Concept
Other Self-Authenticating Writings
Authentication and identification
Other Self-Authenticating Writings
Rule 902 spares the proponent the showing that Rule 901(a) otherwise demands: evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.1 The four categories covered above rest on an official’s seal, signature, or certification, the kind of vouching on which statutes have often allowed writings to be received “without further proof.”2 Rules 902(5) through (10) add six more kinds of writing, and they earn the shortcut in three ways. Official publications and acknowledged documents show an official’s backing on their face.3 Newspapers and trade inscriptions carry little risk of forgery, and an interested party can easily confirm or expose them.4 Commercial paper and federally presumed documents borrow their status from law outside the evidence rules: Rule 902(9) adheres to general commercial law, and Rule 902(10) applies any federal statute that declares a writing presumptively genuine.5
All six share a ceiling. Compliance with Rule 902 means only that the judge admits the item, and the opponent can still dispute its authenticity before the jury, for example with proof that the document is a phony or bears a forged signature.6 The opponent can also object that a self-authenticating writing contains hearsay or expert opinion, as a newspaper may, because presumptive authenticity does not resolve the source or accuracy of what a writing reports.7
The rationale for the shortcut is debatable. If the justification is that these writings are very difficult to forge, recent technologies weaken it. If it rests on the assumption that most writings offered at trial are genuine, so that the opponent should carry the burden of showing otherwise, the same logic could reach any writing that on its face connects to the party it is offered against.8 Rule 902 applies that logic only to its listed categories, which the sections below take in rule order.
Official Publications
Rule 902(5) makes self-authenticating “[a] book, pamphlet, or other publication purporting to be issued by a public authority.”9 The category covers what governments print for general use: statutes, court reports, rules, regulations, and manuals such as officially published child support guidelines.10 Statutes and court decisions had already dispensed with preliminary proof for most of these publications, so the rule largely confirms existing practice.11
The operative word is “purporting.” A publication qualifies when it presents itself as issued by a public authority, and its official character comes from its appearance, as when a title page or imprint names the agency as issuer.12 The proponent needs no custodian to confirm what the cover already says, and no seal, signature, or certificate either. The category for sealed and signed public documents works differently, since it turns on a seal of a governmental body and a signature.13 The line that matters runs between a publication that discusses an authority and one that purports to come from it, because an agency’s name in the text does not make the agency the issuer.
The rule decides authenticity and goes no further. Rule 902(5) does not confer admissibility on all official publications; it supplies a means by which their authenticity may be taken as established for purposes of admissibility.14 A printed agency report is thus shown to be the genuine report, while the question whether its findings may be used for their truth remains one of hearsay. The opponent can still offer proof that a particular copy is a counterfeit.15
Newspapers and Periodicals
Rule 902(6) makes self-authenticating “[p]rinted material purporting to be a newspaper or periodical.”17 A page whose masthead and date line present it as part of a particular paper meets that description on its face, so the proponent need not call anyone from the publisher.
The shortcut is safe because the realities of newspaper and periodical publication make the risk of forgery extremely low.18 Consider how easy it would be to expose as a forgery an article falsely claimed to be from the January 12, 2018 edition of the New York Times: a comparison with the genuine edition would settle the matter.19 An interested party can usually confirm genuineness or reveal falsity at little cost, so it is reasonable to place the burden of proving a problem on the opponent rather than to make the proponent call a witness.20 The page comes in and goes to the jury, and the opponent may still prove that this particular page is a forgery.
What the category establishes is the genuineness of the publication, and it stops there. A genuine page can leave open questions of authority and responsibility for the items printed in it.21 Two questions therefore survive a successful offer. The first is who wrote or placed the item, since a newspaper can print a letter that a stranger sent in under another person’s name. The second is whether the item is true, because authentication and the hearsay rule are separate requirements and each is a gate the exhibit must pass on its own terms.22 A genuine page reporting that a bridge collapsed is still an out-of-court statement if offered to prove the collapse, and an opponent may object that it contains hearsay or expert opinion.23
The two scenes turn on what the printed item says about its own source. A letter to the editor is a submission the paper chooses to print, so the masthead identifies the paper and leaves the writer’s identity open. A notice or advertisement is an insertion placed by the person it names, and the view stated in the sources is that such items should be treated as self-authenticating for the narrow fact that they were inserted by the authority of the person who purports to have inserted them, with contrary evidence always admissible.24 Even then the notice shows only who placed it, and whether what it announces is true remains a separate question. A common mistake is to treat a newspaper’s self-authenticating status as proof that a quoted person said something or that a reported event happened.
Trade Inscriptions
Rule 902(7) makes self-authenticating “[a]n inscription, sign, tag, or label purporting to have been affixed in the course of business and indicating origin, ownership, or control.”26 Without it, the proponent of a labeled item would have to meet Rule 901(a), ordinarily through testimony such as that of a witness with knowledge of the label’s source.27 The two phrases that define the class explain why the shortcut works.
The first condition is that the marking purport to have been affixed in the course of business. The basis for self-authentication is the day-to-day reliance by members of the public on the correctness of such markings and the unlikelihood of fabrication, and many cases involve trademarks and brand names that federal and state laws forbid others to use.28 As in the other Rule 902 categories, “purporting” means that the judge reads the item’s face, and no witness has to confirm that the marking was applied in business.
The second condition is that the marking indicate origin, ownership, or control. The category covers what trade markings ordinarily say: who made the item, whose it is, or who answers for it, as with a manufacturer’s name on a package or a company’s name on a delivery truck. A tag that says none of those things falls outside the category, however official it looks.
Without Rule 902(7), the legend would present a hearsay problem, because using the matchbook as proof of its own origin means relying on its out-of-court statement of where it came from, and the prosecutor would need a witness able to give similar testimony about the source of a promotional item.29 Rule 902(7) lets the trier of fact accept the matchbook as being from the bar without other proof, and the hearsay objection goes away.30 What the rule does not supply is the further inference that the defendant visited the bar. That depends on his possession of the matches and on whatever else the prosecutor shows.
Self-authentication has the same ceiling here as elsewhere. The labeled item is admitted and may be considered by the jury, and the opponent remains free to offer evidence casting doubt on the label’s legitimacy.31 Two errors recur: treating any writing found on an item as a trade inscription, and reading the rule as proving more than the label says, as though the matchbook’s legend established that the defendant sat in the bar.
Acknowledged Documents
Rule 902(8) makes self-authenticating “[a] document accompanied by a certificate of acknowledgment that is lawfully executed by a notary public or another officer who is authorized to take acknowledgments.”33 The ceremony behind the certificate is simple. The signer goes to a notary, produces identification such as a driver’s license, and swears to having signed the document or signs it in the notary’s presence, and the notary then adds a certificate and seal attesting to what happened.34 Statutes have often accepted acknowledged deeds, conveyances, and other instruments “without further proof,” and Rule 902(8) carries that practice into the evidence rules.35
An ordinary signature on a private paper proves little alone, because a name is the first thing a forger copies. The proponent of a bare signed paper must therefore tie it to the signer through a witness or circumstances. An acknowledgment supplies a different kind of proof, created at the moment of signing and long before anyone contemplated a lawsuit: an officer checked the signer’s identification, took the signer’s declaration, and recorded the event in writing. The certificate thus shows that a public officer attended to the genuineness of the signing, which is the assurance a seal gives a public document, and it gives the paper the same presumption.36 A forger would have to deceive an officer in person or counterfeit the certificate, and the burden of showing a problem falls on the opponent, who remains free to prove forgery.37
The rule asks for two things, and each can fail on its own. The document must be accompanied by a certificate of acknowledgment, and a notary public or another officer authorized to take acknowledgments must have lawfully executed that certificate. The first requirement ties the paper to an officer’s attention at the time of signing. The second makes sure the attention came from someone the law empowers to give it.
A second scenario shows where the rule stops.
The court ruled correctly. Self-authentication means only that the document can be admitted and considered by the jury, and it does not bar the opponent from offering counterproof or from arguing that the document deserves little or no weight.38 The certificate answers the foundation question, whether the document may go to the jury without a sponsoring witness. It does not answer the jury’s separate question whether to believe the document, and a binding instruction would take that question away from the jury.
The acknowledgment also vouches for the signing and for nothing beyond it. Presumptive authenticity does not resolve the source or accuracy of what a document reports, so objections that it contains hearsay or inadmissible opinion survive.39 A notarized statement by a bystander describing an accident is genuinely the bystander’s statement, yet the account, if offered for its truth, still needs its own way past the hearsay rule.
Commercial Paper
Rule 902(9) makes self-authenticating “[c]ommercial paper, a signature on it, and related documents, to the extent allowed by general commercial law.”41 Commercial paper means written promises and orders to pay money, such as checks and promissory notes, and the rule reaches the signatures on them and the documents that go with them. This category is built differently from the ones before it. Rules 902(1) through (8) each name a feature the judge can see on the face of the item, such as a seal, a masthead, or a notary’s certificate. Rule 902(9) names none. It sends the judge to another body of law and accepts what that law accepts, so general commercial law sets the scope of the category and Rule 902 adds no test of its own.42
The general commercial law the rule refers to is the Uniform Commercial Code, and two of its provisions show what the borrowing delivers. Section 1-202 makes certain documents required by an existing contract prima facie evidence of their own authenticity. Section 3-505 provides that a formal certificate of protest, a stamp by the drawee (the bank or other party ordered to pay) that payment was refused, or bank records are admissible and create a presumption of dishonor.43 A holder who offers a returned check bearing the bank’s refusal stamp can therefore put the stamped paper before the jury without calling a bank officer. The presumption of dishonor comes from commercial law, and Rule 902(9) supplies the route by which the stamped paper enters the courtroom.
Borrowing avoids a conflict between two bodies of law. Commercial law has already decided that certain documents prove their own authenticity or create a presumption, and if the evidence rules still demanded a foundation witness, a document presumptively genuine in the commercial setting would be unproven in court. Rule 902(9) removes that disagreement by adopting the commercial rule, and the burden of showing a problem rests on the opponent, who is positioned to dispute a signature or a record.44
The boundary of the category appears on a paper that concerns money without being a document that commercial law presumes genuine.
The contractor’s route is the general one: produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the letter is what the contractor claims it is.45 A common error is to reason that anything connected with a payment is commercial paper. The category depends on whether commercial law gives the particular document its treatment, and a document’s subject matter does not decide that question.
A paper that qualifies is admitted and considered by the jury, and no more. The opponent may still offer proof that the signature is forged or the paper is a phony, and the presumption does not resolve the source or accuracy of the information the document reports, so objections such as hearsay survive.46
Statutory Presumptions
Rule 902(10) supplies no test of its own. It makes self-authenticating “[a] signature, document, or anything else that a federal statute declares to be presumptively or prima facie genuine or authentic.”48 Statutes often use the words presumption or prima facie evidence when they speak of authentication, and the rule treats the statute’s choice of those words as the trigger.49 A presumption directs a conclusion once some basic fact is shown, and prima facie evidence establishes the point on its face unless the opponent rebuts it. Ordinarily the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is genuine.50 When a federal statute has already declared the item presumptively genuine, the statute stands in for that evidence, and no foundation witness is needed.
The cross-reference prevents a collision. A statute declaring a signature prima facie genuine would accomplish little if the courtroom still demanded a sponsoring witness, because the statute would call the document presumptively genuine while the court treated it as unproven. Rule 902(10) removes the conflict by taking the statute’s presumption as it finds it. The rule creates no presumption of its own, and what Congress has declared sets the scope of the category. Like the commercial-paper category, this one borrows its test from outside the Federal Rules of Evidence, from a federal statute here and from general commercial law there.51
The standard illustration is the tax return. Section 6064 of title 26 provides that “[t]he fact that an individual’s name is signed to a [tax] return . . . shall be prima facie evidence for all purposes that the return . . . was actually signed by him.”52 A return bearing the taxpayer’s name therefore comes in as self-authenticating under Rule 902(10), without a witness who watched the taxpayer sign it. The presumption attaches to a narrow fact, who signed, and prima facie status leaves the taxpayer free to answer it with evidence that the signature is not the taxpayer’s, in which case the jury decides whom to believe. The statute speaks only to the signing, so whether the figures on the return are accurate, or may be used for their truth, remains a separate question for the other rules of admissibility.
What separates a signed tax return from a signed lease is whether any federal statute attaches a presumption to the signature.
The usual error is to treat any signature the law cares about as presumptively genuine, or to assume a statute the facts never mention. The category matters only when the facts identify a federal statute that uses presumption or prima facie language about genuineness, and a careful answer names that statute and its effect before invoking the rule. Without such a statute, the proponent returns to the other categories of Rule 902 or to the general standard of Rule 901.