Concept
Why the Witness Holds It
Spousal immunity
Why the Witness Holds It
Trammel v. United States gives the privilege against adverse spousal testimony to the witness-spouse alone, who may be neither compelled to testify nor foreclosed from testifying.1 The federal system and most states follow that allocation, and the defendant keeps only the separate privilege for confidential marital communications.2 An examiner is likely to ask why the law gave the choice to the witness instead of the accused, who held it under the older Hawkins rule. A student who can state the allocation but cannot defend it will stumble when the facts shift, as when a spouse testifies after a promise of leniency, because the reasons behind the rule decide those cases.
Three lines of reasoning support the allocation, and the subsections below take them in turn. The first is a burden: the law’s default is to use every rational means of finding the truth, so a privilege that keeps a witness off the stand must justify what it costs the factfinder. The second is a purpose: the privilege exists to protect marital harmony, and that purpose gives no reason to let an accused silence a spouse who wants to speak. The third is a doubt: critics ask whether a spouse’s willingness shows what the Court took it to show, especially when the government has offered something in exchange. The first two explain why the Court moved the privilege; the third marks where the new rule remains open to attack.
Evidence Versus Privilege
Trammel began by asking whether the privilege against adverse spousal testimony promotes interests important enough to outweigh the need for probative evidence in the administration of criminal justice.3 The question carries a presumption. Privileges run against the law’s default of using all rational means to find the truth, so the Court said they “must be strictly construed and accepted ‘only to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth.’”4
Strict construction follows from what a privilege does at trial. A trial reconstructs events from what witnesses know, and a privilege removes a witness, or part of what a witness knows, from that reconstruction. The loss falls on the party who needed the evidence and on the public’s interest in an accurate verdict, so whoever defends the privilege has to show what it buys.
The Court measured the spousal privilege against three familiar ones. A penitent discloses what he believes to be flawed acts or thoughts to a spiritual counselor in total and absolute confidence. A lawyer must know all that relates to the client’s reasons for seeking representation, and a physician must know all that a patient can articulate in order to identify and treat disease.5 Each privilege therefore limits its protection to private communications, and each is rooted in the imperative need for confidence and trust.6 The relationship cannot do its work without full disclosure, and the privilege is what makes full disclosure safe.
The privilege Hawkins approved had no such limit, and the Court said that no other testimonial privilege sweeps so broadly.7 It was invoked not to exclude private marital communications but to exclude evidence of criminal acts and of communications made in the presence of third persons.8 The Court repeated the charge that such a privilege “secures, to every man, one safe and unquestionable and ever ready accomplice for every imaginable crime,”9 and concluded that “reason and experience” no longer justified so sweeping a rule.10
The private statement never depended on the testimonial privilege. Confidences between spouses have their own protection, the confidential marital communications privilege associated with Blau v. United States, and that privilege lets the spouse take the stand while barring disclosure of certain communications passing between the spouses.11 The acts are another matter. They are the kind of evidence the Hawkins privilege was invoked to exclude, along with communications made in the presence of third persons, which were never confidences between the spouses in the first place.12
The testimonial privilege also costs the factfinder more. The disqualification and the testimonial privilege can keep the spouse completely off the witness stand, while the communications privilege bars only certain communications once the spouse is testifying, which is why the communications privilege is the more defensible of the two.13 A privilege that removes the whole witness, including what she saw and did, takes more than one that withholds a conversation, and it needs a stronger justification. The trust-and-confidence reasoning behind the other privileges cannot supply one, because confidential communications are already covered. What remains is the preservation of the marriage itself, the subject of the next subsection.
An answer that defends the testimonial privilege by pointing to the trust spouses place in one another has borrowed the justification that belongs to the communications privilege. A spouse’s observations of acts, and statements made before third persons, fall outside that justification, so a claim that rests on confidentiality cannot reach them.
The Marital Harmony Rationale
Once confidentiality drops out as a justification, the testimonial privilege rests on a single idea: the modern justification for the privilege against adverse spousal testimony is its perceived role in fostering the harmony and sanctity of the marriage relationship.15 Trammel tested that idea against a rule that put the privilege in the accused’s hands, and the Court concluded that vesting it in the witness-spouse furthers the important public interest in marital harmony without unduly burdening legitimate law enforcement needs.16 The reasoning has two steps. The first concerns the spouse who is willing to testify, and the second concerns the spouse the government might otherwise bargain with.
A rule that bars testimony to protect a marriage works only if the testimony would damage a marriage that would otherwise survive. When one spouse is willing to testify against the other in a criminal proceeding, the Court said, the relationship is almost certainly in disrepair, and there is probably little marital harmony left for the privilege to preserve.17 The phrase “whatever the motivation” makes the reason for the willingness irrelevant, since anger, fear, a bargain, or a change of heart all show that the spouse has already chosen to accuse.18 A rule that lets the accused veto such testimony is, in the Court’s words, “far more likely to frustrate justice than to foster family peace.”19 The record in Trammel contains testimony of this kind: asked whether divorce was contemplated, Mrs. Trammel said her husband had told her, “I would go my way and he would go his.”20
The same logic explains why the witness is the proper holder. Her own decision to testify or to refuse is a fair indication of the condition of the marriage.21 California reasoned the same way when it moved the privilege from the defendant-spouse to the witness-spouse in 1965, accepting a study commission’s view that the witness is more likely than the accused to decide whether to claim the privilege on the basis of the probable effect on the marital relationship.22
One rule produces both results, and the harmony rationale explains why. The witness-spouse’s choice stands in for any judicial assessment of the marriage, so the court asks only whether she is willing. The unwilling spouse is protected exactly where the rationale has force.
The second step claims that giving the accused control of the privilege could damage the marriage itself.23 The argument runs through the government’s bargaining position. In a case like Trammel, the Court said, the government is unlikely to offer a wife immunity and lenient treatment if it knows her husband can prevent her from giving adverse testimony, and without such an offer the privilege can let one spouse escape justice at the other’s expense.24 It hardly seems conducive to the marital relation, the Court added, to place a wife in jeopardy solely by virtue of her husband’s control over her testimony.25 Elizabeth Trammel’s own situation fits the point. She testified after a grant of immunity and assurances of lenient treatment,26 and the government represented that she had not been prosecuted for her role in the conspiracy.27
Critics of the change argued that it lets the government come between husband and wife. The Court answered that neither Hawkins nor any other privilege prevents the government from enlisting one spouse to give information about the other or to aid in the other’s apprehension, and that only the spouse’s testimony in the courtroom is prohibited.28 The adverse testimonial privilege therefore covers the act of accusing in open court. A spouse who gave agents information before trial has not been compelled to do anything the privilege addresses.
State law gave the Court outside evidence that attitudes had moved. Arkansas, North Dakota, and Oklahoma, each of which had permitted an accused to exclude adverse spousal testimony in 1958, have since enacted a proposed rule that drops it, and the Court gave the trend in state law special weight because the laws of marriage and domestic relations are traditionally reserved to the states.29
The harmony premise is itself an assumption about how marriages respond to compelled testimony, and it has been questioned. Some suggest that the privilege really rests on something else, either on the sense that adverse spousal testimony deeply offends our sense of justice or on a wish to prevent the temptation to perjury.30 The judicial assumptions behind husband-wife privilege are that spouses will communicate more with a privilege and would resent adverse testimony, that stronger marriages result, and that the social benefit outweighs the lost truth, and each of them is disputable and has been neither proved nor studied.31 Those doubts leave the rule unchanged. Trammel allocated the privilege on harmony reasoning, so an answer that explains why the witness holds it should be built on that rationale.
Criticism of Trammel
Trammel made the witness-spouse the holder on a premise about marriage: a spouse who is willing to testify against the other is in a relationship that is almost certainly in disrepair, so a veto in the accused’s hands protects little.33 The criticisms below attack that premise. They are critiques of the rule and not exceptions to it. A federal court applying Trammel still treats the witness-spouse as the holder, and the defendant cannot keep her testimony out because she testifies under a deal.34
The premise reads a spouse’s decision to testify as evidence about the marriage, and the reading is only as good as the decision is free. Elizabeth Trammel testified after a grant of immunity and assurances of lenient treatment, and the Court held that those assurances did not make her testimony involuntary.35 Critics respond that when both spouses are implicated, the government has something valuable to offer, and a spouse who accepts is choosing between testifying and facing prosecution herself. The notes after the case press the same doubt, asking whether the claim that a willing spouse’s relationship is “almost certainly in disrepair” is convincing.36 On the critics’ view, willingness may measure the strength of the government’s offer as much as the health of the marriage.
The facts of Trammel sit closer to Dana than to the spouse the Court had in mind. The government represented that Elizabeth Trammel had not been prosecuted for her role in the conspiracy,37 and she testified after immunity and assurances of lenient treatment.38 Anne, the wife in the earlier hypothetical, shows the premise at full strength. She took no part in Henry’s crime, and she could have invoked the privilege had she refused to testify.39 Nothing in her story gives her a reason to testify apart from the state of her marriage. What separates the two women is whether the witness had something to gain or lose from the government apart from the marriage itself.
A second objection concerns what the allocation gives prosecutors. The Court reasoned that the government is unlikely to offer a wife immunity and lenient treatment if her husband can prevent her from giving adverse testimony.40 The converse follows: once the witness-spouse controls the privilege, such an offer can buy admissible testimony. The notes ask what new tool Trammel provides to prosecutors when both spouses are implicated in criminal activity,41 and a critic can ask whether the bargaining that tool invites is any kinder to the marriage than the veto was. The Court’s own reply was that nothing in Hawkins or any other privilege kept the government from enlisting one spouse to give information about the other or to aid in the other’s apprehension, since only courtroom testimony is prohibited.42 The objection therefore concerns what the allocation adds to that existing freedom, which is a bargain for testimony that the accused can no longer block.
Some courts recognize a joint-participant exception, though it is not part of the rule Trammel announces.43 The Tenth Circuit invoked it in Trammel itself. Under the exception, the testimonial privilege does not apply, regardless of who holds it, if the spouses were joint participants in the crime, and the Supreme Court nowhere mentions the point.44 Courts have continued to apply the exception after Trammel (see, e.g., United States v. Clark). One court observed that Trammel carries negative implications for it: if the Supreme Court looked on the exception with favor, it is peculiar that the Court did not decide the case on that ground instead of confining the privilege to the witness-spouse, and one would have expected some indication that the exception might still make the privilege unavailable when the witness-spouse asserted it.45 Most courts, however, hold that the privilege continues even if both spouses were involved in criminal activity.46 The exception points in the opposite direction from the dilemma criticism. That criticism worries about a spouse pressed to testify, while the exception would let the government compel a spouse whom Trammel otherwise protects. Its status is taken up under the exceptions to the privilege below.
The majority’s answer sits inside its premise. It looked to willingness “whatever the motivation” and treated the spouse’s own decision as the signal of the marriage’s condition,47 where a rule keyed to motive would send courts probing why a spouse is willing. On the other side of the ledger, no other testimonial privilege sweeps so broadly, because the others protect only private communications,48 and a privilege that can remove a whole witness from the stand is one to keep narrow.49
Justice Stewart, concurring in the judgment, voiced a different kind of skepticism. Paraphrasing Justice Jackson, he suggested that the Court’s opinion would be of greater interest to students of human psychology than to students of law.50 The remark does not touch the holding. It does mark the harmony premise as a judgment about how spouses behave, and a judgment of that kind can be questioned on facts, like Elizabeth Trammel’s, where it fits poorly.