Concept
Notice in Criminal Cases
Other crimes, acts, transactions, and events
Notice in Criminal Cases
Rule 404(b)(3) adds a procedural duty to the substantive rules taught so far: in a criminal case, the prosecutor must take specified steps before other-act evidence reaches the jury.1 The earlier sections asked what an earlier act may be used to prove and how sure the court must be that the act happened. This duty asks what the defendant must be told about the other acts, and when. The first part below covers the notice and its timing; the second covers what the notice must say.
The duty serves two ends. The first is to prevent surprise. The defendant has prepared to meet the charged offense, and a defendant who first hears of an incident from years earlier on the morning of trial has no time to find witnesses who contradict the government's, collect records, or frame an objection. That time matters because the court asks only whether the evidence is sufficient to support a finding that the act occurred; clear and convincing proof is not required.2 The defendant's strongest responses are therefore an attack on the quality of the government's proof and an argument about unfair prejudice, and both take preparation. The second end is to make the prosecutor commit to a purpose before trial. A word like intent or identity can conceal the forbidden inference from a person's character to the person's conduct,3 and the court can test a purpose only if the proponent exposes the reasoning behind it.
Reasonable Written Notice
In a criminal case, the prosecutor must provide reasonable notice of any other-act evidence the prosecutor intends to offer at trial, so that the defendant has a fair opportunity to meet it.4 The phrase “any such evidence” points back to the rule's first two subsections, so the duty reaches every other crime, wrong, or act offered for a permitted purpose, whether motive, opportunity, intent, or another purpose.5 Only the prosecutor bears the duty, and only in a criminal case. It arises without any request from the defendant, because the text conditions it on nothing but the prosecutor's intent to offer the evidence.6
The rule measures reasonableness by what the notice is for, which is the defendant's fair opportunity to meet the evidence, and it fixes no number of days. A notice is reasonable when it arrives early enough, and identifies the evidence clearly enough, for the defense to investigate the earlier event, find the witnesses and records that cut against the government's account, and prepare its objection. A notice that comes too late, or says too little to investigate, fails the standard even if every word of it is accurate.
Clause (C) fixes form and timing: the notice must be in writing before trial, or in any form during trial if the court, for good cause, excuses lack of pretrial notice.7 Each requirement does its own work. Pretrial timing gives the notice its value, because the defense can use none of the time it needs if the first word arrives mid-trial. The writing fixes what the prosecutor committed to, so a later dispute is settled by a document, and the court can compare the offer at trial with what the notice announced.
The good-cause exception exists because other-act evidence sometimes surfaces late for reasons that have nothing to do with the prosecutor's diligence; without an exception, the court would have to exclude probative evidence or ignore the rule. The exception must stay narrow, though. If carelessness counted as good cause, nearly every late notice would qualify, and the requirement of written notice before trial would become optional. The inquiry therefore turns on why the notice is late. The exception also excuses only the lack of pretrial notice, so the demand that the defendant have a fair opportunity to meet the evidence remains in force even when the notice comes during trial.8
The two announcements are equally late, and the reason separates them. In the first, the prosecutor had the witness all along and simply failed to give notice, which leaves the court nothing to excuse. In the second, the evidence did not exist for the government until trial was under way, which is the situation the exception addresses. Even then, the court still asks whether the notice given leaves the defense a fair opportunity to respond.
The duty also depends on the evidence being an other act. Evidence of the charged crime itself is direct evidence and not other-act evidence. Acts so intertwined with the charged crime, so linked in time and circumstance that one cannot be fully shown without proving the other, also fall outside Rule 404(b).9 Evidence outside the rule is outside its notice clause as well. Suppose a defendant on trial for assault is shown to have screamed threats at the victim on the sidewalk seconds before the punch. A court that finds the threats inseparable from the story of the assault treats them as part of the charged event, and no notice is owed. A fight the same defendant started with a stranger in another bar five months earlier is a separate event, an other act, and it does call for notice.
The current wording is the product of the 2020 amendments, which changed the notice requirement in a number of ways and, in the Advisory Committee's words, imposed “additional notice requirements.”10 Older opinions and outlines may therefore describe a narrower duty. The current text imposes the duty on the prosecutor outright, so a defendant who never asked is still entitled to notice. It also requires a writing and a statement of purpose and reasoning, in addition to reasonable notice of the evidence itself. An answer should state the current rule.
The third and fourth steps carry most of the exam weight, because they separate a notice that is merely late from one that is late for a reason the rule recognizes. The fifth step is easy to forget, since a notice can be timely and written and still fall short if it names no purpose.
Stated Purpose and Reasoning
Rule 404(b)(3)(B) adds a content requirement to the notice: the prosecutor must articulate in the notice the permitted purpose for which the evidence will be offered and the reasoning that supports that purpose.12 The clause asks for two things, and the second is easy to overlook. The purpose names the disputed fact the evidence is meant to prove, such as knowledge or identity. The reasoning explains how the other act proves that fact, which is the chain of inference examined throughout this chapter. A notice that supplies only the purpose leaves the defense and the court holding a label, and a label like intent can sit on top of the forbidden step from the defendant's character to the defendant's conduct.13
The requirement ties the notice duty to the substantive test, because that test can be applied only when the links are visible. Admissibility turns on whether the other act reaches a disputed fact without passing through character, and the proponent must specifically identify the particular purpose for which the evidence is relevant.14 When the pretrial notice must state the reasoning, the defense learns before the evidence is offered which inference the jury will be asked to draw. The defense can then aim its attack on the proof of the act, and its argument about unfair prejudice, at the chain the prosecutor actually stated. The judge benefits too, because the chain is on paper before the jury hears any of it and can be checked for a detour through character.
A written statement of purpose and reasoning also commits the prosecutor. A chain stated before trial is a fixed point against which the trial offer can be measured. If the prosecutor later retreats to a vaguer justification, or shifts to a different purpose once the first looks weak, the defense can point to the notice and object that the offer departs from what was articulated. A prosecutor who must write out the links in advance also has to find out whether the links exist, and a theory that amounts to the claim that the defendant did it before and so did it again is hard to dress up as reasoning.
A notice that names a listed purpose in a single word and stops there is also deficient, because the clause calls for the reasoning as well as the purpose. The opposite error is to treat a well-drafted notice as settling admissibility. A notice that states purpose and reasoning satisfies the notice duty, but the evidence must still clear the proof standard and the unfair-prejudice weighing covered earlier. The stated reasoning is also open to attack on its merits, since a chain that runs through the defendant's type fails the substantive ban however clearly it is written.