Concept
Habit Versus Character
Habit and routine practice
Habit Versus Character
Rule 406 lets a party prove a person's habit to show that the person acted in line with it on a particular occasion, yet the rule's text never says what a habit is.1 The definition comes from a contrast with character. That contrast repays careful study, because the two are easily confused and the law treats them very differently: courts frown on character traits offered to show how a person acted on a given occasion, but they receive personal habits and the customary behavior of organizations far more readily.2
Character is a generalized description of a person's disposition, or of the disposition with respect to a general trait such as honesty, temperance, or peacefulness, and it is usually regarded as meriting approval or disapproval.3 Habit is narrower. It is a person's regular practice of responding to a particular kind of situation with a specific type of conduct, and the response may become semi-automatic.4 A character for care, for example, describes a tendency to act prudently in all the varying situations of life: in business, at home, in handling automobiles, and in crossing the street.5
Everyday speech blurs the line. People talk about a habit for care, a habit for promptness, a habit of forgetfulness, even a bad habit of stealing or lying. Evidence of those so-called habits is the same kind of evidence that the general rule against character proof targets.6 The label a witness or lawyer chooses therefore settles nothing. What matters is the breadth of the conduct the evidence describes, and on an exam a stem that calls some behavior a “habit” is inviting you to look past the word and measure that breadth.
Specificity does the sorting. A person who bounds down one stairway two or three steps at a time, who stops at a particular pub after each day's work, or who drives without using a seatbelt has tied one kind of situation to one type of conduct.7 Punctuality shows the same split. A person may have a character trait for punctuality and also a habit of returning to the office from lunch between 12:50 and 1:00 p.m.; evidence of the trait would be rejected, and evidence of the regular return would normally be received.8
The permitted inference runs straight from the pattern to the act, and that is why habit slips past the objection to character. Take a driver who always comes to a full stop at stop signs and looks both ways. If a party offers that pattern to show she is a cautious, law-abiding person, the evidence would usually be excluded. Offered instead to show how she acted on a specific occasion, in a way that does not involve her general character or propensities, the same pattern is relevant, and Rule 406 makes clear that habit may be proved to show conduct in conformity with it.9
Habit also proves more than character does. A regular response to a particular situation generally carries greater probative force than a character trait because it is more specific and less volitional.10 Character may be thought of as the sum of one's habits, though it is surely more than that, and the uniformity of response to a habit is far greater than the consistency with which conduct conforms to character.11 Proof follows the same gradient. Stop-sign conduct is easy to describe, can be shown to have occurred repeatedly, and compares easily with the situation in dispute. Conduct described as getting angry quickly is much harder to describe accurately, and much harder to show was repeated in circumstances manifestly similar to those at trial.12 Add the moral overtones of character against the neutral quality of habit, and the difference in treatment is no surprise; it explains why Rule 406 stands out in Article IV by stating a rule of admissibility rather than limits.13
Conduct that falls short of habit gets no admission under Rule 406 and meets the general rule against character evidence. Levin v. United States (1964) shows the line being drawn. The accused offered testimony about his religious “habits” to show that he was at home observing the Sabbath, not out obtaining money through larceny by trick, and the testimony was held properly excluded. Religious practices do not lend themselves to “invariable regularity,” the court reasoned, because the very volitional basis of the activity raises serious questions about its invariable nature and hence its probative value.14 Volition is the wedge: the more a practice depends on choice, the less it resembles a habit.
The definition is easy to state and hard to apply. The dividing line between habit and character is far from distinct.15 Disagreement in the cases centers on what constitutes habit, since the number of instances required and the consistency of behavior demanded inevitably invite differences of opinion. Adequacy of sampling and uniformity of response are the key factors, yet no precise standard for measuring their sufficiency can be formulated.16 The next section turns to those factors.