Concept
Confidentiality
Marital communications
Confidentiality
Confidentiality is where contested claims to the marital communications privilege are usually fought. The Supreme Court's decision in Blau v. United States supplies the starting rule: confidential communications between husband and wife are privileged against compelled disclosure, and communications between spouses are presumed confidential.1 The presumption allocates the burden of proof. The government, as the party seeking the evidence, must overcome it, and the spouse who invokes the privilege need not prove that the conversation was private.2 The allocation fits how spouses actually talk, since most exchanges between husband and wife take place with no one else listening. It also spares the claimant a bind, because a spouse required to prove confidentiality might have to describe the very conversation the privilege exists to keep out of court.
Marriage and communication are matters of status and form. Confidentiality depends on circumstances the spouses may never have considered when they spoke: who else was in the room, who else was told, and what the speaker expected the listener to do with the information. The presumption fixes the starting point, and the contest is over whether the party offering the evidence can prove facts that defeat it.
The subsections follow that order. The first teaches Blau in full, because the presumption and the burden must be in hand before any rebuttal can be weighed. The next three take up the usual rebuttals in turn: an outsider who was present or was told, a speaker who meant the message to be passed along, and an overhearer or interceptor.
Presumption of Confidentiality
Blau v. United States fixed the allocation of proof on this element. Communications between spouses are presumed confidential, and the government must overcome that presumption, so the spouse invoking the privilege does not have to prove the exchange was private.3 re Grand Jury Investigation (Hipes) recounts the facts of Blau before applying the rule. A husband invoked the marital privilege in refusing to tell a federal grand jury where his wife was, and the district court overruled the claim and sentenced him for contempt.4 The government argued, successfully in the Tenth Circuit, that no privilege existed because he had failed to prove that his wife conveyed the information to him privately. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that marital communications are presumptively confidential and that the government bears the burden of overcoming the presumption.5 The Tenth Circuit's approach would have made the claimant prove a negative, that nobody else heard or would hear of the exchange, before the privilege could apply.
Two features of the privilege explain why the burden sits where Blau put it. First, the presumption matches experience. Communications between spouses, privately made, are generally assumed to have been intended to be confidential, while a communication that its nature or circumstances show was obviously not meant to be confidential is not privileged.6 Spouses talking at home usually have no audience, so a rule that began from the opposite assumption would demand proof of something that is usually true. That is why a claimant who shows the marriage and the communication does not first have to show what the speaker intended. Second, every fact that can defeat confidentiality is a circumstance of the exchange: who else was present, who was told afterward, whether the speaker meant the message to be passed along. The party offering the evidence has the motive and the tools to look for those facts. A claimant who had to establish confidentiality might be forced to describe the conversation in detail, which is the very disclosure the privilege exists to prevent.
The presumption decided the outcome in Hipes. Mrs. Hipes, who had been granted immunity and had answered many of the grand jury's questions, refused to say what her husband's job responsibilities were.7 The Ninth Circuit did not reach her testimonial privilege, because the question probed an area presumptively protected by the communications privilege and the government had not overcome the presumption.8 The government made no showing that the information came from any source other than her husband's conversations with her, and counsel on both sides assumed that whatever she knew about his job came from what he told her.9 The government's fallback was that he performed his duties at a workplace among other employees. The court answered that his job may have been in the public eye while his conversations with his wife remained presumptively confidential, so the government still had to show that those conversations were not private.10
A proponent who offers some evidence can still lose if that evidence fails to show that the communication itself was meant to be shared. In United States v. Montgomery the government sought to use a handwritten letter from a wife to her husband. She had left it on the kitchen counter of the couple's home, it was recovered from their bedroom during the execution of a search warrant, and she testified that she had hoped her husband would pass its substance on to his sister.11 The Ninth Circuit began from the rule that the government bears the burden of showing the communication was not intended to be confidential, and it treated the letter as the kind of communication likely to be confidential.12 The wife's hope that her husband would relay the substance did not make the letter itself non-confidential, and the court refused to cast aside the presumption by speculating that the couple's children, who lived in the house, saw or were likely to see it.13 The two decisions differ in the quality of the government's showing. In Hipes the government offered nothing about the source of the witness's knowledge. In Montgomery it offered a relay hope that concerned the letter's substance and not the letter, plus the bare presence of children, with no evidence that they would likely read it or that the writer ignored the risk. The court contrasted United States v. McCown, where a husband's instruction to his wife to write a check, which was delivered to co-defendants living with the couple, supported an obvious inference that he did not mean to hide the instruction from them.14 That contrast previews the intent-to-relay rebuttal taken up below.
The presumption is not limited to grand jury investigations or federal criminal cases. In Haddad v. Lockheed Cal. Corp., an employment discrimination suit, the Ninth Circuit held that the privilege protected a marital communication a witness had related, because the employer failed to overcome the presumption. The testimony should have been excluded, though the error was harmless because the evidence was cumulative.15 State v. Serrano shows the same presumption in an Oregon statute and states the burden in steps. Oregon ordinarily requires the party asserting a privilege to establish that it applies, but the legislative commentary to the state's evidence code indicates that communications made during marriage are presumed confidential unless intent to disclose is apparent from the circumstances.16 In light of that presumption, the court held that a defendant need only demonstrate that he was married to his wife and that a communication occurred during the marriage. The burden of persuasion then shifts to the state to show that the communicating spouse did not intend confidentiality.17 The court reasoned that the communicating spouse controls the subject, wording, medium, and audience of a communication and is the one positioned to tell the listener not to repeat it. That is why the speaker's intent governs and why the circumstances of the exchange are the right evidence to examine.18
A presumption can be rebutted, and Pereira v. United States shows what a successful rebuttal looks like. The Court stated that marital communications are presumed confidential but that the presumption may be overcome by proof of facts showing the communications were not intended to be private. A third party's presence negatives the presumption, and so does an intention that the information be transmitted to a third person.19 Mrs. Joyce's testimony there consisted primarily of statements made in front of other people, acts that were not communications, trips taken with third parties, and her own acts, and any residue that may have been confidential was too slight to matter.20 The proponent in Pereira proved facts about the circumstances of the exchange, which is exactly what the government failed to do in Hipes.
On an exam, the claimant has very little to prove and the proponent a good deal. The question to ask is who must come forward with facts about the setting.
The presumption answers only the confidentiality element. The claimant must still establish the marriage and a communication, which the earlier sections addressed, and the party offering the evidence may rebut with facts about the circumstances of the exchange. The next three subsections take up the usual rebuttals: a third party who was present or was told, a speaker who meant the message to be passed on, and an outsider who overheard or intercepted it.
Third Parties Present
Blau v. United States made communications between spouses presumptively confidential and placed on the government the burden of overcoming that presumption.22 The most common way to carry that burden is to show that someone outside the marriage heard the words or was told them. Wolfle v. United States states the governing principle: a communication made in a third party's presence is usually treated as unprivileged because it was not made in confidence.23 The principle follows from what confidence means. A statement an outsider has already heard is no longer held between two people, so protecting it would shield nothing the privilege exists to keep while still withholding relevant testimony from the factfinder.
In Wolfle the challenged testimony described a communication from the husband to his wife that he had voluntarily disclosed to his stenographer.24 The Court noted that a stenographer's or private secretary's duties are ordinarily confidential, and it framed the question as the extent to which the privilege embraces transmission, likewise in confidence, through a third-party intermediary whose own communications are not privileged.25 The answer was that the husband's voluntary disclosure to the stenographer took the communication outside the privilege.26
The Court's refusal to treat the stenographer as a necessary assistant explains the shape of the rule. When the law protects a confidence, it ordinarily bars the testimony of people whose participation in that confidence is reasonably required, such as a nurse present at a patient's examination or a clerk in a lawyer's office, because without that reach the privilege would often be defeated as much as preserved.27 Spouses stand differently. They can ordinarily communicate without anyone's help, so the privilege can be enjoyed and preserved without extending it to third persons to whom the communications have been voluntarily revealed.28 The privilege also suppresses relevant testimony, and the Court said it should be allowed only when it is plain that marital confidence cannot otherwise reasonably be preserved.29 A husband who brought a stenographer into the exchange acted by choice, since he could have communicated without her, and the privilege does not rescue a confidence its speaker voluntarily exposed.
The same reasoning governs a child. Wolfle observed that communications voluntarily made in the presence of the couple's children, if old enough to comprehend them, or of other family members within the intimacy of the family circle, have uniformly been held unprivileged, and it treated that rule as persuasive support for its result.30 The usual modern statement is that a third person, including the couple's child, who is capable of understanding the communication defeats confidentiality even if the spouses wanted the matter kept quiet.31 The capacity limit tracks the risk that matters, because a listener who cannot comprehend the words is unlikely to grasp or report them, so the speaker has not meaningfully exposed the confidence. Some authority doubts that a child's presence should count at all, reasoning by analogy to the necessary assistants a lawyer-client conversation can tolerate, and the point is disputed when the child is old enough to understand.32 On an exam, treat the presence of a child old enough to comprehend as defeating confidentiality under Wolfle, and mention the dispute only if the facts invite it.
Outsiders other than employees and relatives produce the same result. In Pereira v. United States, Mrs. Joyce's testimony consisted primarily of statements made in front of Brading or Miss Joyner, or both, and the Court stated that the presence of a third party negatives the presumption of privacy.33 The Eleventh Circuit, in an unpublished decision, applied that principle in U.S. v. Abram. A husband asked his wife to find out whether there was any activity at the bank across from her workplace, and he made the request in Parker's presence, so the request fell outside the privilege.34 The stenographer in Wolfle, Brading and Miss Joyner in Pereira, and Parker in Abram played different roles, yet the result is the same. Confidentiality ends once the words are exposed to a person outside the marriage, whatever that person's loyalties or willingness to testify.
A third person who might have seen a communication stands on different footing from one who actually received it. In United States v. Montgomery the government relied on where a wife left her handwritten letter to her husband, the kitchen counter of the family home, and on the fact that the couple's children lived there.35 The Ninth Circuit held that this did not rebut the presumption, because nothing showed that the children would likely have seen or read the letter, or that the wife wrote without regard to whether they would. The court declined to set the presumption aside by speculating about who might have looked.36
Two things separate Montgomery from Wolfle. The husband in Wolfle put the contents into a third person's hands himself, so the exposure was established and only its legal effect was in question. In Montgomery the exposure was a possibility the government never proved, and Blau assigns that burden of proof to the government.37 The Ninth Circuit's attention to whether the wife acted without regard to the children shows that the speaker's own knowledge and conduct drive the inquiry. Voluntary exposure to a known listener defeats confidentiality, and the bare chance that a household member could have looked does not.38 A listener whom the speaker did not know about presents a different problem, taken up below under eavesdroppers and interception.
Exam facts usually mention household or office staff in passing, and the working question is whether anyone was actually in the room when the words were spoken.
Intent to Relay
The presumption of confidentiality that Blau v. United States gives every marital communication can be overcome by proof that the speaker did not mean the exchange to be private. Pereira v. United States identifies two kinds of proof that do the job: a third party's presence, and the intention that the information conveyed be transmitted to a third person.41 The first route, taken up in the preceding subsection, needs an outsider who actually heard or saw the exchange. The second needs no outsider in the room, because a speaker who plans for the listener to carry the words onward has not entrusted them to the marriage at all. The listener was asked to be a messenger rather than a confidant, so excluding the testimony would protect no marital confidence while withholding relevant evidence. The burden of proving that intent stays where Blau put it, on the government, and the presumption remains in place until facts displace it.42
The Ninth Circuit found the intent to relay in the circumstances of the exchange in United States v. McCown, even though nothing in the record showed that anyone discussed secrecy. Barnes, Jr., had directed two co-defendants, Stewart and Beasley, who lived in the house with him and his wife, to buy a firearm at a pawn shop. The check that paid for it was one his wife, Kelly, had written, and when she was asked at trial who had told her to write it, she answered, "My husband."43 The court held that the privilege did not cover her answer, because the obvious inference was that Barnes, Jr., had directed his wife to write the check and nothing suggested he meant to keep that instruction hidden from Stewart and Beasley.44 The instruction was one link in a plan that put the wife's check into the co-defendants' hands, so a court could infer that the husband expected them to learn where it came from. The same opinion pointed to Grulkey v. United States, where a husband's letter to his wife was not confidential because he knew she had difficulty reading and anticipated that a third person would read it to her. That case draws the same kind of inference from what the speaker knew about the listener's situation.45
The facts of Montgomery look similar on the surface and come out the other way. Mrs. Montgomery wrote her husband a handwritten letter and left it on the kitchen counter of their home. In it she told him that if he could not stop O'Connor, or if the two of them could not stop her together, she would write to O'Connor or talk to her herself, and at trial she testified that she had hoped he would pass that information to his sister, Mary O'Connor.46 The Ninth Circuit held that the government had not rebutted the presumption. A handwritten letter from a wife to her husband, left on the kitchen counter of the couple's home, is the kind of communication likely to be confidential, and unlike in McCown the court could not draw the obvious inference that she understood her request would be transmitted to O'Connor.47 That the letter implored the husband to communicate the substance of her concerns did not make the letter itself non-confidential.48
What separates the two decisions is the object of the speaker's intent, which is a different question from whether some third person figures in the story. Barnes, Jr., gave an instruction whose execution carried his wife's check to the co-defendants, so the instruction itself was going to be seen by the people who mattered to the scheme. Mrs. Montgomery wanted her husband to act on the substance of what she wrote, and nothing required him to reveal that she had written to him or that the request came from her. A message to be acted on differs from a message to be forwarded. The first sends the information outward through the listener's own conduct and leaves the exchange between the spouses private, while the second makes the listener a courier for the speaker's words. The speaker's own testimony that she hoped the substance would travel did not change that in Montgomery, because the hope concerned what her husband might say to his sister and not whether the letter would be shown to her.
The intent that counts is the intent the speaker held when speaking. In State v. Serrano the Oregon Supreme Court held that the communicating spouse's intent governs confidentiality, reasoning that the speaker controls the subject, wording, medium, and audience of a communication and is the spouse positioned to tell the listener not to repeat it.49 An Oregon decision applying the state's evidence code shows how that intent is found: the court looks to the communicating spouse's intent at the time the communication was made, and intent may be inferred from the circumstances.50 The timing point follows from what confidentiality means in any jurisdiction, since the question is what the speaker meant when speaking. In that case the wife left two notes for her husband in the family home, and the notes conveyed, among other things, that she wanted a divorce. She testified that she meant both notes for him alone and consulted no one in writing them, and leaving them in the family home, where the likeliest result was that only he would see them, permitted the court to infer an intent of confidentiality.51
The husband's later conduct in that case drew the same line from the other direction. He spoke to a third person, Preciado, about facts that appeared in the notes, such as that his wife wanted a divorce. Nothing showed he told Preciado that she had communicated those facts to him in notes, and because he merely disclosed the subject matter, the notes stayed privileged.52 (Whether a spouse can give up the privilege by disclosure is the subject of the section on assertion and waiver below.) The distinction between a communication and the facts it concerns, which limits how far the privilege reaches, also limits this rebuttal. A spouse who talks about a topic with others has said little about whether a particular exchange with the other spouse was meant to stay private, and treating that talk as proof would let a later, innocent remark erase a confidence that was real when made.
An exam stem that says a spouse wanted someone else to know something is asking which thing the speaker meant to travel: the words of the exchange, or only the information they carried.
Eavesdroppers and Interception
Blau v. United States makes every communication between spouses presumptively confidential and leaves the government with the burden of overcoming that presumption.55 The two rebuttals taught so far both rest on something the speaker did: bringing an outsider into the exchange, or meaning the words to be passed along. A harder question arises when the speaker did neither and an outsider learns the words anyway, either by overhearing them or by getting hold of a letter after it left the sender's control. Authority on that question is thin and divided, so this subsection separates the points that are reasonably stable from the points a court may resolve either way.
The weight of decision holds that the privilege does not protect against the testimony of a third person who overheard an oral communication between spouses, whether by accident or by eavesdropping, or who learned the contents of a letter through interception, loss, or misdelivery.56 In Williams v. Burks, the court offered a similar idea as one of two alternative grounds: a communication that would otherwise be privileged loses that character when it comes into the hands of a third party.57 The reasoning starts from the cost of the privilege. Because the privilege does nothing except keep relevant evidence from the factfinder, its scope is confined to what reasonable protection of marital communications requires.58 Within that scope the speaker is the person best placed to guard the confidence. A spouse can ordinarily take effective precautions against being overheard and so bears the risk of skipping them, and a spouse who sends a letter by messenger should expect that the messenger may lose it or deliver it to the wrong person.59
The weight of decision also leaves open a prior question: whether the privilege can ever stop an outsider from proving a confidential communication. In Wolfle v. United States the government argued that confidential marital communications are privileged only when a spouse is the witness, so that a third person may prove them freely. The Court said the question remained open in the federal courts and declined to decide it, because the husband's voluntary disclosure to his stenographer already took the communication outside the privilege.60 Some courts applying particular statutes have gone further and held that the statute bars only the examination of a spouse, so that another person may testify to the statements and documents referring to them may be received.61 If the privilege restrains only the spouses, the overhearing cases are easy, because the privilege never reached the outsider. If it reaches every witness, as the usual statement earlier in this chapter has it, the overhearing cases must instead rest on the absence of confidentiality or on loss of the privilege through exposure. Courts have not agreed on which explanation is correct, and an answer on this point should say so.
The two scenes fall on opposite sides of the line that the precaution reasoning draws. Spouses who know that another person could easily hear them can lower their voices or move, and when they carry on regardless, the intent to keep the exchange confidential is missing.62 Surveillance the speakers cannot detect offers no such chance. On the contrasting view, a holder who had no opportunity to claim the privilege before the disclosure occurred is not held to have waived it, and electronic surveillance is the usual example.63 The growth of sophisticated eavesdropping techniques has also led to curbs on their use and on the admissibility of what they yield, and to privilege rules that forbid disclosure by third persons.64 The weight-of-decision language is not limited to ordinary eavesdropping, so a court facing a hidden device could follow either view, and that is the least settled corner of this element. The precaution reasoning weakens in a similar way when one or both spouses are incarcerated, yet jailhouse communications are frequently held unprivileged on the theory that confidentiality was not, and could not be, expected.65
The steadiest point concerns betrayal by the spouse who received the message. Except in jurisdictions that read the privilege as restraining only the spouses' own testimony, most decisions hold that the privilege is not lost when the eavesdropping, or the delivery or disclosure of the letter, results from the betrayal or connivance of the spouse to whom the message was directed.66 The reason runs in short steps. The recipient could not testify to the message in court against the speaker's will. If the recipient could hand the letter to investigators or let a confederate listen in, the recipient would accomplish out of court what the privilege forbids in court, and the speaker's confidence would last only as long as the recipient's loyalty. A recipient who cannot waive the privilege for the speaker should likewise be unable to breach it by giving a third party unauthorized access.67 Wolfle sits on the other side of this line, because there the speaker himself chose to expose the words to the stenographer, while here the recipient exposes them without the speaker's consent.
A letter found among the effects of a deceased recipient has the same structure without any betrayal. The recipient did nothing wrong, and the sender could not have guarded against the discovery. Since most courts hold that the privilege survives the death of a spouse, only a court that reads the rule as restraining the spouses themselves could justify admitting the letter.68 The working question on an exam is therefore who exposed the words and whether the speaker could have prevented it. The speaker's own disclosure defeats confidentiality, a recipient's betrayal does not, and an outsider's overhearing or interception usually does when ordinary precautions were available. Surveillance the speaker could not detect is where the authorities divide.