Concept
Routine Practice of Organizations
Habit and routine practice
Routine Practice of Organizations
Rule 406 gives an organization's routine practice the same footing as an individual's habit: evidence of the routine may be admitted to prove that, on a particular occasion, the organization acted in accordance with it.1 The organization may be a business, a fire department, a hospital, a library, or a government office, and its routine practice is sometimes called its custom.2 The inference mirrors the one behind personal habit. The disputed occasion was one more instance of a situation the organization meets in a regular way, so the factfinder may conclude that it met the situation the same way again. Of the two kinds of proof the rule covers, this one meets the least resistance, and the reasons it comes in easily also show where it stops.
Two features make organizational routine easy to prove and persuasive once proved. Organizations generally adhere to prescribed routines and procedures, so their established practices are comparatively easy to discover: a hospital isolates patients with certain highly contagious diseases, and a business answers complaints in a set way.3 The facts behind a routine are also commercial rather than personal. Habit consists of purely voluntary personal acts, while a routine rests on business needs, and for that reason it frequently shows a greater degree of regularity than an individual's habit does.4 Extreme regularity gives both habit and routine their probative force, so an organization's routine often starts from a stronger position than a personal habit.5
Courts that resisted evidence of personal habit were still willing to admit a business organization's custom if it was reasonably regular and uniform.6 Two explanations fit that pattern. First, no one confuses business practice with character, as courts do confuse habit with character; nobody mistakes the way a mail room operates for a moral trait of the mail room. Second, the need for regularity in business, together with the organizational sanctions that may follow when employees deviate from established procedure, gives extra guarantees that the questioned activity followed the usual custom.7
Before Rule 406, proof of a routine standing alone was often held insufficient to show that an act was done, and courts demanded corroboration that the routine was followed on the occasion.8 The demand had a practical cost. People who carry out routine transactions seldom remember a particular one, and staff come and go, so a corroboration requirement asks for the very memory that the routine makes unnecessary. Rule 406 rejects corroboration as a condition of admissibility on the ground that it relates to the sufficiency of the evidence, not its admissibility, and that choice greatly facilitates proof of routine practice in many contexts.9 The routine comes in, and the factfinder decides how far it carries. The corroboration section below takes up that second sentence of the rule in full.
A routine proves whatever it commands. Where it commands action, it proves the action happened. A hospital can offer its routine of isolating patients with certain highly contagious diseases to show that a particular patient was isolated.10 Regular adherence to a standard protocol of informing research subjects of a drug's known risks and benefits likewise answers an allegation that some subjects were never informed.11 And a company that shows its mail clerk empties the out box and mails its contents every afternoon can use that routine to show that a letter placed in the box that day went out, though no one remembers the letter.12
Where the routine commands restraint, it proves that the act did not happen.
The inference runs the same way in both directions, and so does the foundation, which also sets the limit on the proof. Evidence of an organization's routine practice may be admitted only if a sufficient pattern of repeated responses is established to warrant a finding that the practice was routine.13 A rule on paper does not supply that pattern. The question is what the organization actually did, and admissible business practices can even depart from official or acknowledged company policy.14
When an exam stem describes a company policy and asks whether it comes in, test the foundation: ask how many times, over what period, and with what uniformity the practice was actually followed.
The word custom has a second meaning that must be kept apart from routine practice. In a negligence case, proof of the defendant's fault works like proof of any other fact: the parties offer direct and circumstantial evidence, and the factfinder decides what inferences to draw and whom to believe.15 What the other members of an industry usually do is circumstantial evidence of that kind. It is offered to show the standard of reasonable conduct against which the defendant's own conduct may be measured, and the factfinder remains free to decide what it proves. If every other maker of punch presses installs a particular safety switch, that fact bears on whether omitting it was unreasonable. It describes other actors, so it cannot show what this defendant did on any occasion. Routine practice under Rule 406 runs the other way: it describes the organization's own regular conduct and is offered to show that the organization acted that way on the occasion in dispute.16 A manufacturer's own practice of testing every press before shipment would be offered to show that this press was tested, while the industry's practice of installing the switch would be offered to show what care required.