Concept
Court-Appointed Experts
Qualifications of witnesses
Court-Appointed Experts
Rule 706 lets the court itself appoint expert witnesses, which gives the trier of fact a source that neither party selected.1 The idea is old. As early as the fourteenth century, before juries heard witnesses, judges summoned experts to help with scientific questions, and the judge's power to call witnesses generally, and experts in particular, is well settled in this country.2
Party-selected experts leave gaps that appointment is meant to fill. A litigant may be unable to afford an expert or to find one willing to testify, as a medical malpractice plaintiff sometimes cannot. And a party who picks an expert will pick the best witness, not necessarily the most qualified expert.3 In many cases the result is testimony that overstates the disagreement among the experts and makes the jury's decision harder.4 Court appointment answers this "battle of the experts," in which opposing sides hire rivals.5
Appointment supplements the adversary system and does not replace it, because the Rule does not limit a party in calling its own experts.6 Daubert gave the device new importance. Once the Supreme Court told federal trial judges to evaluate the empirical validation of purportedly scientific testimony, Justice Breyer's concurring opinion in Joiner encouraged them to use their Rule 706 power, and judges began appointing experts more often.7 Rule 614(a) reaches further, since it lets a judge call any witness in aid of justice, not only experts.8
Even so, appointment remains rare, and the power to call ordinary witnesses under Rule 614 is used even less.9 Lawyers account for much of the reluctance. Most judges have no experience with court experts, and the parties rarely suggest the option, because lawyers are doing everything they can to control the litigation. A court expert means a dramatic loss of control: an unknown stranger, likely to be influential, who is not supposed to have the client's best interests at heart.10 Segments of the trial bar oppose appointment outright, and Rule 706 tries to meet some of their objections.11 Money is a second obstacle. Courts are reluctant to draw on public funds, and in civil cases the power to tax costs at the end of the case may not satisfy an expert who is paid as the work proceeds.12 The subsections below follow the Rule's order: how an appointment begins, what the expert does, who pays, and what the jury hears.
Appointment Process
Rule 706(a) is permissive from start to finish. On a party's motion or on its own, the court may order the parties to show cause why experts should not be appointed and may ask them to submit nominations. It may appoint any expert the parties agree on and any expert of its own choosing, but it may appoint only someone who consents to act.13 The steps run in order, and each does a different job.
The first step, an order to show cause, directs the parties to explain why a proposed action should not be taken, here why experts should not be appointed. A party's motion or the court's own initiative can start it.14 Because the order issues before anyone has been chosen, it tells each side that the judge is considering a neutral and gives each a chance to argue for or against one. The court's own-motion power carries real weight, since the parties rarely raise the idea themselves.15 The court may then ask the parties for nominations, which lets them help choose a person whose views may count heavily in the case.
Two routes lead to a choice. The court may appoint any expert the parties agree on, and it may appoint any expert of its own choosing.16 Discretion governs either way. The court decides whether to appoint at all and, if so, whom, and when the parties have agreed on a candidate the court will usually accede to their wishes.17 Deference to an agreed choice fits the standing objection that a court expert might lean toward one side, because an expert both sides accepted has answered that objection in advance.
Consent limits everything before it. The court may appoint only someone who consents to act.18 That limit separates Rule 706 from the court's power under Rule 614 to call ordinary witnesses: a witness must obey a judge's summons or subpoena, but an expert may decline a Rule 706 appointment.19 A scientist cannot be drafted to study a problem and form an opinion about it, so nomination and agreement produce an appointment only when the candidate is willing.
Those steps settle who may be appointed. They do not settle when appointment is worthwhile. In re Joint Eastern & Southern Districts Asbestos Litigation, the court faced asbestos claims numbering in the hundreds of thousands and epidemiological questions that were complex and riven with uncertainty. It could not reach a just result without reasonably firm projections of the number and volume of claims, and every party had strong and conflicting interests in that data. Those factors, alone and in combination, pointed to the necessity of neutral expert assistance under the court's auspices.20 The opinion acknowledges that Rule 706 should be reserved for exceptional cases in which the ordinary adversary process does not suffice.21
A bankruptcy case offers a different reason to reach for the same tool. The feasibility requirement for a plan is independent of the voting requirements, so even when every class of creditors votes to accept a plan, the bankruptcy court must evaluate feasibility itself, and a plan that is not feasible cannot be confirmed.22 In re City of Detroit, the bankruptcy court, which had that independent finding to make, appointed an independent expert on feasibility.23 The two cases rest on different needs. In the asbestos litigation every party had a stake in the claims data, so no party's own expert could supply numbers the others would trust. In Detroit the court had a finding of its own to make and needed an adviser who answered to no creditor.
A routine dispute sits at the other end. In LeBlanc v. PNS Stores, the court denied a defendant's motion for an independent physician. The defendant already had the plaintiff's medical records, and the court explained that Rule 706, though discretionary, is appropriate only in rare circumstances and "cannot be utilized as an alternative to communication and the adversary process."24 Nothing in that dispute suggested that the adversary presentation had broken down, and a party who wants an opponent examined has a different tool: Rule 35 lets a court require a party whose physical or mental condition is in controversy to submit to an examination by a suitably licensed or certified examiner.25 A fact pattern in which one party asks for a neutral physician in an ordinary injury case describes a poor fit. A pattern with contested mass-tort science and parties who all have a stake in the numbers describes a good one.
Expert's Role
Once an expert consents to serve, Rule 706(b) requires the court to inform the expert of the expert's duties. The court may do so in writing, with a copy filed with the clerk, or orally at a conference in which the parties have an opportunity to participate.27 Both methods put the assignment where the parties can see it. A retained expert takes the assignment from the lawyer who hired her, and a court expert takes it from the judge, so the parties need to know what it says before the work begins. A filed copy gives them a written record, and a conference lets them hear the instructions and respond to them. A private briefing in chambers, with no filing and no notice to the parties, fits neither method.
The Rule then gives the appointed expert four features, listed here in the Rule's order.
- The expert must advise the parties of any findings the expert makes.28
- The expert may be deposed by any party.29
- The expert may be called to testify by the court or any party.30
- The expert may be cross-examined by any party, including the party that called the expert.31
The first two features guard against surprise. As one opinion observes, a lawyer who must deal on cross-examination with an unfavorable expert opinion needs some idea of its basis and the data relied on, and a lawyer who waits until trial to learn them often has too little time to find and expose the vulnerable spots.32 The duty to report findings gives both sides the conclusions at once. A deposition, which is sworn questioning outside the courtroom, lets them ask how the expert reached those conclusions and test the answers before trial. Any party may take the deposition, so neither side's access depends on which side calls the expert.
The last two features answer the opposite worry, that the court's expert will be treated as the responsibility of one party. Because the expert belongs to the court, any party may call the expert, and a party whom the findings hurt may put the expert on the stand as readily as a party whom they help. Cross-examination runs in every direction, even toward the party that called the expert, which departs from the usual arrangement in which a party examines its own witness on direct and leaves cross-examination to the opponent. Language allowing any party to call the expert and entitling all to cross-examine answers the fear that the expert will be viewed as one side's responsibility.33 Calling the expert does not endorse the conclusions, so the caller may test them like anyone else.
A party's own testifying expert shows what sets the court's expert apart. The party's expert may also be deposed after disclosure under the civil discovery rules.34 But the party that retained her presents her and does not ordinarily cross-examine her, since she is its own witness. Rule 706 lets the calling party cross-examine the court's expert because no side chose the expert. An answer that imports the ordinary rule for a party's own witness, by saying that the calling party may not cross-examine or that only the court may call the expert, misreads the text.
Two questions remain: how the court's expert is paid, and whether the jury is told that the court chose the expert. The next two subsections take them up in turn.
Compensation
Rule 706(c) gives every court-appointed expert a right to "reasonable compensation, as set by the court."38 Two features of that sentence matter before the Rule turns to who pays. The expert is entitled to be paid, so an appointment does not conscript unpaid labor. And the court fixes the amount, which fits the reason for appointing a neutral at all: a fee bargained out between the expert and one litigant would tie the expert to that litigant, while a figure set by the judge keeps the price off every party's bargaining table.
The Rule divides responsibility for the fee into two branches. The first covers two kinds of case. In a criminal case, or in a civil case involving just compensation under the Fifth Amendment, the expert is paid "from any funds that are provided by law."39 A just-compensation case is typically a condemnation action, in which the government takes private property and the owner is constitutionally entitled to be paid its value.40 The special provision for these cases guards against shrinking that guaranteed payment by making the recipient pay costs.41 If the owner had to pay for the court's neutral valuation expert, the cost would come out of the award, and an owner entitled to full value would receive less.
Every other civil case falls under the second branch. There the expert is paid "by the parties in the proportion and at the time that the court directs," and the compensation "is then charged like other costs."42 The court therefore controls two things about the parties' share: how the fee is split and when it is due. Once paid, the fee becomes an ordinary cost of suit, so it can be reallocated at the end of the case under the rules that govern other litigation expenses, and those rules usually place costs on the loser.43
The kind of case decides the branch. Which party asked for the appointment, and which side the findings help, play no part. An answer that makes the moving party pay, or the party who benefits from the opinion, invents a rule the text does not contain. In an ordinary civil case the court sets the proportion and the timing, and in a criminal case or a Fifth Amendment just-compensation case the parties pay nothing toward the expert.
The funding rules also help explain why appointment is rare.44 Courts are reluctant to draw on public funds for experts, which is a problem under the first branch. Under the second, the power to tax costs at the end of a case may not satisfy an expert who is paid as the work proceeds, and taxing costs earlier is awkward because the loser usually pays and no one yet knows who the loser is.45 A judge considering a neutral thus meets a billing problem before the expert has done any work, on top of lawyers' wariness about losing control of the evidence.
Disclosure to the Jury
Rule 706(d) is one sentence: the court may authorize disclosure to the jury that the court appointed the expert.47 The verb is "may," so the judge holds a power to use or leave unused in each case, with no duty to tell the jury and no bar against doing so. The Rule also implies that the source of the appointment need not be disclosed unless the court says so.48 The question is when a judge should use the power, and the answer depends on balancing two interests that pull in opposite directions.
The case for telling the jury follows from why a court expert exists. Appointment responds to the battle-of-the-experts problem, in which rivals hired by opposing sides reach contradictory conclusions.49 A jury that does not know the court chose the witness sees one more credentialed person giving an opinion and cannot tell this witness from the partisan ones. The Advisory Committee's Note observes that disclosure "seems to be essential if the use of court appointed experts is to be fully effective."50 Supporters add that jurors should be encouraged to give special emphasis to the court's expert, because that reliance matches the reasons for the appointment.51
The same signal that makes the neutral useful creates the risk. A jury told that a judge picked the expert may conclude that the opinion must be respected, so the appointment can carry improperly significant weight.52 In the Advisory Committee's debates, some members of the bar feared that "the court's imprimatur would overwhelm the jury and cause it to lose sight of the fact that the expert may have a professional bias towards one of the opposing views before it."53 The contention is made that court-appointed experts acquire "an aura of infallibility to which they are not entitled," although the trend is toward providing for their use.54 The mechanism is easy to follow. A neutral expert is neutral between the parties, which says nothing about whether the expert holds a settled view on a question that divides the field, and jurors already tend to defer to someone with significant professional qualifications.55 Adding the court's name to those qualifications may lead jurors to stop weighing the opinion.
Because both interests are real, the Rule picks neither for every case. Disclosure was left discretionary to cover situations in which two responsible schools of thought exist or in which telling the jury would otherwise cause undue emphasis on the expert's testimony.56 Two scenes show how the answer can differ.
The court appointed both experts, so the appointment alone cannot explain the different rulings. The difference lies in the question the neutral is answering. Where the field can answer the question and the party experts are only talking past each other, a visible neutral restores the missing reference point. Where the field itself is divided, a visible neutral turns one acceptable view into the court's view.
Whether the Rule strikes the balance well remains disputed, and an answer should not present the debate as settled. One commentator argues that discretionary disclosure fails to come to grips with the problem. The commentator adds that a court can sometimes let its expert testify as a neutral without bestowing the court's imprimatur, and that where the expert's association with the court cannot be avoided, the harm to the adversary process suggests the court should generally refrain from appointing an expert.57 The worry that a court's expert will bask in a special aura of respectability was one of the objections the Rule's wording was meant to answer, at least in part.58 An answer that says the jury must always be told, or may never be told, misreads the text, because the Rule leaves the choice with the judge.