Concept
Burchett and Judicial Resistance
Habit and routine practice
Burchett and Judicial Resistance
Rule 406 lets a federal court admit a person's habit or an organization's routine practice to prove conforming conduct on a particular occasion, and it requires neither corroboration nor an eyewitness.1 Kentucky refused to follow that approach until its rules changed, and the state supreme court's opinion in Burchett v. Commonwealth states the case for exclusion more fully than most. Kentucky's common law barred habit evidence offered to prove conduct on a particular occasion. The court reversed the defendant's convictions because the jury had heard his own statement that he smoked marijuana daily, offered to show he had smoked it on the morning of a collision.2 The opinions earn a place at the end of this chapter because the majority names the dangers that the specificity and regularity requirements exist to contain, while the concurrence and dissent show how the mainstream answers them.
The majority feared how easily the habit label stretches. The defendant had said that, besides smoking marijuana every day, he drank between a half and three-quarters of a gallon of vodka daily. Had habit evidence been admissible, that drinking routine would have come in as substantive proof that he was likely drinking on the day of the collision. It would have weighed heavily with the jurors, yet it would have been false, because a blood alcohol test showed that he had no alcohol in his system that day.3 The test is what kept the drinking evidence out. The marijuana claim had no comparable check, because his blood sample could not be tested to corroborate his account that he had not smoked that morning. From the contrast the majority drew what it called "the dangerous non sequitur that the habit evidence rule encourages," the step from a defendant's regular performance of an act to the conclusion that he performed it on this occasion.4 A routine describes how often something tends to happen. It does not settle whether the thing happened on one particular day, and a jury invited to close that gap by assumption will sometimes be wrong. The looser the habit label, the more often the assumption will rest on a pattern that was never regular enough to predict the day in question.
The concurrence accepted the majority's alarm and rejected its remedy. Justice Keller acknowledged that the habit label could be malleable, but he believed an appropriately narrow definition of habit would allay the concern, and he would support a rule admitting habit evidence to prove conforming action. He voted to reverse only because, in his view, Kentucky trial courts could not admit habit evidence until the Kentucky Rules of Evidence were amended.5 The concurrence thus agrees with the federal approach on substance and differs only on the source of authority. Its answer to malleability is the one this chapter has developed: a definition tight enough, through specificity and regularity, that a loose disposition cannot pass for a habit.
The dissent attacked the exclusion on both logic and numbers. Justice Cooper observed that character and habit are both offered as circumstantial proof of conforming conduct and that specificity separates them. Testimony that the defendant is a "drunkard" would be character evidence; testimony that he drinks a half to three-quarters of a gallon of vodka a day would describe a habit.6 He counted forty-three states with analogues of Rule 406 and five more that admit habit at common law with some variation. Apart from Kentucky, he noted, only Massachusetts purported to preclude habit evidence, and Massachusetts still admits evidence of business habit or custom.7 In his view, many of the old Kentucky cases involved what is better called character evidence, such as a "habit" of drunkenness or of being a careful driver. The excluded evidence, he argued, met the modern definition of relevance and was admissible under Kentucky's Rule 402.8 His example is generous, and federal courts remain cautious about drinking proof: the Advisory Committee's note observes that evidence of intemperate "habits" is generally excluded when offered to prove drunkenness in accident cases.9 A daily quantity supplies detail, but whether it records a response to a repeated specific situation, rather than a general tendency to drink, remains a question for the trial judge.
The hypothetical shows the federal answer to the majority's worry. The category of habit evidence stays open, the threshold requirements keep loose labels out, and the opponent remains free to prove that the person acted differently on the day. In Burchett itself the blood test kept the drinking evidence from the jury, while the marijuana evidence, which had no comparable check, reached the jury and drew the reversal.
Kentucky did not remain the outlier. In 2006 it amended its evidence code to add a provision modeled closely on Federal Rule 406. The Legislative Research Commission's note explained that in Burchett a majority of the justices had expressed the view that habit evidence should be admissible to prove conduct in conformity with habit, although a majority held it could not be admitted without explicit authorization in the rules.10 The amendment brought Kentucky into line with nearly all other states and the federal rules. Burchett therefore casts no doubt on the federal rule. Its value lies in showing what the exclusionary majority feared, a habit label applied without discipline, and the federal framework meets that fear in layers. Adequacy of sampling and uniformity of response are the key factors.11 The drafters advanced two theories of habit to build in trial court discretion, which leaves the judge room to decline a loosely proved pattern.12 And evidence of what happened on the day remains available to the opponent.