sequence. Tome was prosecuted for sexually abusing his daughter, A.T. He and her mother had divorced in 1988, and a tribal court awarded joint custody of A.T. to both parents, with Tome holding primary physical custody. In 1989 the mother petitioned unsuccessfully for primary custody, although she was awarded custody for the summer of 1990. Neither parent attended a further custody hearing in August 1990, and on August 27, 1990 the mother contacted Colorado authorities with allegations that Tome had abused A.T.5
The prosecution’s theory was that the assaults occurred while A.T. was in Tome’s custody and that the crime came to light when she spent vacation time with her mother. The defense answered that the allegations were concocted so that the child would not be returned to her father.6 That answer is an implied charge that a motive, A.T.’s wish to live with her mother, was shaping her testimony.
A.T. testified and was cross-examined, so the threshold conditions covered in the earlier sections were met. The trial judge nonetheless expressed concern about the examination. He noted that some defense questions were imprecise or unclear, observed lapses of as much as 40 to 55 seconds between some questions and answers, and remarked that on the second day the witness seemed to be losing concentration: “We have a very difficult situation here.”7 The Supreme Court rested its decision on timing, not on the quality of that examination.8
After A.T. testified, the Government produced six witnesses, among them a babysitter, a social worker, and physicians, who recounted a total of seven statements in which she described the alleged assaults. One was her August 22, 1990 remark to the babysitter that she did not want to return to her father because he “gets drunk and he thinks I’m his wife.”9 The Government offered the statements under Rule 801(d)(1)(B), and the trial court admitted them all over defense objection, accepting the argument that they rebutted the implicit charge that A.T.’s testimony was motivated by a desire to live with her mother.10
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding all of the statements admissible under the Rule even though A.T. made them after her alleged motive to fabricate arose. The premotive requirement, it reasoned, “is a function of the relevancy rules, not the hearsay rules,” so a judge should weigh the strength of the motive, the circumstances in which the statement was made, and the declarant’s demonstrated propensity to lie.11 The circuits were divided on the question, and the Supreme Court reversed.12 A later part of this section explains why it refused the Tenth Circuit’s approach.
The Court’s holding is a rule about timing. The Rule permits a declarant’s consistent out-of-court statements to rebut a charge of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive “only when those statements were made before the charged recent fabrication or improper influence or motive.”13 The reason lies in the work the statement is asked to do. The Court framed the question as whether A.T.’s statements rebutted the alleged link between her desire to be with her mother and her testimony, and not whether they suggested her testimony was true. The Rule, it said, speaks “of a party rebutting an alleged motive, not bolstering the veracity of the story told.”14 A statement made after the motive began cannot cut that link, because the declarant already had the motive when she spoke, and the statement shares the doubt that attaches to the testimony itself.15 Later courts describe the Rule the same way, as one that reaches only premotive consistent statements and exists to rebut a charge of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, not to bolster the believability of testimony already given.16
A.T.’s statements fell on the wrong side of that line. The motive the defense alleged was her desire to live with her mother, and the Tenth Circuit itself treated her statements as made after that alleged motive arose.17 The Supreme Court concluded that the conditions of admissibility were not established.18 Even her August 22 remark to the babysitter, made five days before her mother contacted the Colorado authorities, voices a reluctance to return to her father, which is hard to treat as an account given before the wish to be with her mother existed. Nor did the Government use the statements for the purpose the Rule allows. At closing it placed great reliance on them for substantive purposes but never once sought to use them to rebut the impact of the alleged motive, and the Court observed that statements that might show whether the abuse occurred shed but minimal light on whether A.T. had the charged motive.19 Consistency with her testimony, however complete, did nothing to change the result.
Dating the motive can be harder than it was here. The date the proponent must beat depends on how the defense frames the charge, so defense counsel has to think carefully about the exact phrasing of the fabrication allegation and about when the motive arose.20 A later section takes up that problem.
The holding is confined to Rule 801(d)(1)(B).21 The Court intimated no view on whether any of A.T.’s statements were admissible under any other evidentiary principle and left those matters for the Court of Appeals to decide in the first instance.22 The trial court had in fact admitted some of the statements under other rules, rulings the Tenth Circuit never reached, so failure under the consistent-statement exemption did not end the inquiry.23 Other routes to admission are taken up later on this page.
Text and Common-Law Roots
The words of subpart (i) are silent about timing, so the Court had to look elsewhere for the requirement. It found support in three places: the common law that stood behind the Rule, the Rule’s own phrasing and narrow reach, and the Advisory Committee’s Notes, which announce no departure from the old requirement.
Under the prevailing common-law temporal priority doctrine, a prior consistent statement offered to answer a charge of bias, interest, corrupt influence, contrivance to falsify, or want of capacity to observe or remember was irrelevant unless it was made before the source of the bias, interest, influence, or incapacity originated.25 McCormick and Wigmore stated the rule categorically: the prior consistent statement “has no relevancy to refute the charge unless the consistent statement was made before the source of the bias, interest, influence or incapacity originated.”26 A later statement does not help the jury evaluate the witness, because its reliability is subject to the same doubt as the trial testimony.27 One reported opinion described a witness’s declarations, including identifications made at a police station, as admissible “under the established rule, if made under circumstances which precluded or made improbable the operation of the motive through which his testimony might be impeached.”28 A statement made before the motive arose is the clearest case of one made under such circumstances.
The Rule’s wording points the same way. It treats a prior consistent statement as nonhearsay only when offered to rebut a charge of “recent fabrication or improper influence or motive,” the phrase the Advisory Committee used to describe the “traditiona[l]” common law against which the Rules were drafted.29 The Court added that this somewhat peculiar language closely resembles the wording of many common-law cases describing the premotive requirement.30
The Government urged a broader reading. Any prior statement by a witness about the disputed issues, it argued, has some relevance to the accuracy or truthfulness of the in-court testimony. Congress could easily have enacted a rule admitting a witness’s prior consistent statements “whenever relevant to assess the witness’ truthfulness or accuracy,” the Court answered, but the narrow Rule it did enact “cannot be understood to incorporate the Government’s theory.”31
A postmotive statement may still carry some probative force. It may suggest in some degree that the in-court testimony is truthful and so did not result from improper influence. But it refutes the charge less directly and less forcefully than a premotive statement does, and if the drafters meant to allow rebuttal along that indirect chain, “the purpose of confining the types of impeachment that open the door to rebuttal by introducing consistent statements becomes unclear.”32
The Advisory Committee’s Notes supply the third support, this time through silence. The Note on Rule 801(d)(1)(B) reads:
“Prior consistent statements traditionally have been admissible to rebut charges of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive but not as substantive evidence. Under the rule they are substantive evidence. The prior statement is consistent with the testimony given on the stand, and, if the opposite party wishes to open the door for its admission in evidence, no sound reason is apparent why it should not be received generally.”33
The Note says nothing about timing. The Court declined to believe that the drafters “intended to scuttle the whole premotive requirement and rationale without so much as a whisper of explanation.”34 The Rule’s central innovation strengthens the point. Because the Rule lets prior consistent statements be used substantively once they are admitted to rebut an improper influence or motive, it becomes all the more important to observe the preconditions for admitting them in the first place.35 Justice Scalia joined the opinion except for Part II-B, the part that relies on the Notes, and the last part of this section returns to his reasons.36
Rejecting Case-by-Case Balancing
The Tenth Circuit treated the premotive requirement as a rule of relevance that yields case by case. The “pre-motive requirement is a function of the relevancy rules, not the hearsay rules,” it reasoned, so a judge should weigh the strength of the motive, the circumstances in which the statement was made, and the declarant’s demonstrated propensity to lie.38 The Supreme Court rejected that approach for reasons that show how the hearsay rules are built.
The argument had surface appeal. A person with a motive to lie does not always lie, the Tenth Circuit observed, so a rule that discounts every postmotive statement sweeps too broadly.39 Applying its test to A.T.’s first statement to her babysitter, the court found that she might have had “some motive to lie” but not “a particularly strong one,” and it upheld admission without analyzing the probative quality of her six other statements.40 The Supreme Court did not reply that postmotive statements are worthless. Such a statement may suggest in some degree that the testimony is truthful, it conceded, but it refutes the charge less directly and forcefully than a premotive one.41 Its objection to balancing therefore rests on how the hearsay rules work and on what balancing costs.
The Government’s theory made relevance the test, and the Court answered that “[r]elevance is not the sole criterion of admissibility.” Were it the sole criterion, the Rules’ general bar on hearsay absent a specific exception, in Rule 802, would be hard to explain.42 On the Court’s view the timing condition is part of what the exemption requires, so a judge may not waive it because a particular statement seems persuasive.43
Balancing would also erase a distinction the drafters drew. A party facing important damaging testimony will often counter with at least an implicit charge that the witness was under some influence or motive to fabricate. If that charge opened the floodgates to any prior consistent statement that satisfied Rule 403, as the Tenth Circuit concluded, “the distinction between rejected Uniform Rule 63(1) and Rule 801(d)(1)(B) would all but disappear.”44 Implicit motive charges are common, so a balancing rule would turn a narrow exemption into something close to the rejected Uniform Rule.
Balancing also carries a practical cost. It would require the trial court to weigh all of the circumstances that suggest a statement’s probativeness against the court’s own assessment of the strength of the alleged motive, which “would entail more of a burden, with no guidance to attorneys in preparing a case or to appellate courts in reviewing a judgment.”45 The Court thought this case illustrated a further danger. If the Rule permitted prior statements as substantive evidence to rebut every implicit charge of recent fabrication, “the whole emphasis of the trial could shift to the out-of-court statements, not the in-court ones.” Here six witnesses recounted seven statements, and the Government’s closing relied on them to prove the abuse without once using them to rebut the alleged motive.46
The premotive rule is not free of difficulty. The dissent observed that the majority itself conceded that the rule, “while seemingly bright line, poses its own administrative difficulties.”47 The majority nonetheless judged balancing the heavier burden.48
Before Tome, the courts were divided. After the Rules took effect, many continued to enforce the temporal priority doctrine, but a large body of authority went the other way.49 Tome resolved the split in the federal courts by making the date a condition of admissibility. The way a statement is admitted also matters, because an admitted consistent statement is substantive evidence. Parry shows what is at stake. There the State requested, and the trial court admitted, a detective’s testimony substantively under Rule 801(d)(1)(B), and the jury was told nothing to limit the testimony to rehabilitative purposes. The reviewing court held that the testimony was inappropriate hearsay and its admission improper.50 Rehabilitative use without substantive effect is taken up later on this page.
A common mistake with a postmotive statement is to argue about how weak the motive was or how detailed and believable the statement is. Neither opens subpart (i), because the Court rejected weighing them.51 The analysis runs in order: date the alleged motive, date the statement, and, if the statement falls after the motive, ask whether another provision admits it.
A statement that fails the timing requirement is not therefore lost. When a party offers out-of-court statements that carry strong circumstantial indicia of reliability, are highly probative on the material questions, and are better than other available evidence, the Court said, “there is no need to distort the requirements of Rule 801(d)(1)(B).” In its words, “[i]f its requirements are met, Rule 803(24) exists for that eventuality.”52 The Court expressed no view on whether any of A.T.’s statements qualified there or elsewhere.53 The trial court had admitted her August 22 statement to the babysitter under Rule 803(24), the residual hearsay exception, and her statements to Dr. Kuper, and apparently Dr. Reich, under Rule 803(4), the exception for statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis. The Tenth Circuit never reached those rulings.54 The two inquiries differ. Rule 801(d)(1)(B) asks whether a statement answers a particular charge, which turns on timing, and the other provisions ask other questions, so a statement that fails here may still pass there.
Concurrence and Dissent
Two separate opinions accompanied the decision, and each previews an argument that returns later on this page. Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment and joined the Court’s opinion except for Part II-B, the part devoted to the Advisory Committee’s Notes.56 The dissent denied that the Rule codifies a timing requirement at all. The majority, it said, believes that this hearsay-related rule “codifies this absolute timing requirement,” and the dissent did not.57
The part of the opinion Justice Scalia declined to join gives effect to the Notes both as “a respected source of scholarly commentary” and as a display of the “purpose” or “inten[t]” of the draftsmen.58 He had made similar use of the Notes himself, in Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey and United States v. Owens, but more mature consideration persuaded him that the practice was wrong. The Notes, having been prepared by a body of experts, are persuasive scholarly commentary on the meaning of the Rules, “ordinarily the most persuasive.” He would not rely on them as a display of the draftsmen’s purpose.59 He still reached the Court’s result. As the Court’s opinion points out, only the premotive limitation makes it rational to admit a prior corroborating statement to rebut a charge of recent fabrication or improper motive, but not to rebut a charge that the witness’s memory is playing tricks.60
That contrast describes the Rule as it stood in 1995. Subpart (ii), added in 2014, now reaches a consistent statement offered to rehabilitate the declarant’s credibility when attacked on another ground,61 a category that includes a claimed lack of memory. The two subparts together ensure that every prior consistent statement admissible to repair credibility can also be used as proof of what it asserts.62
The dissent’s starting point was that the premotive requirement is not part of this Rule. “Rule 801(d)(1)(B) has nothing to do with relevance.” The Rule instead carves out a subset of prior consistent statements that were formerly admissible only to rehabilitate a witness, a nonhearsay use that relies on the fact that the statement was made, and declares them “not hearsay.” If such a statement is admissible for the rehabilitative purpose of rebutting a charge of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, its proponent may now use it substantively, as evidence of its truth.63
The dissent then attacked the majority’s reason for finding a timing rule in the text. The majority premise was that the Rule singles out statements of especially probative force. The dissent doubted it, because other categories of rehabilitative prior consistent statements also, on occasion, seem likely to have strong probative force. McCormick, for example, says that when a witness’s memory is challenged, “it seems clear common sense that a consistent statement made shortly after the event and before he had time to forget, should be received in support.”64
More fundamentally, the dissent said, probative force has little to do with the concerns underlying hearsay law. Hearsay law basically turns on the reliability of an out-of-court declarant, as tested through cross-examination, and not normally on the probative force of the statement if true. Timing may diminish probative force, but it does not diminish reliability, so from a hearsay perspective the timing of a consistent statement is basically beside the point.65 Because the Rule addresses a hearsay problem, and one can find a reason unrelated to the premotive rule for why it does so, the dissent would read its plain words to mean what they say. If a trial court properly admits a statement that is “consistent with the declarant’s testimony” for the purpose of “rebut[ting] an express or implied charge . . . of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive,” the statement is “not hearsay,” and the jury may also consider it for the truth of what it says.66
On the dissent’s account, timing belongs to relevance and is a matter for the trial judge. Special circumstances may show that a postmotive statement was made not because of the improper motivation but despite it. Such a statement can directly refute the charge of fabrication, not by bolstering the witness’s testimony in a general way, but because the circumstances show that the statement is not causally connected to the alleged motive to lie.67
A report the witness gave in May, before any offer, needs none of that argument. Majority and dissent alike would treat it as the kind of rehabilitation subpart (i) describes. The two opinions part ways only on statements that postdate the motive.
The dissent added that nothing in the cases suggests trial judges would find a more flexible rule hard to administer. Flexibility gives the trial judge greater authority to tie rulings on rehabilitative evidence to the needs and circumstances of the particular case, since “[a] flexible approach . . . is more apt to yield a sensible result than the application of a mechanical rule.”68 It also invoked Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. as a reason to doubt that a rigid common-law admissibility rule should be read into the Federal Rules as an absolute condition. The dissent would have held that the Federal Rules authorize a district court to allow, where probative in respect to rehabilitation, the use of postmotive prior consistent statements to rebut a charge of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, subject to Rule 403. Where such statements are admissible for that purpose, Rule 801(d)(1)(B) makes them admissible as substantive evidence as well, provided the Rule’s other requirements, such as the witness’s availability for cross-examination, are satisfied.69
The status of each opinion should stay clear. The majority’s timing requirement governs, and the dissent describes what the law would look like if timing were a relevance factor weighed case by case. The concurrence shows how the same requirement can be defended without leaning on the drafters’ Notes. The dissent’s relevance framing returns in the later debate over whether a postmotive statement may still serve a rehabilitative purpose.