Concept
Surviving Limits on Opinions
Ultimate issue rule
Surviving Limits on Opinions
Rule 704(a) removes one objection and no other: an opinion is not objectionable just because it embraces an ultimate issue.1 Tradition had restricted expert testimony in ways that seem more formal than substantive. Rule 704 abolished the ultimate issue restriction, but some of the traditional concerns persist in modern cases.2 The Advisory Committee’s note names the rules that carry those concerns forward. Rules 701 and 702 require opinions to help the trier of fact, and Rule 403 provides for exclusion of evidence that wastes time. Together they give ample assurance against opinions that would merely tell the jury what result to reach and against opinions phrased in terms of inadequately explored legal criteria.3
Courts therefore ask what an opinion says, not which issue it touches. Three kinds of opinion still draw successful objections:
- an opinion that tells the jury how to decide the case;
- an opinion that states the law or applies it to the facts; and
- an opinion built on a legal label whose criteria no one has explored.
Each fails for one of two reasons: it gives the jury nothing it can use, or its risks outweigh its use. A good objection names the reason. “Unhelpful” and “states a legal conclusion” send the judge to rules that still apply, while “invades the province of the jury” invokes a ground Rule 704(a) has taken away.
These limits differ in kind from Rule 704(b), which forbids an expert in a criminal case to state an opinion about whether the defendant did or did not have a mental state or condition that constitutes an element of the crime charged or of a defense, because those matters are for the trier of fact alone.4 Rule 704(b) is categorical. The limits below call for case-by-case judgments about helpfulness and prejudice, and a witness can often restate the same substance in an acceptable form. The first limit reaches the opinion that amounts to an instruction on the verdict.
Telling the Jury the Result
Rule 704(a) allows an opinion that embraces an ultimate issue; it does not allow a witness to announce how the case should come out.5 The Advisory Committee’s note explains what stops the announcement. Helpfulness and Rule 403 “afford ample assurances against the admission of opinions which would merely tell the jury what result to reach, somewhat in the manner of the oath-helpers of an earlier day.”6 Oath-helpers swore to a litigant’s side of the dispute instead of supplying evidence about it. The note adds that “meaningless assertions which amount to little more than choosing up sides” call for exclusion for lack of helpfulness.7 Rules 701 and 702 embody the helpfulness criterion for lay and expert witnesses alike, so the limit binds both.8
Helpfulness explains the result. A jury needs data it can use to resolve a contested issue, whether an ordinary witness observed the data or an expert supplied it, and testimony that merely tells the jury to decide an issue in a particular way is useless and confusing.9 An opinion that the plaintiff should win is therefore rejected as not helpful.10 A statement that the defendant “should be liable” rests on no fact, measurement, or inference the jury can examine, so the jury learns only which side the witness favors.
Opinions about how the case should be decided, or about what amount of damages would be “just” or “appropriate,” are the standard examples. Neither a lay witness nor an expert may simply tell the jury what decision to reach. Even in the most liberal jurisdictions, such opinions are excludable under Rule 702, because the inference is unhelpful or exceeds the limits of the witness’s expertise, or under Rule 403, because the probative value is outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.11 There is still no categorical ban on opinions, lay or expert, that address ultimate facts.12
The surviving limit works differently from the old ban. The rule against opinions on ultimate facts was unduly restrictive, posed close technical questions of application, and could unfairly obstruct a party’s case; where it survives, parties waste time arguing whether an opinion concerns an ultimate fact.13 The current limit asks instead whether the opinion adds anything, and a bare verdict adds nothing.
Students err in two directions on this line. One reads “should be liable,” reaches for Rule 704(a), and admits the answer because ultimate-issue opinions are allowed. The other reads the brake testimony, remembers the old ban, and excludes it because it supports liability. Both skip the question that decides the ruling: does the opinion give the jury information to weigh, or does it only tell the jury whom to favor?
The same limit governs lay witnesses and works the same way.
State v. Kelly shows the line running through testimony on an issue where expert help is plainly useful. Gladys Kelly stabbed her husband with a pair of scissors, and he died shortly afterward. Indicted for murder, she did not deny the stabbing but claimed self-defense, and to establish the state of mind that claim required she called an expert on battered-woman’s syndrome.14 The court held that the expert could explain the syndrome and relate its characteristics to Kelly, because that testimony helped the jury judge both the honesty and the reasonableness of her fear of imminent danger. The expert could not state that her belief on that day was reasonable. The court rested that limit on the scope of the expert’s knowledge, not on the ultimate issue label.15
The line falls there for a reason. The expert supplies the missing link and ties it to the defendant. Once the jury accepts that link and credits her account, whether her fear was reasonable follows from the jury’s own findings, so the conclusion needs no expert. An opinion that stops at the link is a factual opinion that supports a verdict; an opinion that adds the conclusion is a bottom line.
Several other opinions fail for the same reason, because each tells the jury how to decide something the jury must decide for itself:
- An opinion about what damages would be just or appropriate fails like an opinion that a party should win.16
- Rule 704(a) does not permit a witness to say whether another witness is telling the truth.17
- An expert should not venture an opinion that the defendant is guilty or innocent or on who committed the crime, because guilt, innocence, and identity are for the jury.18
The last item needs a careful reading, because courts routinely admit the opinions of skilled lay observers about identity, and identity is often an ultimate question in a lawsuit.19 The objection falls on the witness who announces the verdict, not on the witness who supplies evidence from which the jury decides.
Questions of Law
Rule 704(a) lets a witness embrace an ultimate issue; it does not let any witness say what the law is. It permits neither a lay nor an expert witness to render an opinion on questions that are matters of law for the court.21 This limit reaches opinions about the law the jury will be instructed on, whereas the old ultimate-issue ban reached opinions about facts.
Opinions that state or apply the law are common targets. The treatise illustrates the exclusion of an expert’s opinion that the defendant had no legal excuses for non-performance and of an opinion that an oil distributor was under a contractual duty to make a shipment.22 In Schmidt v. International Playthings LLC the court recognized that, although Rule 704(a) permits an expert to testify about areas that embrace an ultimate issue, other limitations remain, among them the Tenth Circuit’s rule that an expert “may not state legal conclusions drawn by applying the law to the facts.”23 Citing earlier decisions, the court noted the exclusion of expert testimony on whether an officer “acted reasonably or violated the Constitution” and, in a case over a Form 10-K’s alleged misrepresentations and omissions, on whether the defendants’ actions were “reasonable” or certain disclosed information was “material.”24 Each question asks the expert how a legal standard applies to the facts. The prohibition therefore has two edges: a witness may not state the rule, and a witness may not announce how the rule applies.
The prohibition coexists with Rule 704(a) once ultimate facts are separated from ultimate legal issues. In burglary and rape prosecutions, the ultimate legal issue is whether the defendant is guilty or innocent. Witnesses may testify to ultimate facts, but not to ultimate legal issues such as guilt or innocence.25 A neighbor who saw someone climb through a window at night may say so. A neighbor who adds that the person is guilty of burglary has moved from a fact to the conclusion the jury must reach by applying the court’s instructions.
Testimony does not become suspect merely because it resembles an element of the offense. An expert who describes a factual pattern tells the jury what happens in the world and leaves to the court and jury what the law makes of it. The test is whether the witness gives the jury something to compare against the evidence or hands it a legal label.
An opinion that the defendant intended to defraud would meet a second obstacle, the separate bar on an expert’s opinion about a criminal defendant’s mental state, which a later section addresses.26 The sorting question is whether the witness describes what happened or tells the jury what the law makes of it. An opinion on the first side comes in if it is otherwise helpful. An opinion on the second side is excluded whether a lay witness or an expert offers it.
Undefined Legal Terms
Rule 704(a) leaves every other ground of exclusion in place.28 One of those grounds appears in the Advisory Committee’s note, which says Rules 403, 701, and 702 stand ready to exclude opinions “phrased in terms of inadequately explored legal criteria.” The note gives a pair of questions about one subject. Asking whether a person had capacity to make a will is excluded. Asking whether the testator had sufficient mental capacity to know the nature and extent of his property and the natural objects of his bounty, and to formulate a rational scheme of distribution, is allowed.29 Both questions concern the same mental condition, so only the wording separates them, and that makes this limit the hardest of the three to apply.
The problem sits between the two limits already covered. A question that asks what the law is, or how it applies, is excluded outright, and a plain question of fact raises no concern. A question built on a legal label falls in between, because words like capacity, fraud, or discrimination belong to the law and are also words jurors use every day. Such a question presupposes that both the witness and the trier of fact know the elements of the legal standard behind the label.30 When jurors do not know them, the witness may answer one question while the jurors hear another. An opinion in that form is excluded as unhelpful and possibly misleading.31
Courts sort these questions by examining the word itself. Schmidt describes a two-part inquiry: first ask whether the question tracks the language of the legal principle or statute at issue, then ask whether any term it uses has a specialized legal meaning.32 Close tracking of the legal language is a warning that the question may be asking for a legal conclusion. The steps for the word itself run as follows.
The fourth step does the real work. Once the criteria are in evidence, jurors hold the pieces from which the label is built, and the exploration helps make the legal meaning clear to the trier of fact.38 The opinion then serves as shorthand for facts the jury has already heard.
A bank-robbery appeal shows the opposite pole. The defendant objected that two experts’ opinions about whether she robbed the bank voluntarily, or acted under fear of death or grave bodily harm, rested on inadequately explored legal criteria. The court of appeals disagreed and read the Advisory Committee’s phrase to refer to terminology whose meaning is not reasonably clear to laypeople.39 “Capacity to make a will” qualifies, because the average layperson would not know that it covers three abilities: knowing the nature and extent of one’s property, identifying the natural objects of one’s bounty, and formulating a rational plan of distribution. “Voluntarily rob a bank” and “act under fear of death or grave bodily harm” do not suffer from that disability, because laypeople would ascribe to them essentially the meaning the experts intended.40 Run through the steps, that case ends at the second one, because the legal and everyday senses coincide and nothing needed exploring.
The usual error runs the other way. A lawyer reasons that Rule 704(a) allows ultimate-issue opinions and that a legal word therefore causes no trouble, which ignores the case where the legal meaning departs from the everyday one and nothing has bridged the gap.
Some labels pass more easily. Terms such as “safe,” “dangerous,” “reasonable,” and “good practice” appear appropriate because, once an adequate factual foundation has been presented, they tend to assist the trier of fact in understanding the witness.41 An opinion phrased in terms of negligence itself is different. It asks the witness to formulate the legal standard and is substantially immune to exploration, so it seems calculated to confuse or mislead, and phrasing in factual terms is better.42
Courts have struggled to distinguish adequately from inadequately explained criteria in a legal standard.43 The Fifth Circuit excluded an expert’s opinion on the “legal” as opposed to the “factual” cause of an accident in Owen v. Kerr-McGee Corp. It also excluded a tax professor’s opinion that a taxpayer’s theory was not implausible in United States v. Burton, treating evidence of the “uncertainty of the controlling law” as excludable under Rule 403. The Eleventh Circuit, in United States v. Gold, approved expert testimony that claims were reimbursable under Medicare.44 The decisions show how hard the boundary is to place.
A criminal trial adds a second hurdle that clear wording cannot remove. An expert must not state an opinion about whether the defendant did or did not have a mental state or condition that constitutes an element of the crime charged or of a defense.45 A psychiatrist’s opinion on a defendant’s mental state must therefore clear both hurdles, and because the second is categorical, rephrasing cannot rescue an opinion that falls within it.
The next section takes up that bar in detail.