Concept
Limits of Rule 405
Methods of proving character
Limits of Rule 405
Rule 405 answers one question: once character evidence is admissible, how may a party prove it? Reputation or opinion testimony is the default, and cross-examination of the character witness may reach relevant specific instances; when character is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, specific instances may be used as well.1 Antonio’s truth defense in Shylock’s defamation suit shows the rule at full width. Shylock sued over being called a “usurious cheat,” so his dishonest lending is the very thing Antonio must prove, and Antonio may offer a reputation witness, two opinion witnesses, and three witnesses to specific loans.2
Everything else in this unit marks where that freedom ends. Rule 405 reaches only as far as the word character, and it sits beneath Rule 404: Rule 404 decides whether character may be used at all, and Rule 405 chooses the method only where Rule 404 gives character some room.3 Even inside that room the rule supplies a method, not relevance. An accused who offers his own character, for instance, must offer a pertinent trait, and honesty is not pertinent to a charge of aggravated assault.4
Four kinds of evidence fall outside the rule, though each can pass for character evidence:
- Acts offered under Rule 404(b)(2) are admitted only on the premise that their relevance does not depend on a conclusion about character, so a rule that governs proof of character has nothing to govern.5
- Habit is defined as something different from character, and Rule 406 is silent on the method of proof, so Rule 405’s confinement to reputation and opinion does not carry over.6
- Sexual-offense evidence is governed by Rules 413, 414, and 415, which treat the method of proof explicitly, and by Rule 412 when the evidence concerns an alleged victim.7
- A witness’s truthfulness is governed by Rules 607, 608, and 609, to which Rule 404(a)(3) sends the character of a witness as it affects credibility.8
The three subsections below take up other-purpose acts, the sexual-offense rules, and witness truthfulness. Habit needs no more here, because Rule 406 prescribes no method of proof.
Other-Purpose Acts Under 404(b)
Rule 404(b)(1) bars evidence of another crime, wrong, or act when it is offered to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with it. Rule 404(b)(2) permits the same evidence for another purpose, such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.9 One earlier act can therefore be inadmissible on one theory and admissible on another, and the proponent’s theory decides which rule governs.
The working question is what inference the proponent needs. If the inference runs through the person’s disposition, the act is character evidence: Rule 404 decides whether it may come in, and Rule 405 supplies a form only if character is permitted. If the inference runs from the act straight to a specific fact, such as who committed the crime or whether an injury was an accident, the act is admitted on the premise that its relevance does not depend on any conclusion about character. Rule 405 then has nothing to regulate.10
The usual error is to ask whether the evidence is damaging or shows other crimes. The controlling question is the stated purpose, and whether that purpose can be reached without first reasoning from disposition.
Because Rule 405 drops out, nothing confines the proponent to a particular witness or form. The proponent may prove the act in its own case through an eyewitness, a record, or any other competent source. A cross-examiner whose only aim is to test a character witness must take the answer, as the earlier discussion of taking the answer explained; a party with a non-character theory proves the act directly.
The absence of Rule 405’s limits does not make the evidence automatically admissible. A jury asked to consider an earlier misdeed on a narrow point such as intent may treat it as proof of a bad person, so Rule 403 still applies, and courts sometimes exclude for unfair prejudice proof that goes too far afield.12
In a criminal case the prosecutor must also give reasonable notice of the evidence, so that the defendant has a fair opportunity to meet it, and must state in the notice the permitted purpose and the reasoning that supports it.15
Sexual-Offense Rules
For the accused, the ordinary pattern is the one this chapter has followed. He proves character by reputation or opinion and not by specific instances, but the prosecutor may bring in his past conduct by asking his character witnesses about it. That arrangement is sometimes called the “mercy rule,” and the Supreme Court in Michelson called the rules around it “archaic, paradoxical, and full of compromises and compensations by which an irrational advantage to one side is offset by a poorly reasoned counter-privilege to the other.”17 The trait must also be pertinent, meaning one that would make it less likely that he committed the crime charged.18
Rules 412 through 415 break from that pattern, and they break in opposite directions on the two sides of the courtroom. Rule 412(a) bars, in any civil or criminal proceeding involving alleged sexual misconduct, evidence offered to prove that a victim engaged in other sexual behavior or evidence offered to prove a victim’s sexual predisposition.19 Rule 404(a)(2)(B) is expressly subject to Rule 412, so the gate that ordinarily admits an alleged victim’s pertinent trait is itself controlled by the shield rule in these cases.20 The bar turns on what the evidence is offered to prove and not on its form, so a reputation witness does not get through merely because Rule 405(a) approves the form.
The court may admit three kinds of evidence in a criminal case:21
- Specific instances of the victim’s sexual behavior, offered to prove that someone other than the defendant was the source of semen, injury, or other physical evidence.
- Specific instances of the victim’s sexual behavior with the person accused, offered by the defendant to prove consent or offered by the prosecutor.
- Evidence whose exclusion would violate the defendant’s constitutional rights.
The first two exceptions tie the evidence to a concrete, case-specific fact, such as a different source for the injuries or an earlier relationship with the accused, and both reach only specific instances. Reputation and opinion about the victim’s sexual behavior or predisposition fit neither, so only a constitutional compulsion could bring them in.
Procedure matters as well. A party who intends to offer evidence under these exceptions must file a written motion at least 14 days before trial, specifically describing the evidence and stating the purpose for which it is offered, unless the court for good cause sets a different time. The party must serve the motion on all parties and notify the alleged victim or the victim’s guardian or representative.22 Civil cases use a different test. The court may admit evidence of a victim’s sexual behavior or predisposition only if its probative value substantially outweighs the danger of harm to any victim and of unfair prejudice to any party, and it may admit evidence of reputation only if the victim has placed it in controversy.23
The shield rule also has a boundary, and the boundary is the subject matter of the case.
On the defendant’s side, the movement runs the other way. Rules 413 through 415 are exceptions to the general ban on character evidence about the defendant, applying when he is charged with sexual assault or child molestation and when a civil case alleges that he committed such conduct.24 They allow his other sexual assaults or child molestations to be offered, and they treat the method of proof themselves, so Rule 405’s usual limits on specific acts do not control.25
Set side by side, the two groups of rules invert Rule 405 in opposite directions. For an alleged victim in a sexual assault case, reputation and opinion are barred and specific acts come in only in relatively rare instances.26 For a defendant charged under Rule 413 or 414, Rule 405 does not set the method at all. The difference follows from whose conduct the offer concerns, so the first question in any problem is whose character is at stake.
Witness Truthfulness Under Rule 608
Rule 404(a)(3) sends the character of a witness, as it bears on credibility, to Rules 607, 608, and 609, and Rule 608 then does for witnesses what Rule 405 does for the accused and the alleged victim: it prescribes the forms of proof.30 Under Rule 608(a), a witness’s credibility may be attacked or supported by testimony about the witness’s reputation for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or by an opinion about that character, but evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the witness’s character for truthfulness has been attacked.31 Supporting a witness is rehabilitation, the opposite of impeachment, and the Rules restrict only two of its modes: character for truthfulness and prior consistent statements.32 Rule 608 is the restriction on the first.
The gateway is open because a witness’s character for truthfulness is circumstantial evidence on the question the jury must answer about all testimony: is it true? A witness who has deceived before supplies some evidence of an untruthful trait, and that trait slightly raises the probability that the witness lied on the stand.33 This is a propensity inference, and the Rules tolerate it for reasons peculiar to witnesses. Some defend it because the veracity of witnesses is a highly important issue; others, because the data on which the inference rests are likely to be accurate and subject to quick, clear proof.34 Honesty is not a pertinent trait for an accused charged with aggravated assault,35 but it is the one trait that bears on whether a witness’s testimony is true.
The forms on direct examination are reputation and opinion, and the foundations are brief. Reputation testimony must concern the witness’s reputation at or near the time of trial, and it must rest on the character witness having discussed the reputation with others, having heard it discussed, or never having heard it discussed although contrary comments would have reached the character witness had they existed.36 The questioning is perfunctory because Rule 608 limits the form: a character witness may not explain an opinion by recounting something the principal witness did, such as defrauding the character witness of savings.37
The timing rule has a purpose. If a party could offer truthful-character witnesses at once, each side could line up character witnesses behind every witness nobody had challenged, and the trial would become a distracting, time-consuming bolstering contest.38
The attack need not take the form of reputation or opinion evidence. In United States v. Murray, defense counsel offered no such evidence against the government’s informant, but cross-examination exposed his drug use, his convictions, his concealment of drug use from a police contact, and his inconsistent statements to the grand jury. The Third Circuit treated that cross-examination as an attack on his character for truthfulness, which let the prosecution call a police lieutenant to give an opinion supporting him.
The same case shows where the form limit falls. The lieutenant’s account of using the informant on earlier occasions supplied a basis for his opinion, but his testimony about how many cases the informant had helped make was extrinsic proof of specific instances offered to support credibility, which Rule 608(b) forbids. The Fourth Circuit reached the same result in United States v. Taylor, where an officer testified that an informant’s information had produced convictions in other cases. A foundation answers how well the character witness knows the principal witness; a count of cases tells the jury what the principal witness did, and proving that would take a trial of those cases. The line matches the one in Rule 405: acquaintance may be shown, and narration of conduct may not.
Specific instances follow a third rule. Except for a criminal conviction under Rule 609, extrinsic evidence of a witness’s specific instances of conduct is inadmissible to attack or support truthfulness, but the court may allow inquiry into them on cross-examination if they are probative of the truthfulness or untruthfulness of the witness or of another witness whose character the witness being cross-examined has testified about.39 Relevance is measured against truthfulness: falsifying a loan application bears on it, and a barroom brawl does not. Convictions fall outside the bar because they are the kind of data likely to be accurate and subject to quick, clear proof, and because it seemed anomalous for a person convicted of serious crimes to appear before a jury and benefit from its likely assumption of a clean record.40 Rule 608(b) says nothing about the cross-examiner’s good faith, yet courts require a good-faith belief that the event occurred, and the questioner must take reasonable steps to confirm it.41 If opposing counsel objects and the questioner cannot show a good basis at sidebar, the judge should bar the inquiry.42 A witness who testifies on another matter does not, by doing so, waive the privilege against self-incrimination for testimony that relates only to character for truthfulness.43
The second target in Rule 608(b)(2) mirrors the cross-examination of a character witness under Rule 405(a). A character witness who has testified to the principal witness’s truthfulness may be asked about the principal witness’s specific acts probative of untruthfulness, and because extrinsic proof is barred, the cross-examiner must take the answer.44 The inquiry tests the character witness’s basis. A witness who has never heard of a notorious act may know the principal witness less well than claimed, and one who knows of it and still vouches applies a strange standard of truthfulness.
The second step is where most points are lost, since a party who sees an honest-sounding reputation witness assumes the form is enough and skips the question whether anyone has attacked the witness.