Concept
Anticipation of Litigation
Work-product protection
Anticipation of Litigation
Every protection discussed so far hangs on one qualifying phrase. In Hickman, a party sought a lawyer’s written witness statements and mental impressions without any showing of necessity or hardship, and the lawyer had taken those statements “with an eye toward the anticipated litigation.”1 Rule 26(b)(3) carries the phrase forward as the first condition of protection: work product consists of “documents and tangible things that are prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or its representative.”2 The party resisting discovery must show that the phrase applies,3 and it must do so before the court reaches substantial need and undue hardship.4 An item that fails the phrase receives no work-product protection, however carefully a lawyer handled it, and the ordinary rules of discovery govern.
The difficulty is that almost any serious accident or dispute might end in a lawsuit, and everyone who writes about the event afterward knows it. Courts note that almost every business activity carries a potential for litigation, and that routine use of counsel’s input on that potential should not cloak otherwise routine business documents with protection.5 The doctrine protects something narrower: each side’s informal evaluation of its own case, each side’s independent preparation, and each side’s detailed preparatory work against automatic use by the other.6 Courts therefore ask how a document came to exist, not whether someone could have foreseen a suit.
This unit first asks when litigation counts as anticipated. It then turns to what links a document to that prospect: the because-of test that most circuits apply, the narrower primary-purpose test, and the screen that removes ordinary business records.
Litigation Need Not Be Pending
Hickman answers the timing question on its own facts. Fortenbaugh took the survivors’ signed statements on March 29 “with an eye toward the anticipated litigation,” when representatives of two of the deceased crew members were already in communication with him. Claims were eventually presented for all five of the deceased, four were settled without litigation, and the one claimant who sued did not file until November 26, 1943.7 The protected preparation therefore came after claims arose and months before any complaint existed.
Rule 26(b)(3) keeps that timing. Some earlier decisions attached significance to whether a document was obtained before or after litigation began, but that emphasis cannot be sound, because prudent parties anticipate litigation and begin preparing before an action is formally commenced.8 A rule keyed to the filing of a complaint would also leave the earliest preparation open to demand while it is being done, which discourages the independent preparation the Rule is meant to encourage.9
Hickman had a lawsuit in mind, yet the litigation that must be anticipated can include any form of adversary process, including an investigatory subpoena from a grand jury or an administrative agency.10 The grand jury setting shows the timing principle at its sharpest, since an inquiry begins before any indictment. In In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 473 F.2d 840 (8th Cir. 1973), the Eighth Circuit stated the test directly: the question is “not whether litigation has begun but whether documents were prepared or obtained in anticipation of litigation.”11
The other half of the phrase supplies the limit: some real prospect of an adversary proceeding involving the party claiming protection must exist. In In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910 (8th Cir. 1997), the White House claimed work-product protection for its lawyers’ notes. The court assumed, for argument, that the White House anticipated a congressional investigation of itself and not merely of the individuals who worked there, and it even assumed that such an investigation was adversarial. The only harm that investigation could bring was political harm, and the court declined to endorse the claim “where it is based on nothing more than political concerns.”12 Fear of political fallout does not turn a lawyer’s notes into work product.
A consultation held when nothing adversarial is on the horizon falls on the same side of the line. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, a lawyer’s recollections of an April 2008 consultation were not work product. No litigation was on the horizon, the investigation that led to the grand jury began nearly two years later, and the consultation took place in the ordinary course of a business transaction.13 Work product prepared in the course of business, the court added, is not immune from discovery.14
A memo written during a disagreement over a contract’s meaning raises the same doubt when no one has threatened suit or retained counsel to file one. The parties were simply at odds over interpretation, a very common commercial occurrence, so there is a very substantial question whether the memo was prepared in anticipation of litigation.15 Hickman’s lawyer, by contrast, was already in contact with the claimants’ representatives.16
Courts agree that some prospect of an adversary proceeding is required, but they differ on how concrete it must be. Some insist on a showing that, when the material was created, there was an identifiable prospect of particular litigation in the near future.17 Others reject a specific-claim requirement as too narrow. In In re Sealed Case, 146 F.3d 881 (D.C. Cir. 1998), the court reasoned that lawyers do much of their most useful work before any claim emerges, as when they advise potential grand jury targets or weigh the legal risks of business decisions, and that a lawyer who knew such notes were unprotected would not risk writing them. Where lawyers claim they advised clients about the risks of potential litigation, the absence of a specific claim is just one factor for the court to weigh.18
Whichever formula a court uses, two kinds of proof matter. The first concerns purpose: what the document says, including whether it refers to prospective litigation, and the usual role of counsel, particularly where only in-house counsel was involved. The second concerns likelihood, meaning whether an identifiable prospect of particular litigation existed in the near future.19 Courts also ask whether the same document most likely would have been prepared apart from any concern about potential litigation,20 and the next subsection builds a test on that question.
The Because-Of Test
United States v. Adlman supplies the working test for the anticipation requirement. The Second Circuit held that a document created because of anticipated litigation, which tends to reveal mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or theories about that litigation, does not lose work-product protection merely because it is also intended to help make a business decision influenced by the litigation’s likely outcome.23 The court asked whether, “in light of the nature of the document and the factual situation in the particular case, the document can fairly be said to have been prepared or obtained because of the prospect of litigation,” the formulation of the Wright & Miller treatise that the Third, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits had already cited.24 Many circuits apply this because-of test today.25 The previous subsection asked whether litigation was a real prospect. This test asks whether that prospect is the reason the document exists.
Sequa Corporation planned to merge two wholly owned subsidiaries in a restructuring expected to generate a large loss and a tax refund, and its vice president for taxes expected the IRS to challenge the refund and litigation to follow. He asked Sequa’s outside accountants, Arthur Andersen, to evaluate the tax consequences, and the result was a 58-page memorandum that analyzed the likely IRS challenges, proposed legal theories for responding, recommended how to structure the transaction, and predicted the outcome of litigation.26 Sequa completed the restructuring in essentially the recommended form, claimed a $289 million loss, and sought a $35 million refund.27 When the IRS summoned the memorandum, Sequa invoked work-product protection. The district court’s language suggests it denied the claim because the memorandum’s primary purpose was to decide whether to go through with a multimillion dollar transaction.28 The question for the Second Circuit was whether an analysis of expected litigation loses protection because it also informs a business decision.
The court answered no, and its reasoning rests on what the doctrine protects. Take a publisher that has received a threat of suit from a competitor claiming exclusive publication rights and asks its attorneys to evaluate the chances of success and the available legal strategies before deciding whether to publish. If the publisher goes ahead and is sued, the “primarily to assist in litigation” formulation would hand that study to the competitor’s lawyers, because its principal purpose was to inform the publication decision rather than to assist in litigation.29 Companies in that position would face an untenable choice. They could scrimp on candor and completeness and decide in the dark, or they could write a frank study of their strengths and weaknesses that cannot be turned over to litigation adversaries without serious prejudice.30
The memorandum’s timing raised no obstacle. Sequa commissioned it before the restructuring occurred, so the litigation depended on a business decision not yet made, but the court had already said that no rule bars protection for documents created before the event giving rise to litigation.31 Under the because-of approach, that contingency is not critical if the document would not have been created but for the possibility of litigation.32
The same formulation also screens documents out. It withholds protection from documents prepared in the ordinary course of business and from documents that would have been created in essentially similar form irrespective of the litigation. Such a document stays unprotected even if it might also help in preparing for litigation, because it could not fairly be said to have been created because of actual or impending litigation.33 The working question is the one the court posed for Sequa’s memorandum: would it have been prepared irrespective of the expected litigation?34
The remand instruction shows both outcomes from one set of facts. There was little doubt that Sequa had the prospect of litigation in mind when it directed the memorandum’s preparation, so the case turned on that single question.35 If substantially the same memorandum would have been prepared in any event, as part of the ordinary course of undertaking the restructuring, the court was to hold that it was not prepared because of the expected litigation and adhere to its ruling denying protection. If the memorandum would not have been prepared but for Sequa’s anticipation of litigation with the IRS over the losses, judgment was to be entered for Sequa.36 The same pages could land on either side of the line, depending on whether they owe their existence to the IRS dispute or to the routine work of carrying out a restructuring.
The forklift hypothetical sorts the same way. The incident form and the repair write-up exist whatever lawsuits loom, since the company would have created them in essentially similar form after any accident, so they fail the screen even though they might help the defense. Outside counsel’s exposure memorandum exists only because the worker threatened suit, so it passes.
The third step does the work, because the first two are shared by nearly every document written after a serious incident. Litigation was likely in Sequa’s restructuring and in the forklift injury alike, and the documents separate only on whether the prospect of suit explains why they exist.
Passing the test makes a document eligible for protection and does not by itself place it beyond discovery.37 The court then asks whether the requester has shown substantial need and an inability to obtain the contents elsewhere without undue hardship. It may order production of the portions for which that showing is made, and it keeps the authority to shield the party’s mental impressions, strategies, and analyses.38 Adlman followed that sequence. The memorandum was the technical and legal analysis of outside accountants and did not reflect Sequa’s own business reason for restructuring, and the IRS made no showing beyond bare assertion that the information was unavailable by other means, which fell far short of the heightened showing Upjohn requires.39 Later sections take up need, hardship, and opinion work product.
The Primary-Purpose Test
Adlman identified two formulations for documents prepared because of expected litigation but meant to inform a business decision. Some courts ask whether the document was prepared “primarily or exclusively to assist in litigation,” which would potentially exclude analysis of expected litigation whenever its primary, ultimate, or exclusive purpose is to inform the business decision. Others ask whether it was prepared “because of” existing or expected litigation, which would include that analysis.41 The narrower formulation traces to the Fifth Circuit, which said in United States v. Davis that the Rule applies only if the “primary motivating purpose behind the creation of the document was to aid in possible future litigation.”42 Adlman noted that Davis itself denied protection to documents made in preparing a tax return, a result well justified because nothing showed any anticipation of litigation, and it called the primary-purpose statement dictum, a remark beyond what the case needed to decide.43
The narrower test answers a real worry. Because almost every business activity carries a potential for litigation, a rule that protected whatever was written with a suit in mind would sweep in ordinary corporate paper.44 Asking for the dominant purpose screens that paper out: if the dominant reason a document exists is something the business would pursue anyway, the document looks like any other business record, even if a lawyer reads it. The cost is that a lawyer’s candid analysis of coming litigation can lose protection when the same pages also inform a business decision.45
The Fifth Circuit’s decision in United States v. El Paso Co. shows that cost. A large corporation sought to shield documents analyzing the liabilities that might result from IRS litigation over its tax returns, but it had prepared them to establish and justify reserves in its financial statements. Treating the Davis statement as law, the court held that the primary motivating force was to bring the company’s books into conformity with generally accepted auditing principles and that the liability analysis was “only a means to a business end,” so the documents received no protection. The documents plainly discussed expected litigation and lost anyway, because the controlling question was which purpose predominated. A Fifth Circuit judge writing for the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals later applied the same requirement in United States v. Gulf Oil Corp.46
A court cannot read an author’s mind, so it infers the dominant purpose from the circumstances.47 Relevant circumstances include the document’s content, such as whether it refers to prospective litigation, and the usual role of counsel in producing it.48
The fourth step usually decides the dispute, since documents prepared for an ordinary business purpose or to fulfill regulatory requirements do not ordinarily qualify.49
Two documents show the contrast. A car manufacturer’s design division routinely compiles a statistical summary of dealer repair invoices to spot design defects and correct them in future models.50 The summary might help the manufacturer’s lawyers resist injury suits, but usefulness in litigation cannot be the test, because anything that could serve as evidence would also help in preparing for litigation. The summary exists to correct defects, so under the primary-purpose approach it stays unprotected even if one reason for preparing it was to help the general counsel. A plaintiff who writes out a chronology of the events leading to his accident at his lawyer’s request, and labels it work product, stands on the other side of the line. He would not have prepared it but for the possibility of suing, nothing else explains its existence, and the label is circumstantial evidence of that motive without being dispositive, so the chronology qualifies under any test.51 The two differ in the one fact this test cares about: the summary has a business reason that would exist without any lawsuit, and the chronology has none.
A railroad shows how routine moves the answer. The railroad requires the engineer of every train involved in any accident to file an immediate report on a form its lawyers designed, with copies going to the operating division, the insurance department, and the general counsel. After a crossing collision, the injured driver asks for the report. The report serves business purposes beyond the expected suit, namely fixing dangerous crossings and identifying negligent engineers, and most courts deny protection to routine accident reports for such reasons: accident prevention, insurance planning, and employee monitoring.52 A jurisdiction that adopts the primary-purpose test should treat the report as unprotected.53
Adlman rejected the narrower approach on the Rule’s own terms. The Rule protects documents prepared “for trial” and also those prepared “in anticipation of litigation,” and the second phrase must name a different and broader category, because drafters who meant to protect only documents made to assist in preparing for litigation would have been satisfied with the first. Nothing in the Rule suggests that documents prepared in anticipation of litigation to assist in a business decision fall outside it.54 The Rule also gives special protection to a representative’s opinions and legal theories about litigation, and it would oddly undermine that protection to exclude such documents merely because they were prepared to assist in a business decision expected to result in the litigation.55 Under the IRS’s standard, documents assessing the strengths and weaknesses of a case, or the likelihood and expected cost of settlement, would lose protection whenever they were prepared for a business purpose, a result the court called unwarranted.56
The conflict remains live. In United States v. Textron, the First Circuit, sitting en banc, held that attorneys’ assessments of the risks of the company’s tax filing positions were not protected, even though the company’s auditors argued the material was necessary because litigation might result over those positions. The majority said the privilege is “aimed at protecting work done for litigation, not in preparing financial statements.” The dissenting judges argued that the right question is whether the materials were prepared because of the prospect of litigation, not for litigation, and that the materials met that test. The Supreme Court denied certiorari, which leaves the conflict among the circuits in place.57 Summaries of the split describe the Fifth Circuit’s standard as arguably narrower than the because-of test, so that reports commonly created for business purposes are less likely to be protected, and describe the First Circuit as asking how remote litigation was.58
That divergence is why the choice of test can decide an exam problem. A document prepared only to help with a suit, like the chronology, is protected under either approach, and a routine business record, like the repair summary, fails under both. The contested ground lies between them, where an analysis of expected litigation also informs a business decision. A complete answer states the because-of test as the approach many circuits apply, states the primary-purpose test as the narrower rival, and runs the document through each.
Ordinary Business Documents
The Advisory Committee’s note to Rule 26(b)(3) states the limit plainly: “Materials assembled in the ordinary course of business ... are not under the qualified immunity provided by this subdivision.”61 Four kinds of records most often test that limit: accident reports, insurers’ claim files, filings that a regulation requires, and internal investigations.
A party might try to shelter routine files by copying counsel on them, or by observing that commercial transactions often end up in court. Accepting that argument would let the exception for trial-preparation materials swallow the rule of broad access to relevant information.62 Courts therefore ask why the document came to exist. A record the business would have made whatever the discovery rules say is not the product of private preparation for litigation.
Routine accident reports are the standard example. Most courts deny them protection because they serve accident prevention, insurance planning, and employee monitoring.63 In Wainwright v. Washington Metropolitan Transit Authority, 163 F.R.D. 391 (D.D.C. 1995), the court compelled disclosure of an escalator company’s accident report and a transit authority’s escalator testing report because each was a routine business report.64 In Soeder v. General Dynamics Corp., 90 F.R.D. 253 (D. Nev. 1980), the court conceded that any aircraft accident carries the contingency of litigation, yet it observed that the manufacturer also wanted to improve its aircraft, protect future pilots and passengers, avoid adverse publicity, and secure future contracts, so an in-house crash report could hardly be said to fall outside the ordinary course of business.65 Litigation is a contingency from the moment of an accident, and a report may help counsel prepare, but neither fact answers whether the report was created because of litigation.
The railroad’s crossing-collision report fits the pattern. The railroad requires an immediate report after any accident, so the report would exist in much the same form whether or not a particular collision led to suit. The lawyer-designed form and the copy to the general counsel do not change that, because the report also goes to the operating division and the insurance department and serves the business aims of fixing dangerous crossings and identifying negligent engineers.66
Insurers present the same question with a timing twist. Insurers earn their living by deciding whether and how much to pay on claims, so an adjuster’s initial report is prepared primarily to carry out that ordinary business, and many courts deny it protection under either test.67 Once the insurer denies coverage, the claimant’s only recourse is a suit, so litigation is more clearly imminent, and a second report prepared after the denial is likely to have been prepared primarily in anticipation of that suit, which is why some courts protect it.68 The insurer is a named representative of the party in both settings, so preparer status does not separate the reports. The first would have been written in substantially the same form whether or not a suit followed, and the second exists because of the dispute the denial created.
A document the law compels a party to prepare is the clearest case. When regulatory law requires a party to create a document, the document cannot be said to have been prepared primarily in anticipation of litigation, because it was prepared to conduct business in compliance with that law, and absent a claim of privilege the party should produce it.69 Even a document written by or to a lawyer is not work product unless it was prepared at least partly in anticipation of litigation, so a document drawn up to comply with a statute or government regulation is not covered.70
Internal investigations test the screen differently, because they have an obvious business purpose, which is to find and correct improper practices, and in many industries some are routine, as accident reviews are. Placing every one under the work-product shield would be excessive. An investigation earns protection when concern for litigation shaped it, so that its content went beyond what an investigation designed simply for business purposes would contain.71 The Third Circuit applied the same principle to a lawyer’s recollections of a consultation held in the ordinary course of a business transaction, stating that work product prepared in the course of business is not immune from discovery.72
The boundary invites argument on both sides, and an exam answer should voice both. A power company’s legal staff writes a memorandum on the company’s possible liability for nuclear accidents after a minor accident at another company’s plant but before any accident of its own. The memorandum will probably be held to have been prepared in anticipation of litigation, but a resident who sues after the company’s later radiation release can plausibly argue that the company anticipated no particular suit when it wrote the memorandum, so that it reads as risk management rather than trial preparation.73
Failing the work-product test neither leaves a document wholly exposed nor makes it evidence. A document prepared to comply with a statute or regulation may still be covered by the attorney-client privilege, which asks its own questions.74 A court may also curtail discovery to protect a person from embarrassment or oppression, and a “semi-privilege” appears to be evolving to shield information that would invade the privacy of people who are not parties to the action.75 And discoverability is a separate question from admissibility: information within the scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.76