Concept
Exceptions to the Privilege
Spousal immunity
Exceptions to the Privilege
In federal court the witness-spouse alone holds the privilege against adverse spousal testimony, so a willing spouse may testify over the defendant's objection and an unwilling spouse may stay off the stand.1 Every rule in the earlier sections assumes a witness-spouse who is entitled to invoke that privilege. Two situations strain the assumption: the charge may name the spouse or a child as the victim, or the spouse may have joined in the crime on trial.
Both exceptions matter only when the spouse is unwilling. A willing spouse already testifies under Trammel v. United States, so an exception adds something only when a spouse invokes the privilege and a court must decide whether to honor the claim. The exceptions also differ in how settled they are. The first depends on what the defendant is charged with, and the privilege is uniformly denied in that setting.2 The second depends on what the witness-spouse did, and the courts are split. An answer to a joint-participation problem must therefore name the approach it applies and cannot present the exception as settled law.
Crimes Against Spouse or Children
The privilege is uniformly denied when the accused spouse is charged with a crime against the witness-spouse or their children.3 The Trammel majority traced the rule in a footnote. Wyatt recognized an exception to Hawkins for cases in which one spouse commits a crime against the other, an exception placed on the ground of necessity and long established at common law, as far back as Lord Audley's Case in 1631.4 Where the exception applies, the witness-spouse's reluctance, however sincere, does not excuse the appearance. That makes the exception the first question to ask about any reluctant spouse, because the rule that the witness holds the privilege matters only after a court confirms that the charge leaves a privilege to hold.
Necessity here has a concrete meaning. When the accused is charged with harming the other spouse, that spouse is the victim named in the indictment or information, and a victim is typically an important or even essential source of prosecution evidence.5 A privilege that let the victim stay silent would frustrate enforcement of the very statute the defendant is charged with violating, so the public interest in effective enforcement of the criminal law is held to override the spouses' private interest in protecting their relationship.6
The exception did not stay confined to violence against the spouse's person. According to the Trammel footnote, it grew to cover crimes against the spouse's property, as in Herman v. United States, and, in recent years, crimes against children of either spouse, as in United States v. Allery.7 Statutes that keep a version of the privilege tend to write the exception more broadly still, reaching any crime committed by one spouse against the other and offenses against children or against the marital relation itself, such as adultery.8 The phrase children of either spouse matters in practice, because the child need not belong to both.
Because no privilege exists in such a case, the prosecutor can call even a reluctant spouse.9 The exception therefore matters most in domestic violence and child abuse prosecutions, where the adverse testimonial privilege is usually unavailable.10 A willing victim-spouse needs no exception to testify, since Trammel already lets a willing witness testify over the defendant's objection. The exception does its work only when the victim would otherwise refuse.
The limit reaches the neighboring privilege too. The Trammel footnote adds that similar exceptions have been found to the confidential marital communications privilege.11 The joint-crime limit on that privilege is taken up below.
A marriage, a reluctant spouse, and a criminal prosecution suggest at once that the spouse cannot be called. That conclusion skips the one question the exception asks: whom does the charge name as the victim?
Compelling a victim to testify against the person who harmed her can seem an odd way to serve her interests. The rule does not turn on her wishes. Trammel treated the witness-spouse's decision to testify or not as a good indication of the state of the marriage,12 but once the charge names the spouse or a child as the victim, that choice is no longer hers to make.
Joint Participation Dispute
A witness-spouse who wants to stay silent may be accused of having joined in the very crime on trial, and the federal circuits split on whether such a spouse keeps the privilege. The Seventh and Tenth Circuits recognize a joint-participant exception for cases in which the spouses are joint participants in a criminal enterprise to which the questions relate, while the Third Circuit rejected it after Trammel.14 The Second Circuit has rejected it too,15 and most courts hold that the privilege continues even if both spouses were involved in criminal activity.16
The exception predates Trammel. The Seventh Circuit enunciated it in Van Drunen, decided six years before Trammel, where the witness-spouse apparently testified voluntarily and the court also relied on the point that the testimony concerned events before the marriage.17 The Supreme Court did not decide Trammel on that ground. The Second Circuit reasoned that a Court favoring the exception would more naturally have used it than confine the privilege to the witness-spouse and partly overrule a decision little more than twenty years old, and that such a Court would likely have indicated that the exception might still defeat a privilege the witness-spouse asserted.18 The court would not say that Trammel rejected the exception, but it found 'some negative implications' in the Court's silence.19
The dispute reaches less far than its prominence suggests. Had Van Drunen foreseen the rule that only the witness-spouse can claim the privilege, the exception would have been unnecessary there, since the spouse testified voluntarily.20 Decisions that applied the exception to a spouse who testified voluntarily therefore carry little precedential weight after Trammel.21 What remains is the harder question of whether the government may override a spouse who wants to remain silent. If an unindicted wife is unwilling to testify and the spouses are coparticipants, a joint-participants exception would let the government force her to testify even where Trammel otherwise would not.22
The case for the exception rests on the privilege's own purpose. The Seventh Circuit reasoned in Clark that the rehabilitative effect of a marriage, which in part justifies the privilege, is diminished when both spouses are participants in the crime.23 On that view the law gives up a witness to protect a marriage, and a marriage built on shared crime deserves less protection.
re Koecher tested that argument and the Second Circuit rejected it. Hana Koecher declined to answer questions on the ground that answering could adversely affect her husband Karel's interest and destroy the harmony of twenty-one years of marriage, and she also invoked the privilege against disclosure of confidential communications.24 The district court followed the Seventh and Tenth Circuit decisions and ruled that she could nevertheless be compelled to testify.25 The Second Circuit held, in agreement with the Third Circuit and in conflict with the Seventh and Tenth, that the marital privilege is not subject to a joint participant exception.26 It was 'unable to accept the proposition that a marriage cannot be a devoted one simply because at some time the partners have decided to engage in a criminal activity.' The decision was later vacated and dismissed as moot, 475 U.S. 133 (1986), so treat it as persuasive reasoning and not as binding authority.27
The case against the exception draws on both the Second Circuit's opinion and the Third Circuit's decision in Malfitano, and it has five parts:
- The silence of Trammel has negative implications, because a Court that favored the exception could have decided the case on that ground and would likely have signaled that the exception might still defeat a privilege the witness-spouse asserted.28
- The testimonial privilege is aimed at marital harmony, and the Third Circuit reasoned that compelling a spouse to testify under the exception could create exactly the negative impact on the marriage that the privilege was designed to avoid.29
- The predicate for the exception is often hard to establish without invading the privilege itself.30
- As Chief Judge Seitz observed in Malfitano, "the closer the marriage, the more likely it will appear that both spouses are involved."31
- The privilege has existed since the early days of the common law and serves important interests, so the creation of exceptions belongs to the Supreme Court or Congress.32
The third reason shows in Koecher itself. The government pointed to the Koechers' alleged training in Czechoslovakia and their long life together in the United States, where Karel was employed by the CIA, as grounds for inferring that Hana knew what he was doing. It had filed no criminal charge against her, and her counsel alleged that she told the FBI in long interviews that Karel kept his doings to himself.33 The exception depends on joint participation, and establishing that predicate can require invading the privilege. Seitz's observation names the resulting danger: the facts that make spouses look like partners in crime may be only the facts that show a close marriage.
In the Henry and Anne illustration, the exception would not have mattered even in a jurisdiction that recognizes it, because Anne was not a participant in Henry's illegal activity.34
Weighed overall, the prevailing approach rejects the exception for the testimonial privilege.35 Clark is not a clean example of the minority view, because, like Van Drunen, it also rested on the point that the facts under inquiry predated the marriage.36 That second ground belongs to a separate dispute. A scattering of federal case law refuses the adverse-testimony privilege when the acts under interrogation predated the marriage, a minority position treated earlier under premarital events.37
The joint-crime exception stands on firmer ground for the confidential marital communications privilege, and running the two privileges together is the usual error in this area. In Marashi, the court held that the marital communications privilege does not apply to statements made in furtherance of joint criminal activity.38 A number of circuits likewise refuse to honor the accused's objection to spousal testimony about such communications where the testimony is not given under compulsion.39 The Third Circuit shows how the two rulings coexist. It holds both that there is no exception to the general spousal privilege for criminal activity and that communications about ongoing or future criminal activity are not protected by the confidential communications privilege.40
The two privileges protect different things. The testimonial privilege is aimed at marital harmony, which compelling a joint participant to testify could itself damage.41 Statements made in furtherance of a joint crime fall outside the communications privilege, so excluding them compels no one to accuse a spouse on the stand. The practical posture differs as well. The Tenth Circuit cases, Kapnison and Neal, carefully limited the exception to testimony given 'by consent of the witness spouse.'42 In those cases the exception defeats the defendant's objection and does not override an unwilling spouse.
Even for communications, the exception stops at the point where participation begins. In United States v. Montgomery, the court applied Marashi and held the exception inapplicable, because Mrs. Montgomery had not become a participant at the time of her communications, so no joint criminal activity had yet been undertaken.43 The majority of circuits agree that communications made before a spouse begins to participate in the criminal activity are privileged, and the Tenth Circuit's Neal points the other way.44 Participation that begins after a communication does not strip it of protection under the majority view.