Concept
Opinions on Credibility and Law
Proper subject matter for expert testimony
Opinions on Credibility and Law
A fully qualified expert still cannot tell a jury that another witness is lying or what verdict the law requires. Both opinions fail the helpfulness requirement of Rule 702(a), which admits expert testimony only if the expert's specialized knowledge "will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue."1 Courts apply that requirement with two allocations of power in view: the judge's power to decide the law, and the trier of fact's power to decide what the evidence means and which witnesses to believe.2
The ground for exclusion is helpfulness, not a rule against opinions on matters the jury must decide. Rule 704(a) provides that an opinion "is not objectionable just because it embraces an ultimate issue,"3 and for the federal courts that provision settled the old dispute over whether expert opinion on ultimate facts invades the province of the jury. It does not; such opinion comes in if it will assist the trier of fact.4 An answer that excludes a credibility or legal opinion merely because it "embraces an ultimate issue" therefore relies on an abandoned objection. The sound answer names helpfulness under Rule 702(a), reinforced where it applies by Rule 403's concern with unfair prejudice, confusion, and misleading the jury.5
Credibility Opinions
Courts uniformly reject expert testimony on whether a witness has testified truthfully. They describe credibility as the "province of the jury" and protect that province from being "invaded."6 The rejection comes through the helpfulness inquiry, because testimony that a witness is or is not telling the truth would undermine the jury's power to decide whom to believe.7
The reasoning is easy to reconstruct. Jurors judge a witness by watching and hearing the witness and by testing the account against the rest of the evidence. An expert who sat through the same testimony has no better access to those tools, so an opinion that the witness is honest or lying contributes a credential in place of knowledge and invites jurors to hand their decision to someone else.
Rule 704(a) leaves that analysis intact. Abolishing the ultimate-issue objection does not require admission of every opinion that embraces an ultimate issue, because Rules 701 and 702 "embody the criterion of helpfulness for lay and expert witnesses alike."8
That concern also explains, in part, the hostility of many courts toward polygraph evidence.9 An examiner who testifies that the accused was truthful in denying the offense gives an opinion on one person's truthfulness under a technical label. Reliability raises a separate objection: an expert ordinarily describes and defends the methodology behind an opinion,10 and Rule 702(c) requires testimony that is the product of reliable principles and methods.11 Frye v. United States, which gave the general-acceptance test its name, itself involved an early lie-detector device and excluded the evidence.
Expert testimony may bear on credibility without being a credibility opinion. The line runs between rating a witness and supplying a fact.
Both versions involve the same witness, the same account, and the same expertise. What changes is the object of the opinion: the victim's injuries in one, the friend's honesty in the other. An answer that excludes the pathologist because the testimony contradicts a witness misreads the rule, since contradicting a witness is what a great deal of ordinary evidence does. The question is whether the expert rates a witness or supplies information the jury may use in its own assessment.
Syndrome testimony tests this line most sharply. A psychologist who explains that delayed reporting is common among sexual-assault victims gives the jury general information that may help it evaluate the complainant's delay. Courts commonly admit that explanation to answer a defense suggestion that the delay shows no assault occurred, reasoning that jurors can benefit from scientific explanations of the significance or prevalence of delayed reports. A psychologist who instead says that the complainant exhibits the syndrome and therefore is telling the truth has moved from information to endorsement, and virtually all courts would exclude testimony characterized as the expert's belief in the complainant.12 The later section on syndrome and profile evidence examines how closely courts let the first kind of testimony approach the second.
Legal Conclusions
Courts often exclude expert opinions that state legal conclusions when the opinions tell the jury nothing about the facts. A court will often refuse, for example, to receive expert testimony that the defendant's conduct was negligent.14 The judge's power to decide the law is at stake here, because a witness who announces what the law requires competes with the judge for the same job.
The old ultimate-issue bar was overbroad, even simplistic, because any relevant testimony speaks to issues that a jury must resolve.15 What replaced it is the helpfulness standard, and that standard still excludes some opinions. Conclusory opinion testimony is excludable when it does not help;16 an opinion that the plaintiff should win is rejected as not helpful;17 and an opinion that simply tells the jury how to decide is unnecessary, suggests that judge and jury may shift responsibility for the decision to witnesses, and is worthless to the trier of fact.18 Whether an opinion will help is a matter on which the trial court has some discretion, and appellate courts normally review only for abuse of it.19
The Advisory Committee's testamentary-capacity illustration shows how the line is drawn in practice. A lawyer in a will contest who asks an expert whether the testator "had testamentary capacity" builds the question on a legal label. The question presupposes that both the expert and the trier of fact are familiar with the elements comprising the legal standard, and an opinion phrased in terms of inadequately explored legal criteria should be excluded as not helpful and possibly misleading.20 The better question asks whether the testator had the mental capacity to appreciate the nature and extent of his property and the natural objects of his bounty and to formulate a rational scheme of distribution. That form is preferable both for effectiveness and for avoiding an objection.21
The second version works because it breaks the legal label into factual components that the expert can address. The jury then measures those components against the standard the judge supplies. The label itself becomes available once an adequate foundation has explored the legal criteria: a lay or expert opinion on testamentary capacity should then be permitted, because it helps determine a fact of consequence.22
Negligence sits at the opposite end. An opinion phrased in terms of negligence itself has the witness formulate the legal standard and apply it in a way substantially immune to exploration, so it tends to confuse or mislead rather than assist the trier.23 A complex criminal statute presents the reverse situation, since an expert can often help the jury by testifying that the accused's conduct falls within the statutory prohibition.24
Rule 704(a) cannot explain the different rulings, because an opinion is not excluded merely for embracing an ultimate issue. The difference lies in helpfulness: the first answer gives the jury facts to use, while the word negligent has the witness formulate and apply a legal standard.
Rule 704(b) is the one ultimate-issue limit that survives, and unlike Rule 704(a) it applies only to expert testimony.30 When an accused's state of mind or mental condition is in issue, as with lack of predisposition in entrapment or the affirmative defense of insanity, an expert may not testify that the defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition that constitutes an element of the crime charged or of the defense.31 The subdivision was enacted in part as a backlash against John Hinckley's insanity acquittal after his attempted assassination of President Reagan.32 The bar aims at the final conclusion. Applying established diagnostic criteria, such as those in the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, is the kind of methodology an expert ordinarily describes,33 while the step from diagnosis to "he did not have the required mental state" is the step the rule forbids.