Concept
Applying Rules 413–415: A Worked Problem
Prior sexual misconduct of a defendant
Applying Rules 413–415: A Worked Problem
Rule 413(a) lets a court, in a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of sexual assault, admit evidence that the defendant committed any other sexual assault, and it lets the factfinder consider that evidence on any matter to which it is relevant.1 The earlier sections of this chapter took that sentence apart: the trigger, the definition, the proof, the Rule 403 balance, and the notice. A problem on an exam puts the parts back together, and the most common version is a rape prosecution in which the defendant claims consent.
Craig is on trial in federal court for raping Karin at Fort Linden, a military base, which is the kind of federal enclave where sexual-assault prosecutions reach federal court.2 Karin testifies that Craig suggested they “go up the hill” to a secluded picnic ground, that they sat on a blanket from his trunk and kept drinking gin from a pint bottle he had bought before they left the Aero Squad, that they kissed, and that she “physically resisted” when he began to unbutton her blouse and skirt. She told him to stop and said she did not want sex that night. When he kept pressing, she stood up to walk back to the barracks and ran; he dragged her back to the blanket, held her arms down with his knees, ripped off her clothes, and raped her.3 Craig claims consent, so the case turns on whether Karin refused and was overpowered, and any evidence that makes one account more believable than the other carries unusual weight.
The government offers two more proofs. Laura, whom the judge first hears outside the jury’s presence, will testify that she dated Craig for several weeks a year before the charged night, and that after a movie, at her apartment, he kept coming on after she told him to stop and tried to rape her until she screamed and kicked him and he ran. The second proof is a certified judgment that, three years earlier, Craig was convicted of sexually abusing N, a 13-year-old, by fondling and sodomizing her. If Craig did what Laura describes, he probably committed “abusive sexual contact” under 18 U.S.C. § 2244, and his conduct toward N was “sexual abuse of a minor” under § 2243; both statutes sit in chapter 109A of title 18, the chapter to which Rule 413 refers.4
Defense counsel objects that Laura’s story cannot show intent or modus operandi, because no one disputes the assailant’s identity and the episode is too dissimilar from what allegedly happened at Fort Linden; that the conviction shows acts of a totally different nature; and that the evidence invites the jury to convict because it thinks Craig is “that sort of person” and to punish him out of anger at his past, which is classic unfair prejudice.5
The first step settles at once. Craig faces a criminal charge of rape, a sexual assault, so Rule 413(a) governs and the prosecutor need not find a purpose other than propensity.6 Rules 413, 414, and 415 share one trigger: a civil or criminal defendant accused of sexual assault or child molestation.7 Rule 414 would take over only if the charge were child molestation8, and a damages suit by Karin over the same night would run under Rule 415, which borrows the use that Rules 413 and 414 allow.9
The second step tests each prior act against the definition. If Laura is believed, her episode was an abusive-sexual-contact offense, and the judgment records sexual abuse of a minor; both are chapter 109A offenses. N’s age does not move the act outside Rule 413, because the type match asks whether the earlier act is a sexual assault as the rule defines it, and chapter 109A covers the abuse of a minor. Nor does it matter that Laura’s account never produced a charge or that the judgment is three years old, because the rule requires no conviction and sets no time limit.
Defense counsel’s modus operandi argument aims at the wrong rule. Under Rule 404(b), the prosecutor must offer a purpose other than propensity, and an undisputed identity and a dissimilar episode would weaken any such theory. Rule 413 requires no such purpose, because the evidence may be considered on any matter to which it is relevant.10 The prosecution offers both episodes for the propensity inference itself: Craig is that sort of person, so he probably raped Karin.11 An objection that the jury will convict because it thinks Craig is “that sort of person” therefore describes the use the rule permits, and it cannot by itself defeat admission.
The third step asks whether a jury could find that each act occurred. A record of conviction largely answers that question in advance. Laura’s testimony is the only proof of her episode, since no conviction exists, and the judge hears it with the jury excused, giving Craig a chance to refute it. If Craig takes the stand only on that preliminary question, he does not expose himself to cross-examination on other issues, so the prosecutor cannot use the occasion to question him about Karin. If Craig denies Laura’s account, the dispute goes to the jury, because the judge asks only whether a reasonable jury could find that the episode happened.
The fourth step carries the real contest. Rule 403 still lets the judge exclude evidence that qualifies under Rule 41312, but the propensity inference counts as probative value on the scale, so the risk that jurors will treat Craig as “that sort of person” cannot itself be unfair prejudice. Courts look instead to features such as the dissimilarity, age, and inflammatory nature of the earlier acts.13 The defense’s claim of classic unfair prejudice therefore matters only to the extent it rests on those features.
Laura’s account does well on each of them. It is recent, a year before the charged night; it comes from a witness who describes it first-hand and in detail; and it resembles Karin’s story, because an acquaintance Craig had been seeing socially said stop, was pressed, and had to fight her way free. That resemblance makes the episode informative about whether Karin’s account or Craig’s claim of consent is the more believable.
A court reached the opposite result in a sexual-harassment suit against a school guidance counselor. A former colleague testified that he touched her crotch while lifting her onto his shoulders, but she was “equivocal” about whether the touching was intentional, and the “bizarre incident” differed so much from the misconduct in issue that the “dissimilarities reduced significantly the probative value”; the court excluded the testimony under Rule 403.14 A witness who is certain about an unambiguous episode is the reverse of that equivocal colleague, and the same rule points the other way.
The conviction is the closer question. The proof that it happened could hardly be stronger, and three years is recent. But N was a child and Karin an adult, so the defense’s point about a different kind of act has real force, and the abuse of a child may anger jurors more than the rape charged. A judge could admit both proofs, or admit Laura’s account and exclude the conviction because its inflammatory character outweighs its smaller probative value. Both rulings are exercises of discretion, so a strong answer lays out each side and picks one for a stated reason. Appellate courts look for that reasoning. In Blind-Doan v. Sanders, a civil suit by a prisoner against a jailer, the Ninth Circuit reversed a judgment for the defendant because the trial judge had excluded testimony from seventeen others without saying how he evaluated the factors, and some of that testimony rebutted the jailer’s claim that a witness’s presence left him no opportunity to abuse her.15
The last two steps check the machinery around the grant. The problem does not say whether the prosecutor disclosed the evidence to Craig, and that silence is worth flagging: a prosecutor who names Laura for the first time on the morning of trial, without good cause for the delay, has not met the 15-day requirement. Laura speaks from personal knowledge, so her testimony raises no hearsay problem. The certified judgment is a document offered to prove what Craig did to N, so the prosecutor needs a hearsay route for it, and Rule 413 does not supply one. If the evidence had failed at the definition step, the fallback would be Rule 404(b)(2), where the prosecutor must give up propensity and the defense’s points about undisputed identity and dissimilarity would do real work.
What separates Duke’s problem from the guidance-counselor case is what remains on the probative side after the discount. There, dissimilarity combined with an equivocal witness and left almost nothing to weigh. For Duke, dissimilarity and age reduce the value of an account that is otherwise clear, and Rule 403 excludes only when probative value is substantially outweighed by the dangers on the other side, so reduced but real value usually survives. The propensity inference stays on the probative side throughout, and a court that excluded Magdalena’s account for inviting that inference would count as prejudice the very reasoning Rule 413 allows. The strongest answer says the judge could exclude, explains why dissimilarity and age make that possible, and concludes that admission is likelier.