Concept
Who Holds the Privilege
Marital communications
Who Holds the Privilege
The marital communications privilege bars compelled disclosure of what spouses said to each other in confidence during the marriage, and it is a different privilege from the spousal testimonial privilege.1 A bar of that kind protects nothing until someone invokes it when the question is put, and a holder can give it up. Two practical questions follow once the privilege’s elements are met: who may object, and whose conduct lets the evidence in.
Blau v. United States supplies the starting point on burden. Communications between spouses are presumed confidential, and the government, not the spouse asserting the privilege, must overcome that presumption.2 The holder rules pick up from there. They decide who may claim the privilege and whose conduct releases it, and in federal court they cut against an instinct that students carry over from the testimonial privilege, where, as the chapter explained earlier, the witness-spouse alone decides. A spouse’s willingness to repeat a confidence does not silence the other spouse’s objection.
Both Spouses Hold It
In federal court, either spouse may assert the marital communications privilege to prevent testimony about communications between the spouses. The Ninth Circuit so held in United States v. Montgomery.3 The government offered Mrs. Montgomery’s letter to prove that she had conveyed her suspicions to her husband and that he therefore had notice of his sister’s theft. Its brief stated the purpose plainly: “James Montgomery’s criminal intent was proved by his inaction when confronted by his wife about his sister’s theft from the clients.” The court held that the district court erred in admitting the letter and in allowing the government to ask at trial about the couple’s communications.4
A speaker-only rule had surfaced in the Ninth Circuit’s earlier decision in Figueroa-Paz, and the Montgomery court read that decision narrowly. The waiver in Figueroa-Paz was the defendant’s failure “to object to his wife’s testimony as to his communications when it was offered,” so the case stands for the rule that the privilege is waived if no timely objection is made. Its remark that the communicating spouse alone holds the privilege was nonbinding dictum, because the identity of the holder was not germane to the outcome.5 Figueroa-Paz therefore cannot be cited as a holding for a speaker-only rule.
With that remark set aside, the court weighed the language in Blau, its own decisions since Figueroa-Paz, the decisions of other circuits, and the practice of a majority of the states.6 The state count favored the broader rule. The court found thirty-three states plus the District of Columbia that let the non-communicating spouse invoke the privilege, either outright or on behalf of the communicating spouse.7 Each remaining state either vests the privilege in the communicating spouse or has no clear rule.8
Giving the privilege to both spouses solves a problem of proof. Allowing the communicating spouse to disclose one side of a conversation would eviscerate the privilege, because, in the words of a federal evidence treatise the court quoted, letting each spouse testify to his or her own statements “invites attempts to prove circumstantially the statements of one spouse by proof of what the other had said.”9 Montgomery shows the risk at work, since the government was able to prove circumstantially that the couple had discussed the theft.10 Courts reason the same way about the lawyer-client privilege: a client who knows that damaging information could more readily be obtained from the attorney than from the client would be reluctant to confide.11 The parallel for spouses is close, because a confidence is worth little if the listener can be made to repeat it while the speaker cannot object.
Other privileges often have a single holder. Under the Oregon Evidence Code, the client, the patient, or the penitent alone holds the lawyer-client, psychotherapist-patient, physician-patient, and clergy-penitent privileges, and the court there explained that the professional context makes it sensible for the client’s intent to control whether a communication is confidential.12 Marriage offers no comparable professional setting, which is consistent with giving the privilege to both spouses.
A minority of states vests the privilege in the communicating spouse alone or has no clear rule.13 Even a limited view of the privilege lets the listener claim it in two situations. If the government offers the listener’s silence to show that she adopted the speaker’s statement, the statement and her conduct together become her communication, and she can claim the privilege. If a conversation or an exchange of letters is offered to show the collective expressions of both spouses, either may claim the privilege as to the entire exchange.14
The holder question can arise years after the words were spoken. Statements made during a viable marriage keep their privileged status whatever happens to the relationship afterward, even if the spouses are divorced by the time of trial.15
In a problem that pairs a cooperating spouse with an objecting one, fix the jurisdiction first and then ask which spouse spoke. In federal court the objecting spouse may assert the privilege either way. In a state that vests the privilege in the speaker alone, only the speaker’s wishes count.
Assertion and Waiver
The marital communications privilege shields confidences from compelled disclosure, but a shield works only if someone raises it when the question is put.18 The rules below follow the order of a trial: who may claim the privilege, how a holder loses it, and what conduct leaves it intact.
The privilege belongs to its holders, and a party who is not a holder ordinarily cannot assert it for his own benefit. A holder may act through an agent, either someone the holder expressly authorizes or someone whose authority can fairly be implied, as when a lawyer invokes the attorney-client privilege for the client who holds it.19 Because both spouses hold the marital communications privilege in federal court, either spouse, or an agent for either, may claim it.
When the holder is absent, the law may authorize the presiding judge to invoke the privilege on the holder’s behalf.20 Some jurisdictions give the judge discretion to protect the privilege when the holder is not present to assert it. An objection by a party who is not the holder can prompt that discretion, but the party cannot complain if the judge declines to use it, because the privilege belongs to the absent spouse.21 The limit on standing runs one way. If a judge wrongly sustains a claim of privilege and excludes evidence that is not privileged, the disadvantaged party may object whoever the holder is, and the appellate court can correct the error.22
A holder most often loses the privilege by saying nothing when the evidence is offered. As a general proposition, failure to object promptly and specifically waives a privilege.23 The Ninth Circuit applied that rule to marital confidences in Figueroa-Paz, where the defendant waived the privilege by failing “to object to his wife’s testimony as to his communications when it was offered.”24 Timing matters because the privilege prevents disclosure, and an answer once given cannot be withdrawn.
What a holder reveals outside court can also cost the privilege. An Oregon decision applying the state’s marital communications privilege, OEC 505, measured the defendant’s conduct by whether he had disclosed “a significant part” of his communications to his wife.25 The line it drew runs between the communication and the facts behind it. “Only the communication is privileged, not the holder’s knowledge of the facts,” so a holder may tell third persons the facts without waiving the privilege.26 The defendant told a detective that his truck had broken down and that he had lost his cell phone, but nothing in the record showed that he said he had told his wife those things. He had therefore disclosed no part, “much less ‘a significant part,’” of his communications to her.27
Each spouse holds a privilege of his or her own, so one spouse’s waiver reaches only that spouse. In the Oregon court’s words, “even if one spouse has waived his or her privilege of confidentiality, that choice cannot bind the other spouse.”28 The wife in that case waived her privilege by agreeing to testify for the state, which made her earlier talks with friends and family about her divorce, her affair, and her pregnancy largely irrelevant. As for the defendant, the court declined to find that he had waived the privilege as to his wife’s notes.29
Repeating a confidence to one’s own lawyer does not waive the marital privilege. A wife who told her lawyer what she had earlier told her husband in confidence added one person to those who knew, but the lawyer was bound to keep the information confidential, so the disclosure posed no risk of further repetition. That differs from sharing the information with someone who is free to repeat it.30 The lawyer-client privilege aims to encourage clients to make full disclosure to their attorneys,31 and a rule that stripped marital protection from a consultation would cut against that aim.
Waiver presupposes a privilege that attached. If the exchange was never confidential, there is nothing to waive. The presumption of confidentiality can be overcome by proof that the communications were not intended to be private: a third party’s presence negates the presumption, and so does an intention that the information be transmitted to a third person.32 That inquiry belongs to the confidentiality element, where the burden of overcoming the presumption rests on the government.33
An exam problem on waiver usually describes something a spouse did, said, or failed to say, and asks whether the privilege survived.