Concept
Communications Versus Testimony
Marital communications
Marital Communications Privilege
Communications Versus Testimony
Marriage supports two different privileges, and the first task in this area is keeping them apart. The marital communications privilege protects the content of confidential statements that spouses make to each other during the marriage.1 The Supreme Court recognized it in Blau v. United States and treated it as distinct from the spousal testimonial privilege. The same decision recognized a presumption that spousal communications are confidential, so the government must overcome the presumption, and the spouse asserting the privilege need not first prove confidentiality.2
The privilege attaches to the confidence, not to a particular witness. When it applies, neither the husband, the wife, nor anyone else may testify to the occurrence or contents of the confidential communication.3 Spousal disqualification works differently. It keeps a spouse from being a witness at all, so none of that spouse's knowledge reaches the trial through the spouse, but other people who know the same things may still testify.4 The usual formulation of the communications privilege binds every witness, though in Wolfle v. United States the Court left open whether it bars a third party from proving a spousal communication. The question was unnecessary there because the husband's voluntary disclosure of his statement to his stenographer took it outside the privilege.5 Disclosure to third persons returns in the confidentiality section.
The second privilege protects a witness rather than a confidence. The adverse testimonial privilege protects against disclosure of all adverse information, but only if the spouses are married when the testimony is demanded, and the witness-spouse holds it.6 In Trammel v. United States, the Court modified the existing rule so that the witness-spouse alone may refuse to testify adversely. The witness can be neither compelled to testify nor foreclosed from testifying, so a defendant cannot keep a willing spouse off the stand.7 The testimonial privilege reaches further than the confidences privilege in what it blocks. It bars all testimony by one spouse against the other, including accounts of premarital acts or events, while the confidences privilege excludes only testimony about private communications between spouses (and perhaps some behavior in private settings) while they were married.8
Trammel shows the two privileges sorting a single body of evidence. The district court ruled that Mrs. Trammel could testify for the government to any act she observed during the marriage and to any communication made in the presence of a third person, but it held the confidential communications between the Trammels privileged and inadmissible.9 The Supreme Court's discussion explains that line. The old testimonial rule, known as the Hawkins privilege, was invoked to exclude evidence of criminal acts and of communications made in front of third persons, not private marital communications. Private confidences are protected by an independent rule, so the Court had no need of the testimonial privilege to shield them.10 Because the confidences privilege was not at issue, the holding left Wolfle and Blau undisturbed.11
Four differences separate the two privileges.
- The privileges differ in scope. The confidences privilege reaches only private communications between spouses, while the testimonial privilege reaches all adverse testimony, premarital events included.12
- They differ in timing. The confidences privilege protects only communications made during the marriage, while the testimonial privilege applies only if the spouses are married when testimony is demanded.13 Because the confidences privilege looks to when the statement was made, it can outlast the marriage, a point the survival section develops.
- They differ in holder. The communicating spouse holds the confidences privilege at a minimum, while the testimonial privilege belongs to the witness-spouse alone.14
- They differ in their effect on other witnesses. When the confidences privilege applies, no one may testify to the communication, while a rule that keeps only the spouse off the stand leaves other people free to testify to the same facts.15
A single event can travel either route, depending on how the witness came to know of it.
The confidences privilege therefore asks what kind of evidence is offered. A confidential statement made during the marriage qualifies, while a spouse's observation of conduct, like the acts Mrs. Trammel observed, generally does not.16 The testimonial privilege asks who the witness is and whether the marriage still exists when testimony is demanded.17
The two privileges also rest on different justifications. The traditional reasons for the testimonial privilege, preventing marital dissension and sparing a person from condemning or being condemned by a spouse, have no bearing on marital communications. No one can assume that marital conduct changes because of a confidences privilege whose existence the spouses probably do not know.18 The incentive behind the lawyer-client privilege fits spouses poorly for the same reason. A client who knew that damaging disclosures could be pried from the lawyer would hesitate to confide, but spouses who are unaware of the privilege can hardly be weighing it.19
What remains is the Court's own explanation. Protecting marital confidences is regarded as so essential to the marriage that it outweighs the disadvantages the privilege imposes on the administration of justice.20 Behind that explanation lies a sentiment more than a calculation: people feel it indelicate to pry into the secrets of husband and wife.21 Each element of the privilege marks a point where the law decides whether that interest is worth the price. The price is the usual one: probative evidence is suppressed, the factfinder decides without it, and the risk of an erroneous outcome rises, while the benefits are hard to measure.22 Many courts are hostile to privileges, and there may be a trend toward limiting 'communication' to verbal and nonverbal acts meant to convey information.23
Legislatures recognized the confidences privilege early. The English Act of 1853 abolished the disqualification of husbands and wives of the parties and then provided that no spouse could be compelled to disclose a communication made by the other during the marriage. Nearly all American states, while making spouses competent to testify, disabled them from testifying to communications between them.24 Federal courts work from Rule 501 instead. The Advisory Committee's draft rules included a husband-wife privilege, proposed Rule 505, that would have codified the Hawkins rule and eliminated the privilege for confidential marital communications. Congress rejected the draft rules and enacted Rule 501, which manifests an intention not to freeze privilege law and leaves courts the flexibility to develop privilege rules case by case.25 The final section of the chapter takes up how state rules vary.
The rest of the chapter follows the questions a court must answer when a spouse's confidence is offered in evidence. First, were the spouses married when the statement was made, a question with its own treatment for invalid marriages and permanent separations? Second, was the statement a communication? Third, was it confidential, where the presumption of confidentiality and the third-party rules do their work? Fourth, who holds the privilege, and how is it asserted or waived? Fifth, does it survive the end of the marriage? Last, does an exception strip it away? Courts have carved out an exception for communications made to further an ongoing or future crime, and another for communications about a past or planned crime against immediate family members.26 A husband's confidential request that his wife destroy evidence of a crime, for example, falls outside the privilege.27