Concept
Jaffee Facts and Holding
Physician/psychotherapist-patient
Jaffee Facts and Holding
Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996), is the case in which the Supreme Court used Rule 501 to recognize a federal psychotherapist-patient privilege. The Court has said that Rule 501 "manifested an affirmative intention not to freeze the law of privilege," and that it was meant to give courts "the flexibility to develop rules of privilege on a case-by-case basis."1 Jaffee applied that flexibility to a concrete question: were a police officer's statements to her therapist after a shooting protected from compelled disclosure in a federal civil suit brought by the family of the man she killed?2 The Court held that they were, and that the privilege reaches licensed social workers and applies without case-by-case balancing.3 Each fact in the case (a licensed clinical social worker, months of confidential treatment, a civil plaintiff who wanted the notes for cross-examination) returns when the elements and exceptions come up later in this chapter, so the story runs in the order it unfolded.
On June 27, 1991, Mary Lu Redmond, a police officer in Hoffman Estates, Illinois, was the first to answer a call about a fight in progress at an apartment complex. Two of Ricky Allen's sisters ran toward her squad car shouting that someone had been stabbed. Redmond testified that several men ran out of the building, followed by two more, with Allen chasing the other while he brandished a butcher knife, and that she shot Allen when she believed he was about to stab the man he was pursuing. Allen died at the scene. The administrator of his estate sued Redmond and the Village of Hoffman Estates in federal court, alleging excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and wrongful death under Illinois law. Allen's family told a different story: Redmond drew her gun before she left her squad car, and Allen was unarmed when he came out of the building.4
That disagreement over what happened is why the counseling mattered. In discovery the family learned that Redmond had attended about fifty counseling sessions with Karen Beyer after the shooting. Beyer was a clinical social worker licensed by Illinois and employed by the Village.5 According to the Seventh Circuit, Redmond first met Beyer three or four days after the shooting and kept going two or three times a week through at least January 1992, roughly six months later.6 The family wanted Beyer's notes to cross-examine Redmond, because notes of what an officer said about the incident in the following weeks promised material for testing her account at trial.7
Redmond and the Village resisted and asserted a psychotherapist-patient privilege, and the district judge rejected it.8 The Seventh Circuit reports that the judge believed the privilege other circuits had recognized did not reach a licensed clinical social worker, even though an Illinois statute expressly extends the privilege to social workers.9 Neither Redmond nor Beyer complied with the order to disclose. At her final deposition session and again at trial, Redmond answered most questions about the sessions with "I don't recall." Beyer refused to reveal anything beyond Redmond's factual description of the events leading up to the shooting and produced only three pages of redacted notes.10
The refusal cost them at trial. The judge told the jury that the refusal to turn over Beyer's notes had no "legal justification" and that the jury could therefore presume the notes would have been unfavorable to Redmond and the Village. The jury awarded $45,000 on the federal claim and $500,000 on the state-law claim.11 That instruction is why the existence of the privilege decided the case. It assumed the refusal was unjustified, and a recognized privilege supplies exactly the justification the judge said was missing. A patient also has to be able to rely on a privilege before she speaks, so a rule that treats withheld notes as presumptively damaging would punish the holder for asserting it and shield nothing in practice.
The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded for a new trial. It treated the question as one of first impression and concluded that "reason and experience," the touchstones for accepting a privilege under Rule 501, required a psychotherapist-patient privilege.12 In support, it noted that all fifty states had adopted some form of the privilege and that Illinois law expressly extends it to social workers like Beyer. The court then qualified its holding: the privilege would not apply if, in the interests of justice, the evidentiary need for the contents of the counseling sessions outweighed the patient's privacy interests. Applying that balance, it found the need for Beyer's notes diminished because numerous eyewitnesses had seen the shooting, found Redmond's privacy interests substantial, and concluded that the trial court should have protected the communications.13
The courts of appeals had split on whether any such privilege exists. The Second and Sixth Circuits had held that reason and experience compel a psychotherapist privilege in civil and criminal cases. The Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits had rejected it, each reading Rule 501 as limiting new privileges to those the common law already recognized.14 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict and affirmed.15 The refusing circuits' premise, that Rule 501 freezes privileges at their common-law boundaries, cannot survive the Court's statement that the Rule "manifested an affirmative intention not to freeze the law of privilege."16
The Court held that confidential communications between a licensed psychotherapist and her patient in the course of diagnosis or treatment are protected from compelled disclosure under Rule 501. It reached that result because it agreed with the state legislatures and the Advisory Committee that such a privilege serves a "public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth."17 The rationale ties the holding to the cost-benefit framework from earlier in this chapter. A privilege withholds evidence, so it needs a public benefit large enough to outweigh that loss. Here the benefit lies in the fact that psychotherapy is valuable to individuals and society and cannot be performed effectively unless the patient can count on confidentiality.18 The holding names three conditions: a licensed psychotherapist, a confidential communication, and the course of diagnosis or treatment. The later sections on the elements take each in turn.
The Court then turned to Beyer's license, which the trial judge had treated as disqualifying. Everyone agrees that the privilege covers confidential communications to licensed psychiatrists and psychologists, and the Court extended it to licensed social workers in the course of psychotherapy because the reasons for the privilege apply with equal force to a clinical social worker.19 Those reasons are concrete. Social workers provide a significant amount of mental health treatment, and their clients often include the poor and those of modest means who could not afford a psychiatrist or psychologist but whose sessions serve the same public goals. The vast majority of states already extended a testimonial privilege to licensed social workers.20 A privilege limited to costly providers would give a patient of modest means less protection for the same conversation. The Court therefore agreed with the Seventh Circuit that "[d]rawing a distinction between the counseling provided by costly psychotherapists and the counseling provided by more readily accessible social workers serves no discernible public purpose."21
The Supreme Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit's judgment but did not adopt that court's balancing qualification. The privilege it recognized applies without weighing the public's need for information in a particular case against the social value of encouraging psychotherapy.22 The reason is practical. A patient deciding whether to speak candidly in the first session cannot know how a judge will someday weigh a litigant's need, so a privilege that dissolves on a sufficient showing of need offers little assurance at the moment assurance matters. Beyond that holding, Rule 501's case-by-case design leaves the questions of who qualifies, what is confidential, and when the privilege yields to later decisions, which the sections on exceptions and waiver take up.23
The usual exam error is to treat the emotional content of a statement as what triggers the privilege, when the privilege follows the listener and the purpose of the conversation.
The two conversations carry the same emotion and the same subject, so the difference lies entirely in the listener and the setting. Jaffee's own facts fall on the protected side, which is why the instruction presuming that the withheld notes were unfavorable could not stand once the privilege was recognized.