Concept
Admissibility Versus Weight
Reliability and relevancy
Admissibility Versus Weight
Rule 702 conditions expert testimony on a showing that the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods and that the opinion reflects a reliable application of those principles and methods to the facts of the case.1 Both conditions test the route the expert took to the opinion. Neither asks whether the opinion is true. The admissibility decision therefore focuses on the expert’s methods and reasoning, and credibility decisions wait until admissibility has been settled.2 The judge asks whether the expert has a sound basis, and the jury asks how far to believe what the expert says.
Reliable Is Not Correct
The Third Circuit states the division in two sentences: “The evidentiary requirement of reliability is lower than the merits standard of correctness.” A judge decides whether the experts are reliable, and the jury decides whether they are correct.3 The reliability inquiry is still broad. District courts in that circuit must examine all factors relevant to whether the evidence is reliable, including those listed in Daubert and Paoli and any other inquiry the court finds relevant.4 Breadth does not turn the inquiry into a test of correctness. A judge who excluded every opinion that looked wrong would be deciding the merits in the jury’s place.
Conflict between experts does not change the analysis. The 2000 Advisory Committee Note points out that expert opinions can conflict and that conflict alone is not a bar to admissibility: several conflicting opinions may each be reliable, though only one of them, or neither, is correct.5 An exam stem that offers two credentialed experts with opposite conclusions is usually asking which of them the judge excludes, and the answer is usually neither.
The jury’s choice between the economists is a choice about correctness and credibility. It exists only because each opinion cleared the reliability threshold.
The Bendectin plaintiffs show a proponent on the other side of that threshold. On remand in Daubert, the Ninth Circuit again found that the plaintiff’s proof was not valid science. A proponent without peer review must show validity another way, through experts who explain how they went about reaching their conclusions and who show that they followed the scientific method as practiced by at least a recognized minority. The proof also had to satisfy the criterion of fit, which required a showing that children whose mothers took Bendectin were more than twice as likely to suffer limb reduction defects as children whose mothers did not. The court held that neither showing was made.6 Both showings go to the foundation of the opinion and not to its persuasiveness. The Bendectin litigation produced many expert-evidence decisions, and Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals is among them.
The line between method and conclusion is easier to state than to find. The Daubert inquiry is supposed to focus on the expert’s methodology and not the expert’s conclusions, but in practice courts have found the line very difficult to locate.7 A separate opinion in Joiner insisted that the difference between methodology and conclusions is as categorical as the difference between means and ends, and that the strength of an expert’s scientific conclusions is a matter for the jury. It rejected the majority’s statement that “conclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from one another.”8 The majority held that nothing in Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a court to admit opinion evidence connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert, and that a court may find too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion.9 A judge may therefore look at how well an expert’s reasoning connects the data to the opinion without deciding that the opinion is wrong.
A judge facing a battle of experts may feel pulled in three directions. The first is to admit the evidence because the experts are qualified and let the jury resolve the dispute. The second is to decide for oneself whether the proof is valid science. The third is to defer to the scientific community and require the proponent to show that scientists generally agree. Frye most clearly resembles the third approach, because it lets the judge say that any exclusion rests on other scientists’ rejection of the proof and not on the judge’s opinion.10 Courts must also apply the reliability principles even-handedly, excluding testimony that lacks sound methodological grounding while admitting testimony that reasonably, if boldly, reaches into uncharted waters of evolving knowledge.11
Attacking Admitted Testimony
Admission settles that an opinion is reliable. It does not settle that the opinion is credible. Once the judge has found an opinion reliable, counsel must establish whether it is credible,13 and credibility is decided only after admissibility has been determined.14 The attack on an admitted opinion therefore goes to its weaknesses of degree. Counsel may argue that the expert’s data were incomplete, that the assumptions were shaky, or that a competing expert, whose own opinion is also reliable, reads the same evidence differently. The jury weighs those points.
A missing basis is a different problem, and it belongs to the judge. Rule 702 makes reliable methods and their reliable application conditions of admissibility,15 and a court need not admit an opinion tied to the data only by the expert’s own say-so.16 Treating every criticism of an expert as a matter of weight is the common mistake.
The first accountant had a method and a basis, and the opponent can only argue that the basis is thinner than she claims. The second accountant had nothing but her assurance connecting the data to the number, which is the analytical gap that justifies exclusion.
Motions in Limine and Summary Judgment
Two motions test expert evidence at different points and with different effects. The party opposing an expert typically moves in limine to suppress the testimony. If the court grants the motion, the testimony is not entitled to be considered at all and is not part of the case’s record.18 Summary judgment works differently. It assumes that the expert’s testimony is admissible but concludes that the testimony is not sufficiently credible, not sufficiently on point, or undermined by the expert’s own statements, so it does not create the requisite fact issue.19 The court then examines the entire record, and expert testimony that has not been excluded is part of that record and entitled to be considered.20 In antitrust litigation, courts have used criteria that effectively give admitted economic testimony little or no weight, as happened in Matsushita and Brooke.21
An answer should keep three questions apart. The first is whether the opinion is reliable under Rule 702, which the judge decides at the threshold. The second is whether the admitted opinion is credible, which the jury decides after admission. The third is whether the admitted testimony, read with the rest of the record, creates a fact issue, and summary judgment can answer that even for testimony that was properly admitted.