Concept
Reasoning Behind Jaffee
Physician/psychotherapist-patient
Reasoning Behind Jaffee
Jaffee did not hold that therapy deserves protection simply because therapy matters. It asked the question that governs any request for a new federal privilege: whether the privilege “promotes sufficiently important interests to outweigh the need for probative evidence.” Both “reason and experience,” the Court concluded, persuade that it does.1 The question carries a burden, because testimonial privileges, in the dissent’s words, “are not lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth.”2
The Court’s answer has three strands, and this section takes them in order. The first weighs interests: what effective therapy gives the patient and the public, set against the evidence a privilege withholds. The second looks outside the case for confirmation in what the States and the Advisory Committee had already concluded. The third is Justice Scalia’s dissent, which attacked both the result and the way the majority reached it.
The strands answer different questions and work as one argument. The first shows that the privilege is worth having, the second shows that the legal system’s own experience agrees, and the third tests both conclusions against the best case for refusing. The same three steps organize any exam question asking whether a federal court should recognize a privilege for another counselor or confidant.
Private and Public Interests
Jaffee set three considerations against one another: the patient’s private interest in confidence, the public’s interest in mental health, and the evidence a privilege would withhold. The Court judged the first two substantial and the third modest.3 The paragraphs below take them in turn and then answer the objection that the privilege’s benefit cannot be proved.
The private interest starts from how the two kinds of treatment differ. A physician treating a physical ailment can often succeed on the basis of an examination, objective information supplied by the patient, and diagnostic tests. Effective psychotherapy, by contrast, “depends upon an atmosphere of confidence and trust in which the patient is willing to make a frank and complete disclosure of facts, emotions, memories, and fears.” The Court therefore placed the psychotherapist privilege beside the spousal and attorney-client privileges, which are likewise “rooted in the imperative need for confidence and trust.”4
Sensitive subject matter makes that confidence fragile. Because of “the sensitive nature of the problems for which individuals consult psychotherapists,” disclosure of what was said in counseling “may cause embarrassment or disgrace,” and “the mere possibility of disclosure may impede development of the confidential relationship necessary for successful treatment.”5 The word “possibility” carries the argument. A patient need not expect a lawsuit to hold back; it is enough that the sessions could surface in one, and then the safe course is to withhold the detail most likely to embarrass. The therapist is left treating a patient who has not fully appeared.
Stigma sharpens the effect. A dissent in Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California observed that without substantial assurance of confidentiality, people who need treatment will be deterred from seeking it, because people seeking psychiatric guidance tend to become stigmatized, and apprehension of that stigma, heightened by the tendency of people considering treatment to see themselves in the worst possible light, creates “a well-recognized reluctance to seek aid.”6
A private benefit alone does not justify a privilege. The private interests of psychotherapists and patients, while entitled to weight, do not suffice; the justification depends on a showing that the privilege also serves the public interest. The Court found that public good by again likening the situation to the attorney-client privilege and reasoning that psychotherapy promotes mental health.7 It described “[t]he mental health of our citizenry, no less than its physical health,” as “a public good of transcendent importance.”8 Because the patient is usually helped, the privilege serves the patient’s private interest, and the public benefits as well.9
That public-good footing is why courts reading Jaffee say the privilege is not rooted in any constitutional right of privacy but in a public good that overrides the quest for relevant evidence.10
The Court’s own illustration came from the case before it. Police officers who protect a community face the risk of physical harm and also stressful circumstances that may produce anxiety, depression, fear, or anger. The whole community may suffer if officers cannot receive effective counseling after traumatic incidents, either because trained officers leave the profession prematurely or because those in need of treatment remain on the job.11
The attorney-client analogy also does work after the privilege is recognized. Courts follow it to decide waiver: a plaintiff waives the psychotherapist-patient privilege by doing the sort of thing that would waive the attorney-client privilege, such as basing a claim on the therapist’s communications with the plaintiff, or, as with the marital privilege, selectively disclosing part of a privileged communication to gain an advantage in litigation.12 The section on holder and waiver returns to those rules.
The other side of the ledger is the evidence a privilege takes away, and the Court measured that loss against a world with no privilege. In that world, patients would often refuse to make disclosures against their interests, so the statements a litigant hopes to obtain would never exist.13 Because those communications would be unlikely to come into being without protection, sacrificing the privilege’s public and private interests for a modest evidentiary benefit would serve no greater truth-seeking function than recognizing the privilege.14 A statement never made cannot be discovered, so a litigant denied a privileged conversation ends up no worse off than one whose adversary stayed silent. Jaffee’s own facts fit this account: an officer who expects a suit and has no assurance of secrecy has the greatest reason to leave unsaid whatever the family hoped to find.
The same ledger explains why the Court’s reasoning stops at the treatment of the mind. What changes on both entries when the treatment is for a torn ligament rather than for nightmares?
In that scene the facts that weaken the benefit also raise the cost. Because physical ailments can often be treated on examination, objective information, and tests, secrecy adds little to care, and the findings exist regardless of what the patient says.15 A privilege there would suppress evidence a litigant could otherwise obtain, and it would buy almost nothing in return.
The Court’s accounting is instrumental: it justifies the privilege by the useful behavior it encourages, which is candid disclosure in treatment.16 An instrumental argument rests on a prediction about what patients would do without the privilege, and such predictions are hard to test. A privilege’s costs appear in the courtroom while its benefits are difficult to measure, so privileges rest largely on assumptions, some highly probable and others highly problematic.17 The dissent pressed the point. Psychotherapy was a thriving practice before any psychotherapist privilege existed, and the Court offered no evidence that many patients have litigation in the back of their minds.18 A common reply is that everyone thinks trusting a therapist is essential, that therapy depends on frank disclosure of personal and embarrassing matters, and that therapists are ethically required to warn patients of any limits on confidentiality. On that view, the privilege should not be doubted merely because empirical verification is unavailable.19
Privacy offers a second footing that does not depend on any prediction. On the privacy rationale, individual privacy matters not only because it allows room for personal autonomy, permits necessary emotional release, and promotes free self-evaluation, but also as an end in itself. Compelled disclosure inflicts two harms: the embarrassment of having secrets revealed to the public and the forced breach of an entrusted confidence.20 Those harms occur whether or not the patient would have spoken without the privilege. The Supreme Court acknowledged the embarrassment and disgrace that disclosure may cause and concluded that the privilege serves important private interests, but it placed its weight on the instrumental rationale.21 That is the account to give when an exam asks for the Court’s reasoning.
Reason and Experience
Jaffee next looked outside the case for confirmation that the privilege passes the reason-and-experience test, and it found that confirmation in the States, whose “uniform judgment” and “unanimous judgment that some form of psychotherapist privilege is appropriate” the Court invoked.23 The inference from state practice to experience is direct. One federal judge cannot watch a privilege work over years of practice, but the States could, and their widespread adoption of it “strongly suggests that experience with it has been favorable.”24
The other half of the phrase, reason, looks to the nature of the communications. A court applying the same two-part test reasoned that a psychotherapist’s diagnosis may involve matters a patient regards as highly personal, that disclosure would frequently be “embarrassing to the point of mortification,” and that unrestrained disclosure might discourage people from seeking psychiatric help. “Reason thus supports recognition of some form of privilege.”25
It does not matter whether a State acted by statute or by judicial decision. The same decision counted the States that recognize the privilege “either by judicial decision or statute” alike.26 The Court had already accepted in Funk v. United States that a consistent body of state policy determinations reflects reason and experience.
The States do not all draw the privilege the same way. The Court conceded divergence among them on the types of therapy relationships protected and the exceptions recognized,27 but it treated those variations as too limited to undermine the force of the States’ unanimous judgment.28 The consensus has to exist at the level of the privilege itself, not at the level of every detail. A later court noted that Jaffee did not demand uniformity on every application. It extended the privilege to licensed social workers because the reasons for protecting psychiatrists and psychologists “apply with equal force to treatment by a clinical social worker.” It rejected a balancing test because a promise of confidentiality contingent on a judge’s later evaluation “would eviscerate the effectiveness of the privilege,” not because other jurisdictions had rejected balancing.29
Jaffee’s own facts show why state protection alone would fall short. An Illinois statute makes conversations between a therapist and her patients privileged from compelled disclosure in any civil or criminal proceeding, and it defines “therapist” broadly enough to include social workers. The privilege claim would surely have been upheld had the family sued in an Illinois state court, at least on the state wrongful-death claim.30 Without a federal privilege, protection would depend on the forum the plaintiff chose. Because even the mere possibility of disclosure may impede treatment,31 a patient who cannot know in advance which forum will hear a later suit gets little comfort from a promise honored in only one.
The Advisory Committee that drafted the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence in 1972 pointed the same way, at least in part. Even the dissent acknowledges that the Committee recommended a “psychotherapist privilege” of sorts, though the draft covered only psychotherapy conducted by a person authorized to practice medicine or licensed or certified as a psychologist.32 Inclusion in the draft matters because omission counts against a privilege. In United States v. Gillock the Court had refused to add a state legislative privilege in part because the Committee’s draft contained none, and the same reasoning favors a privilege the draft did include.
Courts now run this inquiry whenever a litigant asks for a new federal privilege. Judge Tatel’s separate opinion in In re Grand Jury Subpoena: Judith Miller, a reporter’s-privilege case, set out the Jaffee method in sequence. Guided by Jaffee’s reasoning, the first question is whether reason and experience justify recognizing a privilege at all. The second is whether the privilege should be qualified or absolute, and the third is whether it covers the communications at issue.33 The opinion illustrates the method; it is not the court’s holding.
The method points the other way when its signals are missing. A privilege for parent–minor child communications has been recommended but has received little judicial approval. Privileges for scientific researcher-subject communications and for self-critical analysis have fared only somewhat better.34 Whatever the emotional weight of family confidences, a litigant who can point to little state policy and no Advisory Committee support has shown only the private-interest half of the Jaffee showing.
The same result follows when a litigant seeks a privilege for materials produced in a government investigation. In In re Qwest Communications International, the court found no grounds to buck the trend of declining to create new privileges. There was no groundswell in the state legislatures, and no such privilege was among the nine originally proposed for the Federal Rules of Evidence. The Supreme Court, the court added, has said it is “especially reluctant to recognize a privilege in an area where it appears that Congress has considered the relevant competing concerns but has not provided the privilege itself.”35 Jaffee, in short, supplies a method that ordinarily ends in refusal. The psychotherapist privilege passed because state consensus and Advisory Committee support both pointed the same way.
Steps two and three do most of the work, since a stem that stresses how sensitive a relationship is speaks only to step one. A privilege with a strong private interest but a thin state record and no Advisory Committee support fails the method, which is why a federal court in that position declines to create it.
The Dissent’s Objections
Justice Scalia’s dissent is the fullest statement of the case against the privilege. It should be read as the opposing view, not as the law, but its objections are the ones a litigant resisting a new federal privilege can be expected to raise.
The dissent began with the price of the privilege. Every rule that excludes reliable evidence exacts a cost, but the person who pays differs from rule to rule. When a confession is excluded under Miranda v. Arizona, the victim is the impersonal State or the public at large. Under this privilege the victim is more likely an individual, such as the family seeking the counselor’s notes in Jaffee, who is prevented from proving a valid claim or, worse, from establishing a valid defense, so that the courts “become themselves the instruments of wrong.”37
That cost explains his insistence on the traditional posture toward privileges. In the Rule 501 cases the Court had decided before Jaffee, it had rejected new privileges and construed existing ones narrowly, and the Court today, he wrote, “ignores this traditional judicial preference for the truth, and ends up creating a privilege that is new, vast, and ill defined.”38 The majority and the dissent shared the test; they disagreed about how convincing the showing must be. Scalia had “no quarrel” with the premises that effective psychotherapy benefits patients and serves a larger interest in a mentally stable society. He found the Court’s analysis “insufficiently convincing to satisfy the high standard we have set for rules that ‘are in derogation of the search for truth.’”39
His doubts came as three questions: whether the values at stake are important enough, whether psychotherapy’s contribution to them is distinctive, and whether ordinary evidentiary rules are destructive enough to therapy to justify the privilege. On distinctiveness, he observed that people have long worked out their difficulties with parents, siblings, best friends, and bartenders, none of whom received a privilege against testifying. He asked whether the average citizen’s mental health would suffer more from losing a therapist or from losing a mother’s advice, and he noted that there is no mother-child privilege.40 The majority’s answer, developed above, tied the privilege to the confidence and trust on which psychotherapy itself depends and measured it against the States’ practice.
The deterrence objection is the most empirical of the dissent’s points. Scalia asked how likely it is that a person will be deterred from seeking counseling, or from being truthful in it, by fear of later disclosure, and how far a privilege would reduce that deterrent. The Court, he said, did not try to answer the first question and could not answer the second, because the answer depends on the scope of the privilege, which the Court found it “neither necessary nor feasible to delineate.” A therapist who can promise a patient no more than that a court will not compel disclosure unless the patient describes a harmful act gives so little assurance that the privilege might produce little benefit. That, he added, is not a fanciful example, at least with respect to extension of the privilege to social workers.41
He also challenged the Court’s claim that little truth-finding capacity would be lost. If, without a privilege, “much of the desirable evidence . . . is unlikely to come into being,” he asked, how did psychotherapy become a thriving practice before the privilege was invented, and were patients paying to lie to their analysts all those years? The evidence-generating effect, if any, depends on the privilege’s scope, which the Court declined to consider. He doubted that most, or even many, of those who seek counseling have litigation in the back of their minds, and he said the Court provided no evidence that they do.42
He added that a patient who wishes the benefits of telling the truth must also accept the adverse consequences. He granted that most statements to a psychotherapist will be only marginally relevant, and that sparing patients and therapists needless intrusion and expense is a legitimate purpose. But that purpose, he wrote, could be achieved “by means short of excluding even evidence that is of the most direct and conclusive effect.”43
On state law, the dissent noted that the Court itself concedes divergence among the States on the types of therapy relationships protected and the exceptions recognized. Resting a new federal privilege on the States’ unanimous judgment that some form of it is appropriate is, he said, like announcing a federal common law of torts on the strength of their unanimous judgment that some form of tort law is appropriate. In both cases the state laws vary so much that parties and lower federal judges have “barely a clue as to what its content might be.”44 He found the Advisory Committee support thin as well. The only authority the Committee invoked was a student note, which in turn discussed a single unpublished trial-court opinion that cited no other cases.45 And he read the Committee’s draft as a recommendation against the privilege at issue, since it covered only psychotherapy by a person authorized to practice medicine or licensed or certified as a psychologist. In his view, calling the draft a “psychotherapist privilege” obscured that condemnation and even converted it into an endorsement.46
His objection about method matters for the next section. The Court, he wrote, devoted the bulk of its opinion to the “much easier question” of whether a psychotherapist-patient privilege should exist at all.47 The majority’s answer on social workers is brief: the reasons for recognizing a privilege for psychiatrists and psychologists “apply with equal force to treatment by a clinical social worker.”48 The section on licensed psychotherapists returns to that exchange.
Finally, the dissent observed that the Court had the benefit of fourteen amicus briefs supporting the respondents, most from organizations such as the American Psychiatric Association and the National Association of Social Workers, and none supporting the petitioner. That was no surprise, he wrote, because no self-interested organization is devoted to pursuing the truth in the federal courts, and the expectation is that the Court will have that interest “prominently—indeed, primarily—in mind.”49
The majority answered each objection. It treated the evidentiary cost as modest, since the most sensitive statements would often never be made without a privilege. It weighed that cost against the private and public benefits of effective therapy, against the States’ unanimous judgment, and against the Advisory Committee’s proposal.50
The next section turns from why the privilege exists to what it covers, beginning with who counts as a licensed psychotherapist.