Concept
Specialized Knowledge
Proper subject matter for expert testimony
Specialized Knowledge
Rule 702(a) asks where an expert’s testimony comes from before it asks whether the testimony will help: does the witness bring “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge”?1 The three adjectives sit side by side, joined by “or” and ranked in no order, and the Rule gives the screening job to the last word of the phrase, specialized. This unit follows that phrase through three steps: how far it reaches past laboratory science, where it separates expert opinion from lay opinion, and where a witness’s credentials stop standing in for knowledge.
Beyond Pure Science
Readers meeting “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge” for the first time often assume that “scientific” names the core and that the other two words stretch the Rule to witnesses who barely fit. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael rejected that assumption. The Court held that Daubert’s general holding, the trial judge’s “gatekeeping” obligation, applies to testimony based on “technical” and “other specialized” knowledge as well as to testimony based on “scientific” knowledge.2
The text left no room for a ranking. It “makes no relevant distinction between ‘scientific’ knowledge and ‘technical’ or ‘other specialized’ knowledge,” and it “makes clear that any such knowledge might become the subject of expert testimony.”3 The point had been open. A separate opinion in Daubert asked whether the Rule’s authors meant the phrase to be “broken down into numerous subspecies of expertise,” or simply picked “general descriptive language covering the sort of expert testimony which courts have customarily received.”4 Kumho adopted the second reading and gave a practical reason. No clear line divides scientific knowledge from the other kinds: engineering rests on scientific knowledge, pure science may depend on observation and properly engineered machinery, and efforts to separate them are unlikely to yield legal lines that judges can apply in particular cases.5 A rule that turned on the label would make every proffer begin with a dispute over classification.
Function replaces labels. Experts of all kinds tie observations to conclusions through what Judge Learned Hand called “general truths derived from . . . specialized experience,” and their testimony often rests “upon an experience confessedly foreign in kind to [the jury’s] own.” The judge’s effort to assure that the testimony is reliable and relevant helps the jury evaluate that foreign experience, whatever name it carries.6
The Rule’s reach follows. It covers experts in the strictest sense, such as physicians, physicists, and architects, and also the large group sometimes called “skilled” witnesses, such as bankers or landowners testifying to land values; the expert is a person qualified by “knowledge, skill, experience, training or education.”7 The local carpenter, plumber, and tile layer belong on the list, and the more complex the subject, the more knowledge and experience the witness needs, because error is more likely from someone insufficiently familiar with it.8 Less technical subjects qualify too: burglars’ tools, the effect on livestock of drinking salt water, bricklaying, the strategies and code words of drug dealers, trucking practices, and techniques for controlling motorcycles.9 State courts that follow the federal approach inherit the same breadth. The Delaware Supreme Court, though not bound by the United States Supreme Court’s reading of comparable federal rules, adopted the holdings of Daubert and Carmichael as the correct interpretation of Delaware Rule of Evidence 702 in M.G. Bancorporation, Inc. v. Le Beau.10
Whatever the field, the expert ordinarily describes the methodology she used to assess the significance of the case-specific facts and testifies to its reliability. The methodology “can be technical or theoretical”: it might be the technique for using gas chromatography/mass spectrometry (GC/MS) to identify unknown drugs, or the diagnostic criteria in the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for deciding whether a patient suffers from a particular mental disorder.11
Experience can supply the knowledge. In United States v. Hankey, a police officer’s testimony about a gang’s code of silence was admitted after Kumho because its reliability rested on years of experience and personal knowledge.12 The commentary raises the obvious question, whether simple experience means reliability, and the reliability inquiry near the end of this chapter answers it.
Experience therefore counts as specialized knowledge when it bears on the subject of the testimony. The agent fits the Rule’s text without anyone calling his knowledge science. The officer’s difficulty is one of fit, which the third part of this unit takes up.
Lay Versus Expert Opinion
A witness who is not testifying as an expert may still give opinions. Modern evidence law largely abandoned the old rules that confined opinions to experts and barred opinions on ultimate issues: a lay witness may offer an opinion, even on an ultimate issue, if the opinion is helpful to the jury and rests on the witness’s own firsthand observations.14 Rule 701 turns that into three conditions. The opinion must be (a) rationally based on the witness’s perception, (b) helpful to clearly understanding the testimony or to determining a fact in issue, and (c) “not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.”15 Perception is the foundation: one court treated as admissible lay opinion a paramedic’s impression, formed while treating the defendant’s wife, that the defendant was feigning grief, noting that paramedics are trained to respond quickly in emergencies and that this one had ample time to form the impression.16
Subsection (c) decides which opinions must pass through Rule 702. An opinion that rests on specialized knowledge cannot enter as lay opinion; it must come from a witness qualified as an expert, and the testimony must satisfy Rule 702.17 The line turns on how the witness reached the opinion, because a single topic can be addressed by either kind of witness. The Brown court explained that lay opinion “results from a process of reasoning familiar in everyday life,” while expert opinion “results from a process of reasoning which can be mastered only by specialists in the field.” Under Brown, a layperson may testify that a substance appeared to be blood, but only an expert may opine that bruising around the eyes indicates skull trauma.18
Both opinions read physical evidence through a generalization, and the two kinds of witness acquire that generalization differently. A lay witness must develop it exclusively or primarily through firsthand experience, such as having seen many examples of an author’s handwriting. An expert may also rely on earlier lectures, treatises, and empirical studies; as the saying goes, modern experts stand on the shoulders of the giants who preceded them.19 The same split separates two inferences from one stained shirt. A lay witness may say that the substance on the victim’s clothing appeared to be blood, but he may not say that blood loss caused the death.20
The Advisory Committee gave two reasons for adding subsection (c) in 2000. One was to eliminate the risk that Rule 702’s reliability requirements would be evaded “through the simple expedient of proffering an expert in lay witness clothing.” The other was to keep litigants from evading the mandatory discovery requirements for expert testimony in Civil Rule 26 and Criminal Rule 16.21 Both reasons rest on one mechanism. A party relying on an expert must disclose the expert’s qualifications and the bases and methodology behind the opinion before trial, and a party should not escape that duty by calling a “lay” witness whom the factfinder will treat as an expert.22
Because the test looks at the source of each opinion, one person can supply both kinds of testimony. A toxicologist who watches a driver step out of a car and notices slurred speech, red eyes, and a strong odor of alcohol may give the lay opinion that the driver was intoxicated, as any layperson may.23 An opinion about how reliable a breath-testing instrument is, by contrast, depends on training the toxicologist acquired and ordinary observers lack, and it must come in as expert testimony.
The boundary is blurriest with police officers and auto mechanics, who often testify on points beyond everyday experience and can sometimes qualify as experts themselves. Subsection (c) means that such a witness must qualify as an expert, a process that takes real effort, before testifying to specialized matters.24
Knowledge That Is Specialized
The word that does the screening in Rule 702(a) is specialized, and credentials cannot answer the question it poses.26 A degree, a title, a long career, or a confident manner can sit in front of an opinion with nothing specialized behind it. Qualification and reliability are also separate hurdles: even a person qualified as an expert must offer testimony with a certain degree of reliability.27 Three failures show how the gap arises: a topic with no body of knowledge behind it, a topic outside the field the witness actually knows, and a witness who only repeats what others have said.
The Rule polices the gap because of the freedom experts enjoy. A lay witness’s opinion must rest on firsthand observation, and an expert may also draw on lectures, treatises, and empirical studies.28 That freedom assumes a discipline the witness has actually mastered, because the discipline replaces the missing observation. Where no discipline exists, or the witness has stepped outside the one she knows, the assumption fails and what remains is an ordinary person with a title.
The plainest failure is a topic with nothing behind it.
A witness can also fail where a real field exists, because the knowledge belongs to the field and the witness’s authority extends only as far as the field does. In Hatch v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., the proponent offered the opinion of a witness named Cloyd on whether an insurer’s advertising established a standard and on how a “good neighbor” would act. The court held the opinion properly excluded: it “required no specialized knowledge,” could not have assisted the jury in understanding the evidence or determining any fact in issue, and was “beyond the realm of his expertise.”29 Every juror already has an idea of how a good neighbor behaves, and an expert’s career gives him no better access to that idea than any juror has. The credential travels with the person, but the knowledge stays with the topic, so a court asks the question opinion by opinion rather than once for the witness.
The inquiry looks at how closely the witness’s knowledge relates to the type of issue and does not demand an exact match. A witness whose experience is with elevator motors may testify about a malfunction in an amusement ride’s motor and controls if the motors, control devices, and electrical components are substantially similar. Insisting on ride-specific experience would shrink the pool of witnesses without improving the testimony.30
The third failure involves a witness who works in a real field and contributes none of its knowledge. Experts may base opinions on information gathered outside court, as a physician bases a diagnosis on patients’ statements, nurses’ reports, hospital records, and X-rays.31 That reliance works because the expert evaluates the information with specialized skill and reaches a conclusion of her own, while a witness who simply repeats another person’s conclusion supplies nothing the jury cannot get otherwise. In Williams v. Illinois, an expert answered “yes” when asked whether a DNA profile “found in semen from the vaginal swabs” matched the profile identified as the petitioner’s. The Court held that the answer did not violate the confrontation right, because under Illinois law the phrase was not admitted for its truth; it was a mere premise of the prosecutor’s question, and the expert assumed it true in answering.32 For present purposes the opinion matters for its safeguards against abuse. Trial courts can screen out experts who would act as “mere conduits for hearsay” by strictly enforcing the requirement that experts display genuine specialized knowledge under Rule 702(a), and experts are generally precluded from disclosing inadmissible evidence to the jury.33
In all three situations the witness’s credentials may be impressive, and the defect lies in what stands behind the particular opinion. The psychic has no field, the good-neighbor opinion falls outside the witness’s field and needs no specialized knowledge, and the conduit has a field but exercises none of it.