Concept
Corroboration and Eyewitnesses
Habit and routine practice
Corroboration and Eyewitnesses
Rule 406 ends with a sentence aimed at two old objections: the court may admit habit or routine-practice evidence regardless of whether it is corroborated or whether there was an eyewitness.1 Corroboration means other evidence, independent of the habit proof itself, tending to show that the person or organization actually followed the habit on the occasion in dispute. An eyewitness is someone who saw what happened on that occasion. The Rule removes both as conditions of admissibility. Each condition demanded proof of the very act that the habit evidence is offered to establish.
Both conditions were once real obstacles. Some jurisdictions excluded habit evidence altogether, and others admitted it only if no eyewitness was available to testify about the events said to have triggered the habitual behavior.2 For organizations, proof of a routine standing alone was often held insufficient to show that an act was done, and courts required corroboration that the routine had been followed on the occasion in question.3 The federal rule rejects both limits. Habit or custom evidence with probative force should be admitted unless some other rule excludes it.4
The corroboration requirement did particular damage to organizational routine. Nobody can be expected to recall one of thousands of routine transactions, and personnel turn over. Strictly applied corroboration would therefore defeat the purpose of Rule 406 and work substantial injustice in some cases.5 The same logic condemns the eyewitness condition. It made habit a fallback for cases in which nobody saw what happened, and it excluded the proof whenever someone had.
The Rule's stated reason is that corroboration relates to the sufficiency of the evidence and not to its admissibility.6 The two questions arise at different moments and ask different things. Admissibility asks whether the offered item has probative force of its own and survives the other rules of exclusion. Sufficiency asks whether all the admitted evidence, weighed together, persuades the factfinder of the point. A habit with probative force clears the first question without help from any other evidence, and the jury then decides how much it proves against the rest of the record. An opponent who objects that nothing corroborates the habit is therefore arguing about weight. That argument belongs in cross-examination, contrary evidence, and closing argument, and it gives the court no ground for keeping the proof from the jury.
The eyewitness half of the sentence matters most when the event left no one to describe it. Lance Teel and his wife were driving west on Highway 46 when they collided at a county-road intersection with a car driven by Paul Finney. All four occupants were killed, and no eyewitness saw the accident. The only account of the scene came from a patrolman, whom the court allowed to give an expert opinion on the probable speed and positions of the cars; he concluded that the Finney vehicle was entering the highway from the north and turning left when it was struck.7 Suppose the Finney estate then calls a coworker who commuted with Paul Finney for years and will testify that he stopped at the highway every morning before turning. The absence of any eyewitness does not bar that testimony.8 A rule requiring an eyewitness would close the door in this case, and in every case where death, distance, or time has removed the people who saw. When the participants cannot testify, the pattern of how they usually behaved may be the best circumstantial evidence left.
The Rule removes an added condition and leaves the proponent's basic burden in place. The proponent must still establish a habit or routine, and the key factors are the adequacy of the sample and the uniformity of the response; precise standards for measuring sufficiency cannot be formulated.9 The proponent of an organization's routine must show a sufficient pattern of repeated responses to warrant a finding that the practice was routine.10 Admissibility also stays subject to exclusion under Rule 403.11 Corroboration and proof of a pattern are different showings. The first concerns the day of the dispute, and the second concerns the history that makes that day predictable.
An exam stem that pairs a no-corroboration or no-eyewitness objection with a thin pattern tests whether you can separate the two issues. The objection fails, yet the proof may still fail because too few instances were shown to establish a habit or routine. The sections that follow explain how a proponent builds that foundation: through witnesses who observed the conduct, through specific instances, or through a knowledgeable account of an organization's practice.