Concept
Limiting Instructions as an Alternative
Exclusion for unfair prejudice, confusion, or waste of time
Limiting Instructions as an Alternative
Rule 403 gives a trial judge power to exclude relevant evidence, though not unlimited power. The rule permits exclusion when probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.1 The first limit on that power is the list itself: the judge may exclude only for one of three probative dangers, which are unfair prejudice (decision on emotion rather than reason), inaccuracy (confusing the issues or misleading the jury), and inefficiency (delay, wasted time, or needless repetition).2 The second limit is the subject of this section. The Advisory Committee’s Note tells the judge to consider, before excluding, whether a jury instruction might effectively reduce the unfair prejudice.3
Rule 105 supplies the instrument. When evidence is admissible against one party or for one purpose but not against another party or for another purpose, the court, on timely request, must restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.4
Why an instruction gets the first look
Exclusion removes the evidence for every purpose, the proper ones included, and evidence offered for a proper purpose often carries an improper inference with it. Proof of a defendant’s earlier misconduct, offered to show intent, also invites jurors to conclude that the defendant is the sort of person who does such things, and that is the inference the character rules generally bar when a party offers character to prove conduct in conformity with it.5 A limiting instruction keeps the proper use in the case and directs the jury away from the improper one.
Courts rely on the instruction heavily out of practical necessity. More often than not, they admit evidence that has an unwanted spillover effect and leave the objecting party with a limiting instruction, because little proof would be admissible if its relevance or impact had to match exactly its competency. A great deal of impeachment evidence, for example, comes in even though the jury may not treat it as proof of the other points it appears to establish.6
The dispute over whether instructions work
Experienced judges disagree about whether jurors can follow instructions of this kind. In Spencer v. Texas, the Supreme Court expressed faith in “the ability of juries to approach their task responsibly and to sort out discrete issues given to them under proper instructions.” Justice Jackson warned that all practicing lawyers know the “naive assumption” that instructions overcome prejudicial effects to be “unmitigated fiction.” The court in Dunn v. United States was equally pessimistic: “one cannot unring a bell,” and “if you throw a skunk into the jury box, you can’t instruct the jury not to smell it.”7
Rule 403 does not choose between these views. It treats the instruction’s effectiveness as a variable in the balance. If the court, after considering the probable effectiveness of a limiting instruction, concludes that probative value is substantially outweighed by the dangers of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, it excludes the evidence.8 A reliable instruction therefore shrinks the danger side of the scale, and a doubtful one leaves it intact.
Bruton v. United States marks one place where doubt wins. The Supreme Court held that the substantial risk that jurors, despite instructions, would treat a nontestifying codefendant’s extrajudicial statement as implicating the accused made its introduction improper. Yet the Confrontation Clause permits admitting such a confession with a proper limiting instruction when it is redacted to eliminate not only the defendant’s name but any reference to her existence.9
Where an instruction suffices and where it does not
In United States v. Beechum, the defendant said he meant to turn in a silver dollar, and the government offered proof that he had also carried two credit cards he had no right to hold. Intent was the only live question, and without the credit card evidence the jury would have decided it by judging witness credibility alone, so the evidence added a great deal. The court found the extrinsic offense not heinous enough to provoke an irrational verdict. It emphasized the trial judge’s extensive instructions confining the evidence to intent and described limiting instructions in that setting as substantially effective.
In Old Chief, by contrast, the prior conviction was for assault, the pending counts included an assault, and the defendant offered to concede his felon status. The Supreme Court held that the district court should not have admitted the full record of the earlier conviction over that offer; the next section takes up the holding and its limits.
Rule 105 made an instruction available in both trials, so availability cannot explain the different results. The difference lies in what the instruction was asked to protect. An instruction acts only on the danger side of the scale and cannot raise probative value. In Beechum it guarded evidence of great incremental value against a mild improper inference. In Old Chief it guarded evidence of almost no remaining value, since the defendant had offered to concede the status, against the most natural improper inference there is: that a person who assaulted once did so again, the very propensity reasoning the character rules generally forbid.10
A military appellate court applying Military Rule of Evidence 403 likewise found an instruction adequate. The instruction restricted the members’ consideration of the suggested evidence to credibility and substantially reduced its prejudicial tendencies, and because the evidence had considerable probative value for that proper purpose, the military judge did not abuse his discretion.11
The Advisory Committee’s Note ties the instruction to unfair prejudice, and the other Rule 403 dangers can behave differently. A video, film, or computer animation may convey an impression of objective reality. It misleads if its contents do not correspond closely enough to the actual conditions and context of the events at issue, or if jurors, impressed by the apparent reality it portrays, overestimate its probative worth.12 A limiting instruction that names a forbidden purpose has less to work on when the danger comes from how convincing the exhibit looks, and the discussion of digital and demonstrative evidence returns to the problem.
In other-acts cases, courts build the instruction into the test for admission. One formulation requires that (1) the evidence have a proper purpose under Rule 404(b); (2) it be relevant under Rule 402; (3) its probative value not be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice under Rule 403; and (4) the court charge the jury to consider the evidence only for the limited purpose for which it was admitted.13
Requesting the instruction
Rule 105’s protection arrives only on timely request, so the opponent who wants the restriction must ask for it. The court may give the instruction on its own initiative, or first ask counsel whether one is wanted, when it believes an instruction may be required to avoid plain error.14 Counsel frequently decline to ask, because an instruction draws the jury’s attention back to the damaging evidence. The price of declining is that, absent plain error, the failure to request an instruction precludes raising the point on appeal.15 A Rule 403 objection therefore often ends not in exclusion but in admission with a limiting instruction, and a party who loses the exclusion argument must decide at once whether to ask for one.16
The dissent in Old Chief takes the opposite view of the instruction. Justice O’Connor’s dissent pointed out that the district court had instructed the jury, on the defendant’s own motion, not to consider a prior conviction as evidence of guilt of the crime now on trial. The jury is presumed to follow such a cautionary instruction, she argued, and the instruction offset whatever prejudice the introduction of the prior conviction created.17 Whether that presumption should control when the earlier offense resembles the charged one is the dispute the next section takes up.