Concept
Survival After Death
Attorney-client privilege
Survival After Death
The elements of the privilege describe a communication at the moment it was made: a genuine lawyer-client relationship, a reasonable expectation of privacy, confidentiality preserved afterward, a topic connected with obtaining legal advice, and no plan to commit a crime.1 A lawyer's file can be demanded years later, however, and by then the client who could assert or waive the privilege may have died. Three rules govern that situation. The privilege survives the client. Courts will not weigh a criminal investigation's need for the evidence against it. And the privilege gives way in one setting only: a dispute among persons who claim through the same decedent.
Privilege Outlives the Client
Swidler & Berlin v. United States settled for the federal courts that the attorney-client privilege survives the client's death.2 The case began with a lawyer's notes of a dead man's consultation. Vincent Foster, Deputy White House Counsel, met with the attorney James Hamilton to seek representation in connection with possible investigations of the firing of White House Travel Office employees, and Hamilton took handwritten notes. Nine days later Foster committed suicide. In December 1995 a federal grand jury, at the Independent Counsel's request, subpoenaed the notes, and Hamilton and his firm moved to quash on attorney-client and work-product grounds.3
The district court reviewed the notes in camera, meaning privately in chambers,4 and protected them. The D.C. Circuit disagreed. It thought that posthumous revelation, confined to criminal cases, would chill client communication little or not at all, while the costs of protecting communications after death were high. It therefore held the privilege not absolute after death and applied a balancing test, under which communications whose relative importance to particular criminal litigation is substantial must be disclosed.5 The Supreme Court reversed.6 Because it sustained the attorney-client claim, it did not reach work-product protection.7
The Court began with Rule 501, which tells federal courts to apply “the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience.” That directive does not make an established rule endure for all time.8 But the great body of case law supports survival, by holding or by considered dicta, so the burden fell on the Independent Counsel to show that reason and experience require a departure from the rule.9 The testamentary-exception cases make the case law's assumption plain. They permit disclosure of a dead client's communications in litigation among heirs, yet they call the disclosure an “exception” or an implied “waiver,” and in Glover v. Patten the Supreme Court recognized the exception while expressly assuming that the privilege continues after the individual's death.10 An exception presupposes a rule that would otherwise apply.
The Independent Counsel did not carry his burden. The arguments against survival were thoughtful but rested largely on speculation about whether ending the privilege at death would reduce a client's willingness to confide, and the empirical information was scant and inconclusive.11
The privilege survives because a client decides what to say before anyone knows who will later want to hear it. Confidence that communications will stay confidential after death encourages full and frank disclosure, and the Court declined to assume that a client's fear of disclosure ends at death, even if disclosure were limited to criminal cases: clients may worry about reputation, civil liability, or harm to friends and family.12 The Court was persuaded that if the privilege ended with the client, at least some clients would be inhibited in speaking to counsel.13 The Foster facts illustrate the point. The Court thought it quite plausible that Foster, perhaps already contemplating suicide, would not have sought Hamilton's advice without an assurance that the conversation was privileged.14 If so, the evidence the prosecutor wanted might never have existed.
The Independent Counsel answered with an analogy to the Fifth Amendment. Posthumous disclosure would chill only a client who planned to lie, he argued, because an honest client would reveal the same information while alive. The Court rejected the premise because the attorney-client privilege serves broader purposes. Clients consult lawyers for many reasons, only one of which is possible criminal liability. Lawyers who counsel on personal and family matters, and small-business owners who consult about the problems of the business, reveal confidences about relatives and finances that come nowhere near an admission of crime but that the client would not wish divulged.15
Protecting the notes does not make the underlying events secret. The privilege does not protect disclosure of the underlying facts by those who communicated with the attorney,16 so witnesses who know what happened can still be questioned about it.
Survival preserves only a privilege that attached in the first place.
Because a dead client cannot speak, the executor or another proper successor in interest claims the privilege.17 The client's absence does not put the claim beyond review. If a trial judge erroneously upholds a privilege claim and excludes evidence that is not privileged, the party denied the evidence can object whoever the holder is, and an appellate court can correct the error by holding the privilege inapplicable.18
A stem that pairs a deceased client with a prosecutor's subpoena tests whether death ends the privilege, and it does not. The tempting wrong answer borrows the court of appeals' reasoning that a dead client has less to lose, and the next subsection explains why the Supreme Court refused to adopt it.
No Balancing Test
The Independent Counsel presented the posthumous exception as modest. It would apply only in criminal cases or, as the court of appeals framed it, only to information of substantial importance to a particular criminal case.20 The Supreme Court rejected both versions for a reason that turns on timing. A client deciding what to tell a lawyer cannot know whether the information will later be relevant to a civil or a criminal matter, let alone whether it will be of substantial importance. Balancing after the fact therefore introduces substantial uncertainty into the privilege, and for that reason the Court had already refused to use a balancing test in defining the privilege's contours in Upjohn and in Jaffee v. Redmond.21
A privilege whose protection depends on how a judge later rates the information gives the client nothing to rely on while speaking, and a client who cannot rely on secrecy will hold back the facts the lawyer most needs. The danger concentrates where the stakes are highest, because the graver the matter, the likelier a court is to rate it important years later.
Limiting the exception to criminal cases cures none of this. The Court found no case authority that the privilege applies differently in criminal and civil cases, and only one commentator ventures the suggestion.22 The limit would also be applied after the fact, by the same judges weighing the same interests, so it restores the unpredictability it was meant to reduce.
The Independent Counsel next argued that the privilege already has exceptions, the crime-fraud exception among them, so one more would change little. The majority answered that the established exceptions fit the privilege's purposes, while a posthumous exception in criminal cases appears at odds with the goals of encouraging full and frank communication and protecting the client's interests. A “no harm in one more exception” rationale, it added, could erode the privilege without reference to common-law principles or “reason and experience.”23 The empirical evidence gave the Independent Counsel no help in carrying his burden, because the available studies reach no firm conclusion on whether limiting the privilege would discourage full and frank communication.24
His third argument invoked the principle that privileges are strictly construed because they burden the search for truth. He relied on United States v. Nixon and Branzburg v. Hayes. The Court answered that those cases concerned creating privileges the common law had not recognized, while this case involved one of the oldest privileges in the law. He was asking the Court to narrow that privilege against the weight of existing authority, and he had not made a sufficient showing to overturn the common-law rule.25
Justice O'Connor, dissenting, would have made the privilege yield in a narrow band of criminal cases. She began from the premise that privileges burden the search for truth, are not favored, and are construed narrowly.26 She then weighed two things that change at death. The risk to the client diminishes, while the need for the evidence grows more urgent. The privilege does not protect the underlying facts, and a prosecutor could immunize a living client and compel the testimony. Once the client has died, though, a privilege that silences the lawyer often means a complete loss of crucial information.27
Her remedy was a conditional balancing inquiry. When the privilege is asserted in a criminal case and a showing is made that the communications contain necessary factual information not otherwise available, courts should assess whether fairness and accuracy outweigh the privilege's justifications. Her paradigm case was a criminal defendant seeking a deceased client's confession to the charged offense, where she thought absolute protection would work extreme injustice, and she added that a compelling law enforcement need might also justify an exception.28
She also disputed the majority's account of the existing exceptions. The testamentary exception can expose confidences a decedent would have preferred to keep, such as an undisclosed relationship, so the majority's concern for family confidences applies there equally.29 The crime-fraud exception and the exceptions for claims about attorney competence or compensation, she added, are not necessarily consistent with encouraging full and frank communication or protecting the client's interests.30 She would have affirmed the court of appeals and its remand, because the district court had examined the notes in camera but had never balanced the competing considerations.31
The majority left one narrow question open. The petitioners, while opposing wholesale abrogation of the privilege in criminal cases, conceded that exceptional circumstances implicating a criminal defendant's constitutional rights might warrant breaching it, and the Court said it did not need to decide the issue because no such circumstances were present.32 The question survives only in that form, since the Independent Counsel's general claim of prosecutorial need lost. A defendant's right to present a defense gives the argument some footing, but that right does not override all evidence rules that restrict what defendants can do.33
The refusal to balance should not be carried into waiver law. When a lawyer-client communication is disclosed by mistake, the commentary to the federal rule lists non-dispositive factors: the reasonableness of the precautions taken, the time taken to rectify the error, the scope of discovery, the extent of disclosure, and the overriding issue of fairness.34 Those factors ask whether an existing privilege was lost through a particular disclosure, a question taken up later in this chapter. Swidler asks a different one: whether a privilege that attached still exists after the client's death.
A stem that pairs a deceased client, a grand jury, and a prosecutor who calls the notes critical presents the facts Swidler decided. The privilege holds, and no balancing is permitted. A stem about a defendant who wants a dead client's confession falls within the situation the majority reserved, so state the majority rule, identify the reserved constitutional question, and treat the dissent as the minority view it is.
Testamentary Exception
The one recognized limit on survival comes from the same cases that establish survival. Courts treat disclosure of a decedent's communications in litigation among heirs as an exception or an implied waiver, which presupposes a privilege still in force, and in Glover v. Patten the Supreme Court recognized the exception while expressly assuming that the privilege continues after death.38 The exception covers a communication relevant to an issue between parties who claim through the same deceased client, whether the claims arise by testate or intestate succession or by a transaction during the client's life.39
The operative word is through. Every claimant traces an entitlement to the same person: one group claims under the will, another by intestacy, a third under a gift made before death. These are disputes among insiders, and in them a claim of privilege by the executor or other successor, such as next of kin, is rejected. Relevant communications otherwise within the privilege are subject to disclosure.40
The reason for the exception is the client's presumed intent. The privilege ordinarily protects the client's interests, but it may be impliedly waived to fulfill the client's testamentary intent.41 The law assumes that the deceased would probably approve of ending the privilege, because the resulting evidence will shed light on the distribution of property the client favored.42 The assumption operates by category and does not require proof about this client. The Swidler dissent observed that the exception can therefore reach confidences a decedent would not have chosen to waive, such as a wish to provide for an illegitimate child without disclosing the relationship.43
The same reason marks the exception's edge. The Independent Counsel argued by analogy from the testamentary exception that a client's privilege should likewise end at death when the evidence matters to a criminal investigation. The Court replied that his reading did not square with the case law's implicit acceptance of survival or with its treatment of testamentary disclosure as an exception or an implied waiver. His analogy also failed on its own premise, because the cases consistently justify the exception by the client's intent, and there is no reason to suppose as a general matter that grand jury testimony about confidential communications furthers that intent.44 A grand jury is not a party claiming through the client, and nothing in its inquiry carries out a wish the client held about property. The usual exam error reads the exception as a general rule that the privilege yields whenever a later proceeding needs the evidence.
The statutory versions draw the same line. About half the States have codified the exception by allowing the personal representative of the deceased to waive the privilege when heirs or devisees claim through the deceased client, but not when parties claim against the estate.45 The representative who would otherwise assert the privilege for the dead client is thus the person who waives it in the insider dispute, because the executor or other successor in interest holds the privilege in the client's place.46 The Uniform Rules of Evidence reach the same result by listing, among the exceptions, a communication relevant to an issue between parties who claim through the same deceased client.47