Concept
The Propensity Ban
Other crimes, acts, transactions, and events
Other Crimes and Acts Evidence
The Propensity Ban
We reason from character all the time outside the courtroom. An employer wants to know whether an applicant stole from a past employer. A worker whose lunch has vanished from the breakroom refrigerator thinks first of the colleague who was once caught taking other people's food.1 Each is guessing from a past act to a present one. Rule 404(b)(1) stops a factfinder from doing the same thing at trial: evidence of any other crime, wrong, or act "is not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character."2
What the rule forbids is a chain of reasoning with three links:
- The person did something on an earlier occasion.
- So the person is a certain type of person.
- So a person of that type probably did the same sort of thing on the occasion being tried.
This is propensity reasoning. The middle link, the conclusion about the person as a type, is the one the rule will not let a party use.3
The earlier robberies and the reputation help the prosecution only through the middle link. The propensity rule bars both, because each is offered to support the inferences that he is a thief and therefore robbed the liquor store.4 The objection is to the route of the reasoning. It does not depend on how closely the earlier crimes resemble the charged one.
Two rules state the ban. Rule 404(a)(1) covers character itself: evidence of a person's character or character trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with it.5 Rule 404(b)(1) repeats the bar for evidence of specific acts.6 Where character is admissible to prove conformity, Rule 405(a) allows proof by reputation or opinion testimony and does not allow specific instances of conduct, although on cross-examination of such a witness inquiry into relevant specific instances is permitted.7
The ban reaches civil and criminal cases alike, with a small number of exceptions in criminal cases.8 A criminal defendant may offer evidence of a pertinent trait, and if the court admits it the prosecutor may offer evidence to rebut it.9 Civil cases have no comparable exceptions, so character cannot be used to prove conduct there.10 The one major carve-out is the group of sexual-offense rules, Rules 413 through 415, which permit evidence of a defendant's past sex offense to support an inference that the defendant committed another offense of that type. A later section takes them up.11
The text of Rule 404(b)(1) reaches "any other crime, wrong, or act."12 It conditions none of the three on a charge or a conviction. Because it lists an act beside a crime and a wrong, it also covers conduct that was neither criminal nor blameworthy. What triggers the ban is the purpose for which the earlier conduct is offered. The classic statement in Michelson v. United States shows the same reach: the state may not show the defendant's prior trouble with the law, specific criminal acts, or ill name among his neighbors to prove that he is by propensity a probable perpetrator.13
The second scene is not barred by Rule 404, because the weapons connect the defendant to the shooting without passing through character. A juror who concludes that he was the armed person at the scene may well think him dangerous afterward. That thought follows the finding of fact and does not drive it, so the juror has not used a belief about character to evaluate the person's conduct.14 The ban attaches to a use of an earlier act and not to its subject matter. Neither Rule 404(a)(1) nor Rule 404(b)(1) is a blanket prohibition. Each forbids the evidence when it is offered to prove action in conformity with character, and evidence of specific acts is not barred by Rule 404 when it is offered to prove something besides a person's character.15 The next section turns to those other purposes.
The law distrusts the propensity chain for two separate reasons. The first concerns the strength of the inference. Character is a vague concept, and its effect on a person's actions may vary widely. It is multidimensional and may mean different things to different people, so it is hard to be sure that gas station robberies really show a thieving type of person, if there is such a thing at all. Reputation evidence is likewise open to a wide range of interpretations.16 It is also hard to know how deep a trait runs, to be sure that a person truly has it, or to grasp what it says about her conduct at the crucial moment. In the end the probative worth is limited and hard to assess.17
The second reason concerns what jurors do with the evidence. Character evidence is weak, yet it is often evidence of bad character, and it risks leading jurors to improper prejudice. A juror may turn against a defendant who has been a robber and convict in the present case just to impose additional punishment. A juror may also think a weak prosecution case good enough for a "bad" defendant, since convicting a past thief of a current crime does not blemish an otherwise clean record even if the conviction is mistaken.18 The same passage from Michelson explains why the evidence is excluded anyway. The inquiry is rejected not because character is irrelevant but because it weighs too much with the jury, leading them to prejudge a person with a bad general record and denying him a fair opportunity to defend against a particular charge. Its exclusion also tends to prevent confusion of issues, unfair surprise, and undue prejudice.19
The Advisory Committee's Note adds a third cost. Character evidence distracts the trier of fact from the main question of what actually happened on the particular occasion, and it subtly lets the trier of fact reward the good person and punish the bad one for their respective characters, despite what the evidence in the case shows actually happened.20 The ban therefore targets a chain that adds little probative force and can sway a jury a great deal.