Concept
Rule 413: Sexual Assault Cases
Prior sexual misconduct of a defendant
Rule 413: Sexual Assault Cases
Rule 413(a) departs from the ordinary ban on character reasoning. Rule 404(b) bars evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts offered to prove a person’s character in order to show that the person acted in accordance with it; Rule 413(a) admits evidence of a collateral sexual assault “on any matter to which it is relevant,” propensity included.1 Stated in full, the rule says that in a criminal case in which a defendant is accused of a sexual assault, the court may admit evidence that the defendant committed any other sexual assault.2 That sentence holds two conditions and one grant of permission. The first condition concerns the case on trial: the charge must be a sexual assault. The second concerns the evidence: it must show that the same defendant committed some other sexual assault. When both are met, the judge may admit the evidence, and the jury may reason from the earlier assault to the charged one.
Rules 414 and 415 copy this structure. Rule 414 applies to a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of child molestation, and it admits evidence of any other child molestation.3 Rule 415 carries both rules into civil litigation, where the claim for relief must rest on a party’s alleged sexual assault or child molestation, and it directs the court to consider the evidence as Rules 413 and 414 provide.4 Together the three rules speak to a civil or criminal defendant accused of sexual assault or child molestation.5 Each changes only the category of offense or the kind of proceeding, so the questions asked of Rule 413 (is the right charge pending, and is the other act of the right kind?) serve for all three. Two matters must be settled before those questions can be answered. One is how the charge triggers the rule and how closely the other act must match it. The other is what conduct counts as a sexual assault, since one definition governs both the charge and the other act. The trigger comes first.
Triggering Charge and Same-Type Limit
The first sentence of Rule 413(a) builds two gates, and the evidence must pass through both.6 The first gate is the case on trial: the defendant must be accused, in a criminal case, of a sexual assault. That gate keeps the exception inside the prosecutions it was written for, because Rules 413 through 415 rest on the premise that an alleged offender’s collateral sexual behavior of the same type as the charged conduct has strong probative value.7 If the charge is anything else, the premise has nothing to attach to. A prior sexual assault does not reach a defendant on trial for homicide or armed robbery.8
The second gate is the evidence offered: the other act must also be a sexual assault. Rule 413 therefore lets in only other sexual assault crimes, and it does not admit a dissimilar offense, such as a criminal battery, against a defendant on trial for sexual assault.9 A battery with no sexual element is not collateral sexual behavior “of the same type” as the charged conduct, so the premise does not reach it.10 Remove either gate and unrelated misconduct could enter a sexual assault trial on the strength of the accusation alone.
Both prosecutors hold the same kind of evidence, a 2010 act that matches the present charge, and only the type of crime differs. That difference decides which rule governs. Hale’s prosecutor must find a purpose other than character, such as motive, opportunity, or intent.11 Moss’s prosecutor needs no such theory, because Rule 413 lets the jury consider the evidence on any relevant matter, propensity included.12 When a gate stays closed, admissibility continues to be governed by Rule 404(b), or by Rules 608 and 609 when the purpose is impeachment.13 The common exam error is to reach for Rule 413 whenever a sexual offense appears somewhere in the facts. The rule asks about two places, the offense now being tried and the act being offered, and a sexual assault in only one of them leaves Rule 413 unavailable.
The word “may” keeps the judge in control after both gates open. The suggestion that Rule 413 displaces Rule 403 has been rejected; Rule 403 applies.14 Representative Susan Molinari, co-sponsor of the enacting legislation, said as much: the general standards of the rules of evidence continue to apply, including the restrictions on hearsay evidence and the court’s authority under Rule 403 to exclude evidence whose probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.15 Rule 413 lifts the ban on one inference, the propensity inference. It does not vouch for the quality of any particular witness or record, so a weak, remote, or inflammatory account of a prior assault can still be kept from the jury. The factors that guide that call include the similarity of the prior act to the charged offense, its recency, the number of collateral offenses, and the strength of the evidence supporting them, and the section on Rule 403 balancing takes them up.16
Defining Sexual Assault
Rule 413(d) defines sexual assault in two layers. The first layer is a crime under federal law or under the law of a state, with “state” defined as in 18 U.S.C. § 513.18 The second is a list of conduct that the crime must involve. The definition governs Rule 413 and Rule 415 alike, so one test measures both the offense on trial and the other act the prosecution offers.19 The list sorts into four groups.
The first group is any conduct prohibited by 18 U.S.C. chapter 109A.20 That chapter includes abusive sexual contact under section 2244 and sexual abuse of a minor under section 2243.21 Suppose a prosecutor in a rape trial offers a certified copy of a judgment showing that the defendant, in another state three years earlier, fondled and sodomized a 13-year-old after encouraging the child to drink beer and play strip poker. That conduct is sexual abuse of a minor under section 2243, so it falls within chapter 109A and meets the definition even though the earlier victim was a child.22
The second group covers two kinds of contact without consent. One is contact between any part of the defendant’s body, or an object, and another person’s genitals or anus.23 The other is contact between the defendant’s genitals or anus and any part of another person’s body.24 The words “without consent” do the sorting: touching the other person welcomed is not within either category.
The third group looks to the defendant’s gratification. It takes in deriving sexual pleasure or gratification from inflicting death, bodily injury, or physical pain on another person.25 The category fits the premise behind Rules 413 through 415, that collateral sexual behavior of the same type as the charged conduct has strong probative value.26
The fourth group adds an attempt or conspiracy to engage in any conduct described in subparagraphs (1) through (4).27 An assault often stays incomplete only because the victim resisted or escaped, and the definition does not let that fact take it out of the rule. Suppose a former dating partner testifies at a rape trial that she let the defendant touch her, that he kept coming on after she told him to stop and tried to rape her, and that she screamed and kicked him so hard that he cried out in pain and ran away. That account describes what is probably abusive sexual contact under section 2244, a chapter 109A offense, and an attempt to rape would qualify under the fourth group in any event.28 The definition asks whether the conduct was a crime of a listed kind. It says nothing about a charge or a conviction, a point the later discussion of proof returns to.
The same list explains why words alone usually fall outside it. Every category requires contact, sexual gratification from inflicting death, injury, or pain, or an attempt or conspiracy to do one of those, and lewd remarks, emails, or texts supply none of them.29
Consent separates assaults from ordinary relationships in the same way that contact separates them from speech. A prosecutor trying a 60-year-old man for sexual assault on a 14-year-old girl may know that he was once married to a much younger woman and has had consensual sexual relations on several occasions with women much younger than himself.30 None of that involves contact without consent, gratification from inflicting pain, or an attempt or conspiracy to do either, so none of it is a sexual assault under the definition. Offered to show that the defendant is the kind of person who would assault a young girl, the evidence stays within the ban on character reasoning, and the prosecutor must find a purpose other than character.31
Rules 413 through 415 look at the alleged offender’s collateral sexual behavior; Rule 412 looks at the victim’s, and it is essentially an exclusionary rule.32 The danger it guards against is that a factfinder who thinks the victim of low moral character because of prior sexual activity may treat the victim as someone who was “asking” for sex, whether or not the victim consented on this occasion.33