Concept
State Law Variations
Spousal immunity
State Law Variations
Trammel v. United States settles who holds the privilege against adverse spousal testimony only for federal criminal cases: the witness-spouse alone may claim it, so the defendant cannot keep a willing spouse off the stand.1 A state court answers the same question under its own statutes and decisions, and a federal ruling on the federal common law of privilege is persuasive authority there and nothing more.2 A state that adopts the Trammel allocation does so by choice.
Each underlying choice therefore stays open in every state: whether to keep the privilege at all, who holds it, and whether to abolish it in criminal cases. States have answered differently, so no single national rule exists. Some have moved the privilege to the witness-spouse, some leave it with the defendant or with both spouses, and some have abolished it in criminal cases.3
For an examinee, the forum is the first fact to read in any spousal-witness problem. Reciting Trammel in a state-court problem answers a question the state may have answered the other way.
Different State Holders
The Trammel opinion itself records how far state law had moved. When Hawkins was decided in 1958, thirty-one jurisdictions allowed an accused to prevent adverse spousal testimony, and by 1980 the number had fallen to twenty-four. In 1974 the National Conference on Uniform State Laws revised the Uniform Rules of Evidence to reject the Hawkins rule in favor of a limited privilege for confidential communications.4 That erosion changed the federal rule. It changed no state's rule, because each state decides for itself whether the privilege exists and who holds it.5
Holder rules differ because the privilege can be justified in more than one way, and each justification points to a different holder. The reason most commonly offered, preventing marital dissension, would give the privilege to the party-spouse alone and not to the witness.6 A lawmaker who wants the person asked to testify to weigh the effect on the marriage would give it to the witness instead. California took that second view in 1965, when it moved the privilege from the defendant to the witness on a study commission's finding that the witness is more likely to decide on the basis of the probable effect on the marital relationship.7
The resulting state rules fall into four groups, which are alternatives and not steps on a ladder:
- Some states treat the non-party spouse as incompetent to testify against the other in a criminal proceeding. The Trammel opinion counted eight such states.8
- Some states give the privilege to the defendant-spouse or to both spouses, so the prosecution may not call the spouse without the accused's consent. That is the rule the Supreme Court itself followed in Hawkins until Trammel.9
- Some states give the privilege to the witness-spouse, as the Federal Rules and some state evidence provisions do.10
- Some states have abolished the privilege in criminal cases, so a spouse is called to the stand like any other witness.11
The group a state belongs to matters because the holder also decides whether the privilege is waived.12 Under an accused-held rule, the defendant's objection silences a willing spouse. Under a rule that gives the privilege to both spouses, either one can invoke it, so the defendant's objection and the witness's refusal each work on their own. Under a witness-held rule, the defendant's objection carries no weight and only the witness's decision counts. Under incompetency the spouse is barred whatever anyone decides, and under abolition the spouse is called like any other witness.
Colorado's statute shows a consent-based design. It declares that there are “particular relations in which it is the policy of the law to encourage confidence and to preserve it inviolate,” and it provides that neither spouse may be examined for or against the other without the other's consent.13 Three features depart from the federal rule. The statute reaches civil as well as criminal proceedings, while the federal adverse testimonial privilege is confined to criminal cases. It covers testimony for the other spouse as well as against. And the consent that counts is the other spouse's, so the defendant can bar a spouse who wants to speak, which is the veto Trammel removed in federal court.
Exceptions vary in the same way. Colorado's privilege does not apply to a civil or criminal proceeding involving a crime by one spouse against the other, which resembles the federal exception for crimes against the spouse.14 Other exceptions have their own limits. In State v. Anderson, the Iowa Supreme Court held that a statute limiting the marital privilege applied only to cases involving the mandatory reporting of child abuse, so the privilege stayed in place for other crimes.15 State domestic-violence statutes may also allow a victim spouse to be compelled to testify against a spouse charged with that crime.16 The federal exceptions are therefore a starting point for a state-court problem and cannot be assumed to carry over unchanged.
The usual error on a state-court fact pattern is to recite Trammel as though it settled who holds the privilege. It settles that question only in federal court. The sound approach is to identify the forum, apply that state's statute or decisions to recognition, holder, and exceptions, and use the federal allocation only when the problem places the case in federal court.
Engberg and Statutory Holders
Where a state has a statute governing spousal testimony, the statute decides who holds the privilege, and reasoning from Trammel instead is a mistake. In Engberg v. Meyer, a Wyoming post-conviction case, the state supreme court said that United States Supreme Court decisions are “not controlling” and that the federal courts' position on federal common law is “nothing more than persuasive authority.”18 The case arose as a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. It therefore shows how a court reasons about a statute that does not name a holder, and it does not announce a rule for other states.
The Wyoming statute has two sentences. The first bars a husband or wife from being a witness against the other except in specified cases. The second provides that a spouse may be a witness for the other as though the marital relation did not exist.19 Because the State called Donna Engberg, the first sentence governed, since a spouse called by the State in a criminal proceeding must be called as a witness against the defendant.20
The trial shows why the holder mattered. Roy Engberg's counsel wanted Donna to testify and told the court she had no privilege: “Roy has the privilege.”21 The trial court answered that “[u]nder the more recent rule, she can assert the immunity herself.”22 The Wyoming Supreme Court read that answer as the trial judge's mistaken belief that recent Supreme Court authority controlled the decision.23 If the privilege was Roy's, his waiver ended the matter and Donna had to testify. If it was hers, his waiver changed nothing.
The posture of the case shaped the majority's answer. Because the claim was that appellate counsel should have raised the error, the court asked whether counsel had missed a clear and unequivocal rule of law.24 It began from the account of the privilege that treats marital dissension as the usual justification, a justification that would give the privilege to the party-spouse alone.25 It then found a second reading of the statute consistent with the legislature's words. The mandatory words “shall be,” read in light of the concept of privilege, can be construed to let the witness-spouse avoid “becoming the instrument of that condemnation” even though the party-spouse waives.26 Accepting Wigmore's description of who may invoke the privilege, it was arguable that the trial court ruled correctly, albeit for an erroneous reason, so no clear and unequivocal rule was violated.27
The majority held only that its reading was arguable, which was enough on that posture. Engberg therefore leaves open what the Wyoming statute finally means.
The dissent read the same statute and found no privilege in Donna at all. It agreed that the trial court was misadvised in applying the federal Trammel rule and said the Wyoming statute should have controlled.28 In its view nothing in Wyoming law supports a claim that a wife may decline to testify when her husband asks for her testimony in a criminal prosecution.29 It also pointed to Texas and Montana, which relied on their own statutes and not on Trammel.30
Both opinions agree on the first step, that the Wyoming statute and not the federal rule governs. They part on the second step, what the statute's first sentence means. On the majority's reading, a wife called by the State may claim the privilege even though her husband has waived his own. On the dissent's reading, a wife whose husband wants her testimony has no privilege to refuse. The wording explains the split. A statute that conditions testimony on the other spouse's consent, like Colorado's, points to the party-spouse, and a statute that speaks of the witness's own privilege points to the witness. A flat command that a spouse “shall be” no witness against the other fits neither pattern cleanly, and reasonable judges read it in opposite ways.
An exam stem built on this dispute will pair a state that has its own statute with a husband who waives and a wife who refuses. The answer starts with the statute's text and asks whom the bar protects and whether the language speaks of the witness's refusal or of the other spouse's consent. The federal allocation serves only as a persuasive analogy. An answer that describes both readings of an ambiguous statute will come closer to what a state court would do than one that announces the Engberg majority's view as settled.