Concept
Methods of Proving Habit
Habit and routine practice
Methods of Proving Habit
Rule 406 lets a proponent use a person's habit or an organization's routine practice to show conforming conduct on a particular occasion, and it excuses the proponent from corroborating the habit or producing an eyewitness.1 What the rule does not say is how the proponent shows that the habit exists. It names no kind of witness, no form of testimony, and no number of occasions. The earlier sections set the substantive demands: a specific situation, an adequate sample, a uniform response. This section covers the proof that carries those showings to the judge.
The silence is deliberate. Rule 406 as submitted to Congress contained a subdivision (b) that would have allowed habit or routine practice to be proved by opinion or by specific instances of conduct sufficient in number to warrant a finding that the habit existed or the practice was routine. The Committee deleted it because it believed courts should settle the method of proof case by case, and it added that its action was not meant to sanction a general authorization of opinion evidence in this area.2
The caution about opinion makes sense against the line between habit and character. Character is a generalized description of a person's disposition, such as honesty or care, while habit is the person's regular response to a repeated situation.3 A witness who announces that someone is always careful offers the first and calls it the second. Unrestricted opinion testimony would let character evidence pass as habit.
With subdivision (b) gone, courts decide the method of proof case by case, and the trial judge decides whether the foundation suffices.4 Three methods carry most cases: a witness who observed the actor's behavior, proof by specific instances of conduct, and testimony describing an organization's routine. Each supplies facts that the court then measures against the specificity and regularity factors from the earlier sections. The choice of method therefore decides how the pattern reaches the jury and leaves the definition of habit unchanged.
Witness Observation and Opinion
The usual way to establish habit is to call a witness who has watched the actor behave the same way, in the same setting, over a significant period. The proponent must convince the trial judge that the person repeatedly reacted to a specific setting with enough uniformity to establish a habitual response, and a witness who saw that consistent behavior is the ordinary means.5 States that adopted the habit rule without a method-of-proof subdivision follow the same course: the method is determined case by case, and typically a knowledgeable witness testifies that the habit or practice exists.6
The observer is the standard source because a habit is a pattern, and only someone present on many of the occasions can say that the responses occurred and were alike. Firsthand knowledge also gives the opponent something to test on cross-examination: how often the witness was there, what the witness saw each time, and whether the actor ever did otherwise. The size of the sample therefore counts. The greater the number of observations, the more likely a uniform pattern can be shown. A habit need not be free of every deviation, but the foundation weakens when the conduct varies, when the observations span only a short period, or when they include only a few instances.7
A witness may also state a conclusion instead of reciting each occasion. Deleting the proposed subdivision did not remove opinion testimony from the case, because the general rules still apply. Rules 602 and 701 together make a nonexpert's opinion admissible when it rests on personal knowledge and helps the trier of fact decide a fact of consequence, and an opinion about an individual's habit or an organization's routine, grounded in the witness's own knowledge, should normally be permitted on those terms.8 The form saves time when no one disputes the habit, since one sentence replaces a recital of dozens of occasions. When the habit is contested, the court may require the witness to disclose the specific instances behind the opinion, and the opponent may bring those instances out on cross-examination.9 The next subsection takes up those instances.
The opinion route is narrow. The opinion must rest on what the witness saw, it must help the jury, and the trial judge keeps considerable discretion to decide whether the foundation establishes a habit at all.10 It must also describe a habit and not a disposition. A witness who says the actor always stopped and looked both ways at one railroad crossing has stated a conclusion about a single situation and a single response. A witness who says the actor was a careful man has offered the general-disposition inference that character evidence raises, now dressed as an opinion.11 A lawyer who wants the opinion admitted should lay its basis first, by showing how long and how often the witness watched the conduct.
Reputation testimony fits the foundation worse. A witness who reports only that the actor is known for doing something has not watched the conduct, so the personal knowledge that supports an opinion is missing.12 What a community says is also pitched at disposition, while a habit is a regular response to a repeated specific situation.13 Reputation says nothing about how often the response followed the situation, and that ratio of reactions to situations is what the court needs.14
An exam stem that offers a witness to prove habit is testing the witness's basis. Ask whether the witness watched the behavior repeat, over what period, and on how many occasions. A witness who can answer all three from direct experience may testify to the pattern and, in the court's discretion, may state an opinion about it. A witness who can answer only with what people say has not supplied the foundation.
Specific Instances of Conduct
Proof by specific instances is the most direct route to a pattern, because a habit is a regular response to a repeated situation and the instances are the repetitions. A witness who recounts what the actor did on identifiable occasions gives the judge something to count and the opponent something to cross-examine, which an announced conclusion does not. Courts that receive this proof make three demands. There must be enough instances to establish the habit, the instances must resemble one another in circumstances, and the circumstances under which the habit is followed must be present at the time of the conduct sought to be proved.16 One opinion states the sampling standard this way: the examples must be “numerous enough to base an inference of systematic conduct,” and the key criteria are “adequacy of sampling and uniformity of response,” or the “ratio of reactions to situations.”17
The first step rests on arithmetic. One act cannot separate a standing practice from a coincidence, and a handful of acts leaves much the same doubt. The second and third steps catch a subtler error, which is counting acts that look alike but arose in different circumstances. An instance shows how the actor responds to a situation only if that situation was present. An instance from a different setting shows a general tendency, and a general tendency is the disposition inference that separates character from habit.18 A pattern that operates only when its trigger appears also predicts nothing about a day when the trigger was absent.
A stem that supplies a long list of past conduct is therefore testing the match between the list and the situation, and a large number alone does not settle the question.
Proof by specific instances also remains subject to Rule 403, even when the foundation is sound.19 The Advisory Committee's note to the proposed subdivision supplies the model: a court may admit testimony by a witness that on numerous occasions he was with X when X crossed a railroad track and that each time X first stopped and looked in both directions, yet exclude offers of ten witnesses, each testifying to a different occasion.20 The two rulings answer different questions. The first witness's account establishes the pattern by supplying a sample large and uniform enough to support the inference. Once the pattern is established, each further witness adds one more occasion to a habit already proved, at the price of trial time and cumulative testimony.21 Rule 403 lets the court stop the accumulation there, and an exclusion on that ground is a ruling about excess that says nothing against the habit itself.
A comparison of two records shows how a court measures a sample. In Loughan, where the proponent sought to prove a drinking habit, the court contrasted the record with Reyes, in which the evidence consisted of four particular incidents. Firestone had offered evidence of Loughan's drinking over an extended period of time, coupled with evidence of his regular practice of carrying a cooler of beer at or about the time of the accident. The district court relied on the cumulative effect of that evidence in measuring whether it established a drinking habit under Rule 406.22
The two records differ in ways this subsection has developed. Four particular incidents give a court four events to weigh. The Loughan record added duration and a practice, carrying a cooler of beer, tied to the time of the accident, so it spoke to the circumstances of the disputed occasion and not merely to a general inclination to drink. The fuller picture matters because evidence of intemperate “habits” is generally excluded when offered to prove drunkenness in accident cases.23 A proponent needs a record that reads as a pattern and not as a collection of lapses.
Even so, the ruling remained a judgment about sufficiency. Precise standards for measuring sufficiency cannot be formulated, and the trial judge has considerable discretion to decide whether the repetitious activity suffices to establish a habit.24 The comparison shows what a judge may weigh and fixes no required number of instances. The next subsection turns from individuals to organizations.
Foundation for Organizational Routine
Evidence of an organization's routine practice is admissible as tending to prove that the practice was followed on the occasion in question, because the operation of organizations depends largely on establishing and following routines.26 The foundation has two parts. The proponent must establish a sufficient pattern of repeated responses to warrant a finding that the practice was routine,27 and the usual way to do it is through a knowledgeable witness's testimony that the practice existed.28 Those statements place two demands on the witness: firsthand knowledge of the routine, and a description specific enough for the judge to see the pattern. The hard cases arise when a witness satisfies one demand and strains the other.
The personal-knowledge demand exists because a judge deciding whether a routine is established needs to know that the witness describes a practice that actually operates. A general statement that the organization is careful, or always follows its procedures, gives the judge no way to tell whether the witness has seen the practice or is repeating an assumption. A witness who has watched the steps unfold has seen the pattern repeat, and the opponent can test that observation on cross-examination. Knowledge, not performance, is the test, so the witness need not be the person who performs each step. Routines run in the open across many hands, and an employee stationed at one point usually sees how the work moves through the points on either side.
The secretary's account joins two kinds of knowledge. She knows this occasion from her own acts, because she sealed the envelope and put it in the basket, and she knows the routine from watching it operate. A letter written and signed in the course of business and put in the regular place for mailing usually will be admitted to prove that it was mailed.29 Wells Fargo Business v. Ben Kozloff, Inc. shows the same combination at work: the sender testified to what he did with the letter and to how the office handled its outgoing mail, and the court accepted that testimony as proof of mailing.30 The mail clerk would also be a competent witness, but Rule 406 does not require the clerk.
The second demand, specificity, separates the secretary from a witness who knows only the conclusion. An exam stem often presents a witness who sounds sure of the organization's habits but never says how they work.
The difference between the two accounts lies in the mechanics. Where notices are placed, who collects them, and when they leave the building give the judge something to measure, give the jury a picture of the routine to compare with the opposing evidence, and give the opponent specific points to probe. The supervisor's assurance supplies none of those, and its last step, that the notice must have gone out, restates the conclusion the routine was supposed to support. Written rules, standards, or procedures also carry weight for an organization,31 but the description must match what actually happens, because admissible business practices can include ones that depart from official or acknowledged company policy.32 A witness who describes the practice as it operates on the floor is a stronger source than one who recites the handbook.
A routine proves whatever it commands, which means it can show that something was never done. Evidence of an organization's routine practice is admissible as tending to prove that the practice was followed on the occasion in question,33 and a practice of leaving certain things undone is followed by leaving them undone.
The clerk needs the same foundation as the secretary. A job at the point where unsolicited scripts arrived and left gave the clerk firsthand knowledge of what happened to them, and an invariable procedure describes a pattern of repeated responses without exception. The clerk cannot say what became of the plaintiff's particular manuscript and does not need to, since the routine carries that inference. Nor must a second employee corroborate that this script was returned, because corroboration goes to the sufficiency of the evidence and not to its admissibility.34
The first step settles most cases, because performing the routine and watching it both satisfy it easily. Hearing about the routine from others is where the hard cases begin.
The new clerk's account fails the first demand. She knows the routine only because others told her about it, so she reports an assertion she cannot test, and the opponent has nothing of hers to cross-examine. The supervisor's account meets both demands: it rests on years of firsthand experience, and it describes the steps from signing to receipt. Between those poles lie harder witnesses, such as an employee with years in the office who has watched the work pass through her hands without ever performing it. Whether her knowledge suffices is a question for the trial judge, who has considerable discretion over whether the foundation establishes the practice.35
Testimony about a professional's warnings raises a related classification question. When the issue is whether a physician warned a patient of a procedure's hazards, evidence that he always gives such warnings can be called the habit of an individual or the routine practice of an organization. In Arthur v. Zearley, a physician's testimony about what he told all of his patients during the informed-consent conference was received as habit and routine practice evidence.36 Rule 406 reaches both individuals and organizations,37 so the label rarely decides admissibility. Under either label the proponent needs a witness who describes the practice itself, and the opponent remains free to answer with evidence that the practice was not followed on the occasion in question.