Concept
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Proof
Contradiction
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Proof
A contradiction can reach the jury by two routes, and the law treats the routes very differently. Take an eyewitness who testifies that the car that caused an accident was red. Opposing counsel can ask her on cross-examination whether it was not yellow, or can offer someone else to say that it was yellow. Either way the point is the same: not that she lied, but that she erred about a fact, so her other testimony may contain errors and deserves a discount.1
The first route is intrinsic impeachment, in which the contradiction comes out of the witness’s own mouth on cross-examination. The second is extrinsic, which means proof in any style other than statements by the witness being questioned.2 The routes usually run in that order. Counsel presses the witness, and if she will not retract or change her account, counsel calls a second witness whose testimony conflicts with hers. At that point she has been impeached by contradiction. Two accounts that are merely not congruent do not, without more, impeach either witness; contradiction is something counsel does.3
Credibility contests unfold in stages. During direct examination it is uncertain whether the cross-examiner will attack the witness’s credibility at all, so the witness’s proponent ordinarily holds credibility-supporting information in reserve for redirect or a later stage of the case.4 Contradiction follows a similar course: the opponent deals first with the witness on cross-examination and turns to outside proof only afterward.
Courts ration the second route because it costs too much for benefits that are probably slight. If a party could prove every error in a witness’s account with outside evidence, it would introduce lots of evidence unrelated to the main issues, the jury would have to deliberate about whether minor portions of testimony were accurate as well as about the claims and defenses, and the parties would spend large amounts of time and resources on those side questions.5 Extrinsic contradiction is restricted, in short, because of confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, and undue consumption of time.6 Rule 403 lists the same dangers among those that justify excluding relevant evidence when they substantially outweigh its probative value.7
Whether the second route stays open turns on whether the matter is collateral, a question the next section takes up. If it is, counsel may be limited to intrinsic impeachment: the witness’s answer stands, and contradictory testimony offered other than through the witness is barred. If it is not, extrinsic evidence may be introduced to dispute the witness’s testimony on direct examination or cross.8
Cross-examination carries none of that limit. A witness can be asked about any part of the direct examination, because an error in any facet of it can reflect on the witness’s perception, memory, narrative ability, or sincerity, and the jury weighs all of those in judging credibility.9 The trial judge keeps discretionary control under Rule 403, but within that control the cross-examiner may pursue these matters at length.10 The line runs between the question and the proof. A defense witness could be asked, for example, “Wasn’t it a McDonald’s, not a Burger King?” But whatever the witness answered, additional evidence from a source other than the witness would be prohibited.11
One requirement does constrain the questions themselves. When a cross-examiner asserts a fact in the form of a question, the cross-examiner needs a good-faith basis for it. “Your glasses were being repaired at the time of the accident, weren’t they?” asserts a fact and requires a basis; “Were you wearing your glasses at the time of the accident?” merely inquires and does not. The same principle governs the foundation for impeachment by prior inconsistent statement.12
Courts sometimes say that when the collateral rule applies, the cross-examiner must “take the witness’s answer,” but the phrase does not oblige the questioner to accept the first answer out of the witness’s mouth.13 Suppose a witness testifies that she was driving home from church when she saw the collision. Counsel, who has a good-faith basis, asks whether she was not in fact leaving a card game, and she denies it. Counsel may press her, for example by reminding her of the penalties for perjury. Although judicial sentiment is split, there is modern authority allowing counsel to confront her with any contrary writing she would be competent to authenticate, such as a letter she wrote that mentions the game.14 What the phrase forbids is the next step, calling the other card player to prove the game. When the matter is collateral, her answer stands and contradictory extrinsic testimony is barred.15
The second route also has its place in the order of trial. A defendant who wants to contradict a plaintiff’s witness offers the refuting evidence in his case in chief. A plaintiff or prosecutor who wants to contradict a defense witness offers it in rebuttal, after the defense has closed, and the rebuttal must answer new evidence or new theories from the defense case. If rebuttal raises new points, the defendant’s refutation is called surrebuttal or rejoinder. Rebuttal is limited to non-collateral matters, and whether to allow it, and how far it may go, rests in the court’s sound discretion.16 A prosecutor who has already rested may therefore still call a witness to contradict a defense witness, subject to the limit on extrinsic proof.
The same division between questioning and outside proof recurs beyond contradiction. Rule 608(b) lets a cross-examiner ask about specific instances of a witness’s past conduct that are probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, but it prohibits proving that conduct by extrinsic evidence. United States v. Copelin explains that the rule is tailored to strike the balance the collateral evidence rule strikes for contradiction.17 Impeachment by prior inconsistent statement has the same two stages. The traditional foundation expected the cross-examiner to lead the witness gently to the inconsistency: show a written statement, recall the time and circumstances, and only then ask whether she made it and suggest that it undercuts her.18 Rule 613(a), by contrast, lets the examiner question the witness without showing the statement or disclosing its contents, though on request the examiner must show it or disclose it to an adverse party’s attorney.19 Rule 613(b) conditions the second stage: unless the court orders otherwise, extrinsic evidence of the statement may not be admitted until the witness has had a chance to explain or deny it and an adverse party has had a chance to examine her about it. That condition does not apply to an opposing party’s statement under Rule 801(d)(2).20 The sections on prior inconsistent statements develop these requirements.