Concept
Applying Rules 703 and 705 to the Fire Marshal's Testimony
Bases of testimony
Applying Rules 703 and 705 to the Fire Marshal's Testimony
Rules 703 and 705 answer different questions about an expert's foundation, and one arson trial shows each answer at work. Rule 705 governs order and initiative: unless the court orders otherwise, an expert may state an opinion and give the reasons for it without first testifying to the underlying facts or data, but the expert may be required to disclose them on cross-examination.1 Rule 703 governs substance. It says what an expert may rest an opinion on, including otherwise inadmissible material that experts in the field would reasonably rely on, and it limits when the proponent may tell the jury what that material was.2
The case is a suit against an insurance company over whether a warehouse fire was arson. The defendant calls a fire marshal, qualifies him as an expert on the cause and origin of fires, and establishes that he investigated this fire. Counsel asks whether he has an opinion, then what it is, and the marshal answers that the fire was arson, over the plaintiff's objection that counsel must use a hypothetical question.3
On cross-examination the plaintiff's lawyer draws out four things the opinion rests on.4
- A personal inspection of the debris, covering the areas of greatest heat intensity, the pattern of the flames, and the condition of the electrical system.
- A chemist's report on the soil under the warehouse, which found minute traces of gasoline residue near the likely point of origin.
- Conversations with three night watchmen guarding nearby buildings, who told the marshal they first saw fire and smoke on the east side of the warehouse.
- A report by a privately retained expert, and conversations with that expert, whose findings were consistent with the marshal's own.
The plaintiff then moves to strike, arguing that the opinion rests on inadmissible hearsay that is not in evidence and on another expert's opinion. The judge rules against the plaintiff each time. The rulings hold up when tested against the two rules in the order the objections arise.
The first objection, that counsel had to use a hypothetical question, fails under Rule 705. Hypothetical questions were held to strict standards: one was considered defective, and reversal could follow, if it omitted a relevant fact or included a fact the admitted evidence did not support, though modern courts review such defects somewhat more forgivingly.5 Rule 705 lets the expert give an opinion without first revealing the underlying facts or data, so a hypothetical is needed only if the court orders the basis presented first.6 Counsel here chose not to use one and the court did not order one, so the marshal properly gave his opinion.7 The plaintiff is not defenseless, because the marshal may be required to disclose the facts or data on cross-examination, and the phrase 'unless the court orders otherwise' lets a judge require the foundation first when the circumstances call for it.8
The hearsay objection requires sorting the four items, because they reach the marshal by different routes. The debris inspection needs no reliance showing at all, since the first sentence of Rule 703 lets an expert rest an opinion on facts the expert has personally observed.9 The other three items came to him from others, and the second sentence of Rule 703 makes them usable: if experts in the field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data, they need not be admissible for the opinion to be admitted.10 The plaintiff's point that the chemist's report is hearsay not in evidence is therefore true and beside the point. The question under Rule 703 is whether arson investigators reasonably rely on laboratory analyses of this kind.
Courts disagree about how that reliance is shown. The liberal approach treats customary reliance by experts in the field as sufficient. The restrictive approach demands circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness identical or equivalent to those behind a hearsay exception.11 The chemist's report satisfies either view, because laboratory tests conducted in the regular course of a regularly conducted business activity are reasonably relied upon by arson experts.12
The watchmen's accounts are the closest call, since they are oral statements from people the marshal did not supervise. A plane-crash parallel shows how courts handle such sources. An expert who persuades the court that air crash investigators reasonably rely on statements from airport workers will get the testimony admitted, and although the legislative history bars ordinary eyewitness statements as a basis, airport personnel would probably be treated differently from casual observers.13 The watchmen look more like the airport workers than like passersby, because they were guarding nearby buildings and reported what they themselves saw. Under the liberal approach, proof that fire investigators customarily rely on such accounts settles the matter. Under the restrictive approach the defendant would also need guarantees of trustworthiness like those behind a hearsay exception, and the watchmen's statements are the item most at risk.14
The objection that the opinion rests on another expert's opinion fails for a related reason. Rule 703 speaks only of facts or data, but opinions not in evidence, even inadmissible ones, may also form the basis of an expert's opinion if experts in the particular field reasonably rely on them.15 The marshal also does not depend on the retained expert alone. His own inspection, the soil results, and the watchmen's accounts give him a body of information that easily satisfies the requirement that the testimony rest on sufficient facts or data.16
The marshal and the county investigator rely on the same kind of report, and what separates them is whether anything of the witness's own sits beneath the conclusion. The marshal's inspection and the soil results give the retained expert's report a supporting role, which is why the objection to it was properly overruled.
Surviving all three objections settles what the marshal may rest his opinion on. It does not settle what the defendant may tell the jury, because the last sentence of Rule 703 imposes a separate test. If the facts or data would otherwise be inadmissible, the proponent may disclose them to the jury only if their probative value in helping the jury evaluate the opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.17 The defendant's next move shows the difference. Having secured the opinion, the defendant wants the marshal to recite what the three watchmen told him about where the fire first appeared. Those statements are hearsay if offered for their truth, so they fall on the 'otherwise inadmissible' side of the sentence, and the defendant must show that hearing them substantially helps the jury evaluate the opinion. Against that value stands the risk that jurors will treat the accounts as proof of how the fire started, which is the very issue in dispute. The marshal's own inspection already shows how he reasoned, so the recital adds little, and the judge will probably keep it out.18 The opinion stays in even so, because the provision that decides whether he may rely on the watchmen is a different provision from the one that decides whether the jury may hear them.
The plaintiff holds the other half of the exchange. Rule 705 allows the plaintiff to require the marshal to disclose the facts or data on cross-examination, so the plaintiff may bring out any of the four items and carries the burden of knowing enough to ask well.19 The balancing test, by its terms, regulates the proponent's own disclosure of otherwise inadmissible data to the jury, which is a different matter from the opponent drawing the basis out.20